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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW
Introduction
As a northern European humanist' and a biblical
scholar Philip Melanchthon was both philosophically and
theologically inclined to encourage Christian piety and
good works. In his tertius usus legis Melanchthon
introduced to Lutheran theological vocabulary the
'Northern European humanism may be distinguished
from the Renaissance of southern Europe by its focus on the
reform of the church and its emphasis on Christian piety.
With its accent on the ad fontes return to the sources of
western civilization and more importantly, its return to the
biblical foundations of the Christian religion, it provided
many of the materials to be used by the evangelicals in
their desire to reform the church theologically. Two
northern European humanists figure prominently in the life
of Philip Melanchthon. Johann Reuchlin, Melanchthon's great
uncle, was instrumental in guiding the education of
Melanchthon, especially after Melanchthon's father died when
he was eleven years of age. Reuchlin's fame rested on his
reputation as a philologist and he is best remembered as a
scholar and advocate of Hebraic studies. It was Reuchlin
who encouraged the Elector to appoint Melanchthon to his new
university at Wittenberg as a teacher of Greek. The relationship between Melanchthon and Erasmus was less direct
but more enduring (the relationship between Melanchthon and
Reuchlin ended when Melanchthon embraced the theology of
Luther). The two men corresponded throughout their lives
although they never met. Melanchthon shared with Erasmus
the skills of a philologist, the reputation of a stylist, an
abiding concern for unity in the church, and an emphasis on
personal piety. They differed in that the focus of reform
in the church for Melanchthon was theological while for
Erasmus it was for reform in morality and church structure.
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distinctive pedagogical or instructional function of the
Decalogue as the means by which God revealed his will for
the regenerate and instructed them in righteousness.2 It
In 1516 Erasmus published the Novum Instrumentum,
the editio Greek edition of the New Testament. The
importance of this publication for Melanchthon and Luther
can be found in its use as the basis of Luther's German
translation of the New Testament (in the preparation of
which Luther frequently utilized Melanchthon's skills in
Greek). Erasmus typifies the northern European humanist.
His Handbook of the Militant Christian (Enchiridion Militis
Christiani) characterizes his personal striving for
perfection in Christian piety. The Praise of Folly (Morias
Egkomion) satirizes the church and the absurdity of
superficial morality. His sermon (really a treatise)
Concerning the Immense Mercy of God (De Immensa Dei
Misericordia) underscored his desire to base theology in the
Scriptures (in this case, Saint Paul) and his concern for
making the Gospel a factor in Christian living. In his, On
Mending the Peace of the Church (De Sarcienda Ecclesiae
Concordia) Erasmus articulates his hope to restore peace to
the church through a program of reform based on tolerance
and evangelical enlightenment. Erasmus' reform was doomed
by the distrust of both the Roman and evangelical parties
but his concerns were ultimately incorporated, in part, by
the "Reformation" Decrees of the Council of Trent (Session
22). Helpful in understanding Erasmus as theologian, in
relation both to the church fathers and to the evangelical
movement is John William Aldridge, The Hermeneutic of
Erasmus (Richmond, VA: John Knox Press, 1966), passim. On
the influence of Erasmus and Reuchlin on Melanchthon, see
Carl S. Meyer, "Christian Humanism and the Reformation,"
Concordia Theological Monthly 41 (November 1970): 637-647.
The definitive study on Melanchthon as humanist is Wilhelm
Maurer, Der Junge Melanchthon zwischen Humanismus and
Reformatio, 2 vols. (Goettingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht,
1967 and 1969). The first volume is entitled "Der
Humanist." The second volume concerns Melanchthon as
theologian.
2 That Luther also taught a pedagogical function of
the Law will be maintained and supported later in this study
(Chapter III). The point here is that Melanchthon
introduced the terminology which has been adopted through
the Formula of Concord as the classic expression of the
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is not remarkable that a Christian theologian should be
concerned about the Decalogue and Christian sanctification. This function of the Law, however, raised
distinctive questions and problems for the first generation
of evangelical Lutheran theologians. If sinners are
justified by grace, through faith, alone, apart from works
of the Law, and if the Law always accuses sin, then
logically it would seem that the Law has no distinctive
function for those who are righteous by grace through faith
and the Law has only a negative, accusing function for the
Christian who sins. How then can there be a pedagogical,
non-accusatory function of the Law?
For Roman theologians, the problem did not arise
since justification by grace through faith was understood
as necessarily including caritas in fulfilling the works of
the Law. The sola gratia, sola fides was denied.3 For
continuing validity of the Law for the regenerate. On
Luther's relation to the Formula of Concord, Article VI,
"Third Use of the Law," see Armin W. Schuetze, "On the
Third use of the Law: Luther's Position in the Antinomian
Debate (FC, VI)," in No Other Gospel: Essays in
Commemoration of the 400th Anniversary of the Formula of
Concord, ed. Arnold J. Koelpin (Milwaukee: Northwestern
Publishing House, 1980), pp. 207-228. For a carefully
prepared opposing opinion (that is, that the third use of
the Law vocabulary is not descriptive of Luther's position
and in fact distorts it) see Ragnar Bring, Das Verhaeltnis
von Glauben and Werken in der Lutherischen Theologie
(Munich: Kaiser Verlag, 1955), passim, but especially pp.
39-67.
3 Although the theological positions and vocabulary of the various Roman schools at the beginning of the
sixteenth century were anything but monolithic, there was
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other theologians the problem did not arise because the
continuing validity of the Law was summarily rejected. 4
Lutheran evangelicals denied both solutions to the problem
of the Law in relation to the Gospel, contending that the
Roman position obscured the Gospel and the antinomian
position denied the Law and perverted the Gospel. Against
the work righteousness and scholasticism of Roman
theologians and the antinomianism of some evangelical
agreement among both Dominican (Thomist) theologians and
Franciscan (following Scotus) theologians on the
progressive nature of justification and the necessity of
good works for salvation. Hubert Jedin provides a helpful
and detailed picture of the process by which Dominican,
Franciscan, and other theologians reached consensus at the
Council of Trent in a formulation which specifically
rejected the evangelical understanding of forensic
justification and the sola gratia, sola fide of the
reformation. Hubert Jedin, A History of the Council of
Trent, 2 vols., trans. Ernest Graff (St. Louis: B. Herder
Book Co., 1961), 2: 166-169, 239-316. This consensus is
best expressed in the eleventh canon of the article On
Justification: "if any one saith, that men are justified,
either by the sole imputation of the justice of Christ, or
by the sole remission of sins, to the exclusion of the
grace and the charity which is poured forth in their hearts
by the Holy Ghost, and is inherent in them; or even that
the grace, whereby we are justified, is only the favour of
God; let him be anathema." The Canons and Decrees of the
Sacred and Ecumenical Council of Trent, trans. J.
Waterworth (Chicago: Christian Symbolic Publication Soc.,
n.d.), p. 46.
4 The antinomian theology of John Agricola will be
investigated in chapter III. The Zwickau prophets and
Thomas Muentzer, with their emphasis on private
revelation,and the iconoclasts of Karlstadt also bring to
mind movements within the reformation which disregarded the
distinction between Law and Gospel and denied the function
of the Scriptures in mediating the will of God through the
Law. On Luther and his relation to Muentzer and Karlstadt,
see Heinrich Bornkamm, Luther in Mid-Career (1521-1530),
ed. Karin Bornkamm, trans. E. Theodore Bachmann
(Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1983), pp. 51-83 and 143-181.
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theologians, the theologians of the Augsburg Confession
affirmed both Law and Gospel, distinguishing Law and Gospel
but not separating them, affirming the Gospel as the
forgiveness of sin and the Law as God's judgment on sin.
But if justification is by grace alone and the Law always
accuses, what is the function of the Law in the life of the
regenerate? If it does not motivate obedience (for this is
the function of the Gospel) how is one to affirm a positive
function of the Law without confusing Law and Gospel and
without plunging the evangelical witness into the work
righteous theology of the Roman party?
The answer lay in the evangelical understanding of
forensic justification. Justification is not a process but
an event happening in a moment of time by which God by
grace, through faith, for the sake of Christ, declares the
sinner righteous. Forensic justification thus encompasses
both the imputation of the righteousness of Christ and the
non-imputation of sin. But what of the man justified?
What has changed for him? His relationship to God has
changed from an antagonistic relationship of fear and
judgment to a filial relationship of love and forgiveness.
His heart has been enabled to love God. Yet he remains a
man. He still has within himself his previous sinful
nature. He thus experiences the warfare of flesh and
spirit Saint Paul describes in Romans 7. In this conflict
of the new man by grace and the old man of sin, the Spirit
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of God works through Word and sacrament to assure faith and
strengthen renewal. This revealed Word contains the
unchanging will of God in the Law as well as the abiding
promises of Christ in the Gospel. In order that the
Christian sinner-saint might not be left to his own devices
or centered in his own opinions, the Spirit of God through
the Word of God instructs the Christian in that which
pleases God so that the new heart of the Christian may
choose without coercion the will of God, although he
remains spiritually weak and encumbered by sin.
Justification is distinguished from this process of renewal
(sanctification) as God's forensic decree establishing the
relationship which empowers the Christian to do that which
pleases God. But justification and sanctification,
although distinguished (in that justification by grace,
through faith, for Christ's sake, must precede
sanctification and good works) dare not be separated from
one another. In the economy of God justification
necessitates sanctification and sanctification is dependent
on justification.
This brief overview indicates the theological
conjunction of the third use of the Law, forensic
justification, and regenerate free will first articulated
in the theological writings of Philip Melanchthon. The
title of this dissertation is not intended to suggest that
forensic justification, third use of the Law, and
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regenerate free will are in some sense logical constructs
by which Melanchthon sought to synthesize Law and Gospel as
the basis of Christian ethics. Rather, because Melanchthon
accepted the divine Scriptures as the norm of Christian
teaching, these terms expressed what he understood the
Scriptures themselves to teach regarding justification, the
instruction of the Law, and the regenerate free will: (1)
Man is saved by grace, through faith, for the sake of
Christ alone; (2) The Christian has a continuing need for
instruction in the will of God through the Decalogue
because of his dual nature as sinner and saint; (3) God
holds the Christian responsible for choosing the divine
will as the Holy Spirit works through the Word, instructing
the renewed yet sinful heart of the Christian in the Law of
God.
It is the purpose of this study to investigate how
forensic justification, the third use of the Law, and the
free will of the regenerate Christian complement one
another in Melanchthon's theology. The distinction of Law
and Gospel, justification and sanctification, "old man and
new man," sin and grace provide the pedagogical framework
for this expression of evangelical theology. This study
therefore focuses on the fundamental distinction basic to
understanding the Scriptures and articulating Christian
theology -- the distinction between Law and Gospel. In so
doing, it underscores Melanchthon's great and continuing
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legacy as the pedagogue of the Lutheran reformation.s
But it also raises the important question of whether
Melanchthon in formalizing the theology of the Lutheran
church truly conveyed the spirit and insights of Martin
Luther, or ossified Luther's prophetic and pastoral dynamic
into a propositional theology based on scholastic
(Aristotelian) distinctions and humanist presupposition?6
The Formula of Concord, Solid Declaration, affirms
that "The distinction between Law and Gospel is an
especially brilliant light which serves the purpose that
the Word of God may be rightly divided and the writings of
s Melanchthon's contribution to the Lutheran
reformation as educator and dogmatist have been universally
recognized. For his contribution to German liberal arts
education he has been accorded the title "Praeceptor
Germaniae." The definitive work in this area remains Karl
Hartfelder, Philip Melanchthon als Praeceptor Germaniae
(Nieuwkoop: B. De Graf, 1964), passim. Reprint of the 1889
Berlin edition.
6 Many have made this accusation, from a variety
of theological points of view and for a variety of
theological reasons. A sampling would include: Richard R.
Caemmerer, "The Melanchthonian Blight," Concordia
Theological Monthly 18 (May 1947): 115-36. Jaroslav
Pelikan, From Luther to Kirkegaard (St. Louis: Concordia
Publishing House, 1963), pp. 24-75. Ragner Bring, Das
Verhaeltnis von Glauben and Werken in der Lutherischen
Theologie. Karl Holl, Die Rechtfertigungslehre im Licht
der Geschicht des Protestantismus (Tuebingen: J.C.B. Mohr,
1922), passim but especially pp. 16-27. Karl Holl,
"Gogarten's Understanding of Luther," trans. Walter F.
Bense, in What Did Luther Understand by Religion, ed. and
trans. Luther Adams and Walter F. Bense (Philadelphia:
Fortress Press, 1977), pp. 111-120. Albrecht Ritschl, The
Christian Doctrine of Justification and Reconciliation,
trans. and ed. E. R. Mackintosch and A. B. Macaulay
(Edinburgh: T. and T. Clark, 1900), passim. Frank
Hildebrandt, Melanchthon: Alien or Ally? (Cambridge:
University Press, 1946), passim.
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the holy prophets and apostles may be explained and
understood correctly."' Theologically, the sixteenth
century evangelical reformation may be described as a
conscious desire to define Law and Gospel according to the
testimony of Scripture alone. The Scriptures and not the
accumulated philosophical and theological thought of the
previous sixteen centuries were to serve as the norm of
Christian theology. The evangelical affirmation that "the
Law always accuses"8 and thus does not share a complementary function with the Gospel but rather stands in an
adversarial role to the Gospel broke radically with what
had become the scholastic teaching of the Western Church.
The Gospel conversely and in contradistinction to the Law
was described by the evangelicals in accordance with Saint
Paul's epistles as the imputation of the righteousness of
Christ and the non-imputation of sin.
7 FC, SD, VI, 1. see also Ap.,IV,5.
Citations to the Lutheran Confessions will be made
according to document, article number, and paragraph number
in order to facilitate the use of the German-Latin
Bekenntnisschriften and Tappert's English translation. Die
Bekenntnisschriften der evangelisch-lutherischen Kirche
(Goettingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1967 [sixth edition];
The Book of Concord, trans. and ed. Theodore G. Tappert
(Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1959). The following
commonly used abbreviations will be used: AC: Augsburg
Confession; Ap: Apology to the Augsburg Confession; SA: The
Smalcald Articles; TPP: Treatise on the Power and Primary
of the Pope; SC: Small Catechism; LC: Large Catechism;
FC,Ep: Formula of Concord, Epitome; FC,SD: Formula of
Concord, Solid Declaration. English translations in this
dissertation will be those of the Tappert edition.

8Ap,IV,38.
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This formulation of Law and Gospel stands in stark
contrast to the doctrine of justification in the sixteenth
century Roman church.9 Justifacere was used to translate
the Greek dikaioo and etymologically understood as the
transformation by which God "made righteous" the
unrighteous. The Western Church had rightly condemned
Pelagianism. Yet through its transformational and
progressional theology of justification it had made the
continuing good works of the transformed Christian an
essential ingredient in his reconciliation to God. For
faith to be salvific it must be infused by works of love
through which the Christian demonstrated that he was
justifacere. The law of works which had been banished from
the front door by the church's proscription of Pelagianism
entered the church through the back door when justifacere
was understood to describe not the conversion of the
Christian but the process of renewal. This process was
described and amplified by the schoolmen of the Middle Ages
with a variety of definitions and distinctions. Although
diverging among themselves in specifics, the schoolmen
shared in common a denial that one is saved by grace,
through faith, for the sake of Christ alone, viewing grace
9 A concise, accurate, and helpful summary of the
evolution of Augustinian thought and its consequences for
the western church's understanding of Justifacere is
provided in the paper released by the U.S. Lutheran-Roman
Catholic Dialogue entitled "Justification by Faith" in
Origins: NC Documentary Service 13, no. 17 (October 6,
1983), pp. 279-281.
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as an infused quality, faith as intellectual assent, and
Christ as the new Law giver whose death atoned for man's
condition of sin but not for his voluntary sin.
Justification described the process whereby the infused
grace of God and the intellectual assent of man enabled the
regenerated Christian to know and to choose the will of God
revealed by Christ. In this process the Christian became
righteous before God and justified.'° The admixture of
Law and Gospel resulted, from an evangelical point of view,
in a falsification of both Law and Gospel. The evangelical
emphasis on sola qratia, sola fide, and soli per Christum
'At the opening of the debate on justification
at the Council of Trent, Jedin notes the presentation of
Bertano, Bishop of Fano, a Thomist and an advisor to the
papal legates. "Bertano begins by examining the two basic
concepts of justice and faith. There is a three-fold
justice, namely, the justice of God who promised to send us
his Son for the forgiveness of sin; the justice of Christ,
that is, the merits of his Passion and death, which must be
appropriatd by us and become our own (iustia inhaerens);
finally the justice of good works by which we prove
ourselves to be just. The first justice does not justify;
only the second does so because it effects the remission of
sins and fits us for the justice of good works. . . . Only
faith in the Gospel, that is, faith united to hope and
charity justifies. . . . Faith freely bestowed by God is
actively accepted by man, hence he does not remain purely
passive in the process of justification. St. Augustine
says: 'He who made thee without thee will not save thee
without thee,' and St. Thomas declares that 'when we are
justified, we assent to God's justice.' The difference
between the Catholic and Lutheran doctrine of justification
appears on three heads. Bertano declared: "the sola fide
formula is too narrow because it excludes hope and charity;
faith does not contain personal justification; good works
are not merely tokens of justification, they are an
essential element of it." Jedin concludes: "It can hardly
be contested that Bertano's note evidences a profound
insight into the real doctrinal differences and does not
fasten on mere formulas." Jedin, p. 185.
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restored the Gospel to the church and placed the Law in its
proper subordinate position to the promises of Christ. But
it left the evangelical church with a problem of
terminology as it sought to redefine on a biblical basis
the meaning of "Law," "Gospel," "justification,"
"sanctification," "regeneration," and "renewal." It is
with this process of redefinition that this study is
concerned.
Philip Melanchthon occupies a pre-eminent position
in this process of epitomizing and defining the evangelical
insights of the Lutheran reformation. Pedagogue,
classicist, philologist, logician, historian and biblical
scholar, Melanchthon brought the academic talents necessary
to formulate into theological propositions the insights of
Luther, whom he highly esteemed. Through the editions of
his Loci Communes Theologicae, first published is 1521,
Melanchthon sought to epitomize in "Commonplaces" the basic
themes of biblical teaching and to refute the errors of
scholasticism. These copies or commonplaces expanded in
size and scope through the second edition of 1535, and
culminated in a kind of Summa Christianae Doctrinae in the
final Latin edition of 1559."
"The most complete gathering of Melanchthon's
writings is to be found is the Corpus Reformatorum, 28
vols., compiled by Carol Bretschneider, ed. Henry Bindsell
(Brunswig and Halis: C. A. Schwetschke and Son,
1842-1858). Melanchthon's Loci are found in vol. 21, which
includes the first edition of 1521; fragmentary student
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The two topics with which Melanchthon was most
consistently occupied were those of justification and the
Law. In his descriptions of both justification and the Law
one notes a development in theological precision. Regarding justification, Melanchthon's theology evolved into
the vocabulary of forensic justification found in later
editions of the Loci (1535, 1559) and subsequently in the
theology of confessional Lutheranism through the Epitome
and Solid Declaration of the Formula of Concord, Articles
IV and V. With respect to the Law, Melanchthon in the 1535
edition introduced a third function of the Law in addition
to the civil and theological functions described in earlier
writings, including the Augsburg Confession and its
Apology. t2

This three part division of the functions of

notes based on Melanchthon's lectures on the Loci,
published in 1533; the second edition of 1535; and the
third and final edition of 1559. The Corpus Reformatorum
includes only the Latin editions. Hereafter it will be
cited CR, with volume and page number. In this century
Robert Stupperich has provided the closest thing to a
critical edition of Melanchthon's works in his selected
edition of Melanchthons Werke in Auswahl (Studienausgabe),
7 vols. (presently), ed. Robert Stupperich (Guetersloh:
Mohn and Co., 1953 through present). Melanchthon's Loci
are reproduced in the Studienausgabe in the two part second
volume, first (1521) and last (1559) editions, with
footnote references to the 1535 edition. The
Studienausgabe is commonly abbreviated St.A. and will be
cited in this manner with volume and page number.
"In the Ap Melanchthon describes the first use
of the Law ("civil use") in these terms: "For God wants
this civil discipline to restrain the unspiritual and to
preserve it he has given laws, learning, teaching,
governments and penalties." (Ap,IV,22) He speaks of the
second use ("theological use") several paragraphs later.
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the Law is reproduced in the Formula of Concord, article VI
and has remained a part of Lutheran confessional vocabulary.
Concomitant with Melanchthon's specification of
the nature of justification and the instructional function
of the Law is his concern to articulate precisely the
psychology of the regenerate will as it freely chooses to
know and to do God's will revealed in the Holy Scriptures.
Through the vocabulary of•forensic justification
Melanchthon maintains the sola gratia and sola fide of the
Scriptures. Through the third use of the Law Melanchthon
affirms the abiding validity of the Law as revealed in
Scripture against both radical enthusiast opinions and
scholastic Roman theology. Through the free choice
(arbitrium)" of the regenerate will Melanchthon affirms
"For the law always accuses and terrifies consciences. It
does not justify, because a conscience terrified by the law
flees before God's judgment" (Ap,IV,3E). The third
function ("pedagogical use") of the law is summarized in
the FC as follows: ". . . after they are reborn and
although the flesh still inheres in them, [the law gives]
them on that account a definite rule according to which
they should pattern and regulate their entire life"
(FC,Ep,VI,l). "Those who have been born anew through the
Holy Spirit, who have been converted to the Lord and from
whom the veil of Moses has been taken away, learn from the
law to live and walk in the law" (FC,ED,VI,1).
"For consistency arbitrium will be translated as
"choice" and voluntas as "will." The distinction will be
developed in chapters IV & V. Suffice it here that
voluntas in the psychology of the mature Melanchthon
described that faculty of man which is bound by the
"affections" of sin and therefore is not free, and
arbitrium described the free choice the regenerated
Christian heart can make to obey the commandments of God,
understanding at the same time that arbitrium is the
consequence of grace worked in the human heart by the Holy
Spirit mediated by Word and sacrament.

15
the individual's ability to act on the basis of the faith
God gives by grace in living a life responsive to God and
responsible to God. In consequence one notes in
Melanchthon a continuing emphasis on the benefits of prayer
and the necessity of good works.
Overview of this Study
The place of the Law in the context of the Christian
life has remained a primary focus of Christian theology
since Saint Paul penned his letter to the congregations of
Galatia. In addressing the question, what function does the
Law have in the life of the Christian, several attendant
questions come to the fore.

Since the distinctive witness

of the Christian faith is to the Gospel of Jesus Christ,
does the Mosaic Law have a continuing function for the
regenerate? If the Law remains valid for the regenerate,
how does it relate to that Gospel? Does it complete or
perfect the Gospel? Is the Gospel a new Law? Is it the
means by which the righteousness of the Law is attained?
Does sin remain in the "justified?" Are Law and Gospel
mutually exclusive messages of God whereby one's existence
is either within the framework of Law or the framework of
the Gospel? Does grace exclude all human efforts? Does the
Gospel exclude the Law? Obviously the answer to these
questions and others impinges on one's understanding of sin,
grace, Law, Gospel, justification, sanctification, and
righteousness.
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Although Christian theologians have answered these
questions in a variety of ways, for the ten centuries
between the conversion of Saint Augustine and the Lutheran
reformation, the Western Church recognized the priority of
grace and the necessity of good works in the process of
justification, whereby the sinner was made righteous before
God. In making a man righteous, God infused within that man
qualities of love which enabled him to keep the Law. Only a
faith informed by loving obedience to the Law was viewed as
salvific.. The painstaking work of Thomas Aquinas wed this
western, Augustinian tradition to the dialectic of
Aristotelian logic in a synthesis which by the time of the
Council of Trent had become a theological norm for the
Church of Rome." It was on the basis of this
'
4 It would be anachronistic to say that the Roman
church responded to the theology of Luther and Melanchthon
in the 1520s, 30s and 40s on the basis of the Council of
Trent, but it would be appropriate to say that the theology
later canonized at Trent lay behind the Roman responses to
the reformation in the first half of the sixteenth century.
The Roman rejection of forensic justification has been cited
above (footnote 11). Underlying this rejection of the sola
fide and justification as the imputation of the righteousness of Christ and the non-imputation of sin is the Roman
understanding of sin itself. In the Decree concerning
Original Sin it is affirmed, "If anyone denies, that by the
grace of our Lord Jesus Christ, which is conferred in baptism, the guilt of original sin is remitted, or even asserts
that the whole of that which has the true and proper nature
of sin is not taken away; but says that it is only erased,
or not imputed; let him be anathema." The Canons and
Decrees of the Sacred and Ecumenical Council of Trent, p.
24. What remains in those born again is not sin ("as being
truly and properly sin in those born again") but it is "of
sin and inclines to sin." Ibid. The evangelical view of
the reborn as "sinner-saint" is thus categorically rejected,
as well as its implications for justification, the Law, and
free will.
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scholastic vocabulary that Roman theologians responded to
the sola gratia and sola fide vocabulary of the
evangelical reformation. In appealing to the Old
Testament and to Pauline theology the evangelicals
formulated their theology of justification in a way which
radically departed from scholastic definitions and
understandings." To understand this evangelical
departure from traditional Augustinian theology, one must
first appreciate the theological vocabulary the Western
Church had inherited from those who represented themselves
as holding to the Augustinian tradition. Therefore this
study begins with a reprise of conservative Augustinian
theology through the self-avowed Augustinian Thomas
Aquinas, with particular reference to the topics of
justification, the Law, and Christian obedience. This
background is essential in understanding the early theology of justification in both Luther and Melanchthon in the
context of later formulations and in understanding why the
early Luther is often contrasted with the forensic
vocabulary of the later Melanchthon by those who see in
"A helpful essay, positive in tone but written
by a Roman theologian, underscores the evangelical
departure from the scholastic synthesis of Law and Gospel,
justification and works. The essay relates to Luther's
later Galatians commentary but is equally applicable to
Melanchthon. Peter Manns, "Absolute and Incarnate Faith
-- Luther on Justification in the Galatians Commentary of
1531-1535," in Catholic Scholars Dialogue with Luther, ed.
Jared Wicks (Chicago: Loyola University Press, 1970), pp.
121-158.
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Melanchthon a denigration of Luther's theology. It is the
position of this writer that the mature Luther and
Melanchthon both affirmed forensic justification and that
many contemporary critics of Melanchthon's theology are in
fact arguing for a western, Augustinian view of
justification.
Although this thesis is an investigation of the
theology of Melanchthon, it is impossible to undertake
such a study without reference to his mentor and colleague
at * the University of Wittenberg, Martin Luther. For
twenty-eight years mutual esteem for one another's work, a
desire to remain faithful to Holy Scripture, and a shared
responsibility to the evangelical church intertwined the
lives and work of these two men. Differences of
temperament, personality, education, background, roles and
priorities might have isolated these men from one another,
but mutual respect and a shared commitment to the Holy
Scriptures and the preaching of the Gospel enabled these
men to use their talents in tandem, mutually complementing
one another in the explication of reformation theology.
Reformation theology did not spring full flower in
a moment of divine enlightenment. It developed slowly as
Luther and Melanchthon sought to explicate the teaching of
Scripture. It grew amidst controversy, both with theologians of the Roman church-and with theologians within
the evangelical movement itself. One is able to trace
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this theological growth in the writings of both Luther and
Melanchthon, particularly with reference to justification,
the Law, and Christian obedience. In describing the
mature position of Melanchthon regarding justification,
the Law and Christian obedience; this study traces his
theological growth throughout the 1520s, culminating in
the Augsburg Confession and its Apology.
Essential to this study is a recognition of the
reformers' continuing need to define and refine
terminology in order that their evangelical position might
not be misunderstood by its opponents or misrepresented by
deviant supporters. Especially with regard to the
distinctive functions of Law and Gospel the aberrations of
Agricola and his antinomian supporters are noted. This
controversy, beginning in the late 1520s and culminating
in Luther's antinomian Disputations in the late 1530s
resulted in a more precise use of terms and in less
ambiguity in doctrinal formulations. It is during this
period of time that Melanchthon specifies his forensic
description of justification, speaks of the Law's third
use, and begins to speak of the function of the regenerate
free will in obedience to the Word of God.
In the areas of justification, the Law, and
regenerate free will one finds little development or
amplification of Melanchthon's theology after 1535.
Despite continuing controversy and ongoing dialogue with
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the theologians of Rome, the reformed, and among the evangelicals themselves, Melanchthon's theology in his
writings and in the subsequent editions of his Loci
remains unchanged. Indeed, he often repeats himself
verbatim." This would suggest that Luther knew and
approved of the mature theology of Melanchthon, although
Melanchthon's formulations were his own and often distinct
from Luther's.
This survey of Melanchthon's theological development in his articulation of forensic justification, third
use of the Law and regenerate free will would indicate
that these emphases bear a close relationship to one
another, not merely as controverted issues, but in the
"That Melanchthon frequently quotes himself
from one writing to another is evident to anyone having
read his works. Peter Fraenkel remarks that "what we have
elsewhere called the 'propositional' aspect of the Gospel,
leads Melanchthon to think of the Church's continuity in
terms of a repetition of statements." Melanchthon's
contemporaries also noted this tendency, and "they used a
conventional expression to voice their complaint:
"Philippus canit eande cantilenam." Peter Fraenkel,
Testimonia Patrum: The Function of the Patristic Argument
in the Theology of Philip Melanchthon (Geneva: Librairie
E. Droz, 1961), p. 145. As professor of theology and of
the classics, one might suggest that Melanchthon was
simply reaffirming the pedagogical maxim: "Repetition is
the mother of study." But probably more germane to
Melanchthon's concern was theological precision. A
variety of ways of expressing the same truth may in fact
confuse that truth. In this Melanchthon's style differs
significantly from that of Luther, for whom paradox and
seeming self-contradiction were aspects of his theological
style. In consequence, one can cite Luther against Luther
on a variety of topics. Melanchthon is internally very
consistent. The problem for Melanchthon arises when one
attempts to make his theological formulations fit the mold
of Luther's theology.
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focusing on Melanchthon's theology. Any one of these
three emphases, viewed separately, might be misunderstood
(and they were so viewed and in consequence thus
misapplied -- by friend and foe alike). Forensic
justification apart from the continuing validity of the
Law might be abused as license for sin. Andreas
Osiander's rejection of forensic justification may be
viewed in this light. Certainly it was a continuing
charge leveled against the evangelicals by the Roman
party. The third function of the Law, viewed apart from
forensic justification and the Holy Spirit's renewal of
the regenerate will, might be misconstrued as a new
legalism and as a displacement of the Gospel. The Formula
of Concord, Article VI, is a commentary on such a concern
which arose (and continues to arise) among Lutheran
theologians. Emphasis on free choice apart from
Melanchthon's strong accent on the necessity of
justification prior to sanctification would appear
synergistic. Although Melanchthon clearly indicated the
priority of forensic justification to the renewal of the
regenerate free will, his students were less clear and
some of them taught a synergistic view condemned by
Formula of Concord, Article II.
Modern commentators often fault Melanchthon for
separating sanctification from justification. In fact,
through the vocabulary of forensic justification and the
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third use of the Law Melanchthon carefully distinguished
justification and sanctification. Distinguishing
justification and sanctification was especially necessary
pedagogically at a time when the Roman church and even
some among the evangelicals (for example: Osiander)
assumed the Western, Augustinian, "making righteous"
(justificare) concept of justification. Like a tripod,
forensic justification, third use of the Law, and
regenerate free will provided the foundation of
Melanchthon's Christian ethos, underscoring his humanist
concern for Christian doctrine and piety." If any
single leg of this tripod is emphasized disproportionate
to the others, the structure of Melanchthon's theology
tumbles into heterodoxy.
This study would suggest that many of the
detractors of Melanchthon as an evangelical apologist have
failed to view his theology as an organic whole and in
consequence have "put asunder" what Melanchthon had
carefully "joined together." Often one learns more about
the personal concerns of the critic or the theological
concerns of his school of thought than one learns about
Melanchthon. Moreover Melanchthon has suffered in
"This theme is expanded by Robert Stupperich
who writes of Melanchthon that "His whole life he devoted
to the task of challenging men to pietas et doctrina."
Robert Stupperich, "The Development of Melanchthon's
Theological-Philosophical World View," Lutheran World,
vol. 7 (September 1960): 171.
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consequence to his close association with Luther. Luther
himself appreciated the distinctive genius of Wittenberg's
"Magister Philip" and recognized his gifts as pedagogue
and ecumenical spokesman." He also recognized and on
occasion criticised Melanchthon's natural timidity and his
innate desire to achieve consensus among contending
"Perhaps Luther's most famous comment is found
is his table talks regarding Melanchthon, Erasmus,
Karlstadt, and himself. "Res et verba Philippus; verba
sine re Erasmus; res sine verbis, Lutherus; nec res nec
verba Carolostadius" (WA, Ti, III, 460). Citations to
Luther will be made to the Weimar Ausgabe, commonly
abbreviated WA. D. Martin Luthers Werke, 94 vols.,
(Weimar: Herman Boehlaus Nachfolger, 1883-present). When
an English translation is available, reference will be
made to the American edition of Luther's Works, commonly
abbreviated AE. Luther's Works, 55 vols., ed. Jaroslav
Pelikan and Helmut T. Lehmann (St. Louis; Concordia
Publishing House and Philadelphia: Fortress Press,
1958-present). Translations by the author will be so
noted. In his preface to Melanchthon's Commentary on
Colossians Luther commends Melanchthon's exegesis and
style (WA., XXX-2, 68-69). He reserved his highest
commendation for the first edition of the Loci. In his
Bondage of the Will Luther said the Loci deserved to be
included in the canon of the church and that "You cannot
find anywhere a book which treats the whole of theology so
adequately as the Loci Communes do. . . . Next to Holy
Scripture, there is no better book." (WA., Ti, V, 204-5).
Above translation in Loci Communes Theologicae, trans.
Lowell J. Satre, in Melanchthon and Bucer, ed. Wilhelm
Pauck (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1969), p. 17.
Hereafter cited as "1521 Loci" (Satre). For other
positive expressions of appreciation for Melanchthon's
work see the following: WA., Ti. XXX:460; WA., Ti. V:205;
WA., Ti. V:435; WA. XXX, 2:68-69; WA. XVIII: 601.
Luther's appreciation of Melanchthon's gifts was first
expressed after Melanchthon's inaugural lecture at the
University of Wittenberg when he wrote (August 31, 1518)
"a man worthy of every honor" (WA., Br. I, 191-2) (AE.,
48:76-80). When Luther received a copy of the AC he
wrote, "Philip's Apologia . . . pleases me very much."
His additional comment, "I cannot step so quietly or
softly," has been interpreted both as praise and as
criticism (WA., Br. V:319-20, AE. 49:295-99).
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parties." It is ironic that this aversion to conflict
and desire for unity should have repeatedly embroiled
Melanchthon in theological controversy in the fourteen
years he outlived Luther. Melanchthon lacked the staunch
courage of Luther. He optimistically supposed those
holding divergent or deviant positions could be reconciled
to the truth on the basis of the revealed Word.
As a pedagogue and systematician he avoided the
paradoxical vocabulary of Luther's theology. As
classicist he couched evangelical theology in Aristotelian
dialectic.2° As ecumenist he respected and researched
the worthier opinions of the church fathers." As
"Luther was critical of Melanchthon's spiritual
and personal timidity at Augsburg and warned him against
an accommodating spirit (WA., BR. V:405-407; AE. 49:
326-333).
20Quirinius Breen questions whether Melanchthon
understood Aristotle. "It is true that he so favored
Aristotle because he considered him the ace of
dialecticians and a rhetorician, in fact, something of a
'Ciceronian.' Had he not so looked on him I doubt if he
would have defended him." Quirinius Breen, "The Terms
'Loci Communes' and 'Loci' in Melanchthon," Church
History 16 (December 1947): 205. Peter Petersen in his
Geschichte der Aristotelischen Philosophie im
Protestantischen Deutchland (Leipzig: Felix Meiner, 1921),
p. 101, terms Melanchthon a philosophic eclectic. By this
Petersen does not mean that Melanchthon is not basically
Aristotelian. Petersen affirms, however, that for
Melanchthon, Aristotelianism was the clearest philosophy,
especially in its gift of dialectic; and that Melanchthon
appreciated Aristotle for his practical uses, but he was
selective in his use.

"Peter Fraenkel's Testimonia Patrum is the
definitive treatment of Melanchthon's positive and
negative evaluation of the Greek and Latin fathers.
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humanist and philologist he worked out of a background
decidedly differing from Luther's. It is not surprising
then that as pedagogue, humanist, classicist, philologist
and ecumenist, the structure of his theology should differ
from that of Luther. That his pedantic style of theology
suffers in comparison to the vivid, pastoral and
expressive theology of Luther is to be expected. But
Luther frequently praised Melanchthon's doctrinal
formulations.22 Perhaps Luther knew Melanchthon better
than his subsequent detractors. Certainly Luther knew
that his own personal charisma and prophetic utterances
would not sustain the church of the reformation -- only
pure doctrine and Christian piety could do that.23
Fraenkel treats of Melanchthon's criticism of the doctrine
of justification in the fathers and of his selective use
of the doctrine of justification in Augustine, pp. 292-306.
22Even critics of Melanchthon acknowledge this
(sometimes with seeming amazement). Despite the variety
of heresies laid at Melanchthon's door by Lutherans of the
second generation and generations following, there is no
evidence in Luther's works of any severe criticism of
Melanchthon's doctrinal formulations, even in those areas
later in controversy among Lutherans. Whatever other
questions might arise, two things seem certain. Luther
knew Melanchthon's mature theology and Luther was not
reluctant to criticize doctrinal aberrations. Might it be
that some of the criticism of Melanchthon's theology is
anachronistic, filtered through the strife theologically,
politically, and geographically which followed Luther's
death and was only resolved with the publication of the
Book of Concord, 1580?
23

In his last sermon preached at Wittenberg,
Luther said, "I foresee that, if God does not give us
faithful ministers, the devil will tear our church apart
through the sectarians and he will never cease until he has
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This is not to make Melanchthon immune from
criticism. Melanchthon admitted his handling of the
Leipzig (1548) interim to have been a mistake. 24 In
seeking consensus Melanchthon on occasion resorted to
theological ambiguity, as in the 1541 Variata of the
Augsburg Confession.25 By temperament, personality,
accomplished it. In a word, that is simply what he has in
mind. If he cannot do it through the pope and emperor, he
will accomplish it through those who are still in accord
with us in doctrine." (WA. LI:131-32. AE. 51:378).
24 C.R. VIII, 841. For a summary of
Melanchthon's political and theological difficulties
during this period see Robert Kolb, "Historical Background
of the Formula of Concord," in A Contemporary Look at the
Formula of Concord, ed. Robert D. Preus and Wilbert H.
Rosin (St. Louis: Concordia Publishing House, 1978), pp.
12-87. This balanced presentation goes a long way in
correcting the distortions found in Gerhard Friedrich
Bente's "Historical Introductions to the Lutheran
Symbols," in Triglot Concordia: The Symbolical Books of
the Evangelical Lutheran Church (St. Louis, Concordia
Publishing House, 1922), pp. 1-266. Lowell C. Green notes
regarding the Bente "Introduction": "Bente was dependent
on Franz Hermann Reinhold Frank, who was also excessively
biased against Melanchthon in his great work, Die
Theologie der Concordienformel, 4 vols. (Erlangen:
Theodore Blaesing, 1858-65), in A Contemporary Look at the
Formula of Concord. p. 306, footnote 7. The number of
citations in Bente to Frank and a cursory reading of Frank
would substantiate this evaluation.
25 Melanchthon was seldom satisfied with the
original edition of any of his writings, and this included
the Augsburg Confession. Certainly he may be criticised
for treating as a personal document one that had been subscribed by the evangelical church. In 1541 he revised the
Augsburg Confession, bringing the article on the Lord's
Supper into conformity with the expressions of the
Wittenberg Concord (1537), and also the articles concerning free will, justification, and new obedience were
revised. However, these changes were not noted among the
evangelicals until the Roman party first criticized these
revisions as having changed the evangelical position. In
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predilection he was not equipped to pick up Luther's
mantle in 1546 nor was he later able to bring consensus to
the diverging opinions of the evangelicals following
Luther's death." But these are areas beyond the scope
of this study. No one at that time or since has accused
Melanchthon of accomodation either to Rome or to other
evangelical theologians in the areas of forensic
justification, third use of the Law, or the role of the
fact the changes in the Variata do represent a hardening
of the evangelical position against the theology of Rome
and a softening toward those parties participating in the
Wittenberg Concord. In relation to the subject of this
dissertation Seeberg writes: "Faith apprehends the purely
forensic decree of justification. And because this occurs, the Spirit is also granted to the individual for his
regeneration. The inseparable connection which is in
Luther always maintained between regeneration, justification, and sanctification is thus broken. These are the
ideas which underlie the thorough going revision of the
Articles IV and V in the Variata Edition of the Augsburg
Confession." Reinhold Seeberg, Textbook of The History of
Doctrines, 2 vols, trans. Charles E. Hay (Grand Rapids:
Baker Book House, 1952) 2: 360. One should note that
between the presentation of the AC and the revision of the
Variata the controversy with John Agricola had brought
about a tightening of vocabulary regarding justification,
not only in Melanchthon but also in Luther, see chapter
III of this dissertation. In a footnote to his comments
about Melanchthon's theology in the Variata, Seeberg
remarks, "If the Augsburg Confession is to be interpreted
in accordance with the Apology, then the prevalent formula
of the Lutheran doctrine of justification finds its symbolical support in the Variata!" (Ibid.) It seems that it
could be argued that the more the evangelicals specified
their doctrine of justification in relation to the Roman
doctrine of justification, the more the vocabulary of
forensic justification gained priority.
"Melanchthon's role in the polemics within the
Lutheran party following Luther's death has been treated
helpfully in Robert Kolb's "Historical Background of the
Formula of Concord," pp. 13-87.
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regenerate will in sanctification. Indeed, in these areas
(particularly forensic justification and third use of the
Law) Melanchthon found himself aligned with the conservative, "gnesio-Lutheran" party.
The present investigation will therefore restrict
itself to Melanchthon's relation of Law and Gospel
justification and sanctification in the context of
forensic justification, third use of the Law, and
regenerate free will. Melanchthon's pragmatic and
humanistic concern for the Christian in his living
relationship with God focused on justification as the
divine proclamation of forgiveness for the sake of Christ
and its necessary implications for Christian living. "To
know Christ, is to know his benefits."27 It is in this
context that justification is identified with the
forgiveness of sins and faith is emphasized as confidence
(fiducia) in that imputed forgiveness.
The subsequent renewal of the Christian worked by
the Holy Spirit through the revealed Word creates within
the Christian heart a new will to please God. This
regenerate will is enabled freely to choose to do the will
of God. However, while the forensic decree of God has
imputed the Christian righteous by grace, through faith,
for Christ's sake, the renewal of the Christian is
St.A. II,I, p. 7.
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"1521 Loci," (Satre), p. 21.
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incomplete, and the Christian must seek the guidance of
God in his Word to know what works are pleasing to God.
The Christian is free from the Law in that it no longer
condemns him, but he carries within him in this mortal
life weakness and sin. Therefore the Christian must avail
himself of the Word by which is revealed the will of God.
The Law thus remains necessary as a testimony to the works
which please God. Far from separating justification from
sanctification, Melanchthon intends to stress the implications of God's forensic decree for the life of the
redeemed sinner-saint. In distinguishing forensic
justification from Christian renewal, Melanchthon emphasized the central doctrine of the evangelical church, the
sola gratia, sola fide, soli per Christum of justification.
Melanchthon clearly affirms that this forensic
decree necessarily effects a change in man's heart so that
he seeks to know and to do the will of God. But man's
relationship to God is not based on his continuing renewal
or his good works either prior to or following the gift of
God's grace. That relationship depends entirely on the
divine imputation of Christ's righteousness and the
non-imputation of sin. Therefore the doctrine of forensic
justification emphasizes the monergism of divine grace
while the renewal of the heart with its ability freely to
choose the will of God revealed in the Word, emphasizes
Christian responsibility.
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As indicated above, pure doctrine and Christian
piety characterize Melanchthon's theological concern for
the church. This concern to epitomize doctrine in
theological propositions has caused Rome to see in
Melanchthon the beginnings of later Lutheran orthodoxy and
the stagnation of evangelical theology in a scholastic
mold. These same scholars have charged that Melanchthon's
distinction of justification and sanctification, even if
for pedagogical purposes, resulted in the separation of
justification and sanctification in later orthodoxy.
Evaluation of this position is beyond the scope of this
study, but recognizing these positions as they relate to
an interpretation of Melanchthon's theology is vital.
Jaroslav Pelikan represents this position concisely when
he writes,
Is is interesting as well as significant that those who
most strenuously opposed Melancthonian theology continued
to do so in terms of Melanchthonian philosophy and
Melanchthonian psychology. . . . One of the major
conclusions to which the researches of Karl Holl have led
is the thesis that much Lutheranism after Luther is not
really Lutheran, but Melanchthonian, and that later
Lutheranism filled Luther's words with Melanchthon's
meanings and then put Luther's words into Melanchthon's
categories. . . . Contemporary research in the theology
of Luther has taken it as its aim to get behind
Melanchthon to the real Luther and to rediscover Luther's
relevance for the present theological crisis.28
Does Melanchthon misrepresent Luther in his doctrine of
forensic justification, third use of the Law, and
28 Jarosoav Pelikan, From Luther to Kierkegaard
(St. Louis: Concordia Publishing House, 1963), p. 26.
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regenerate free will? It is the conclusion of this thesis
that he does not.
In a study that involves the topics of
justification, the Law, and Christian renewal, it is
essential that parameters be set. The focus of this study
is on the continuing validity of the Law for the regenerate
in the context of Roman theology of the sixteenth century,
Luther's theology, evangelical controversies of that time
and the essential harmony of forensic justification, third
use of the Law, and regenerate free will in explicating the
basis of Christian ethics. What was the understanding of
justification, the Law, and Christian obedience that
informed Melanchthon's Roman opponents? How did Melanchthon
come to his mature position in these theological areas?
What are these mature positions and how do they relate to
one another? Is Melanchthon's position in these areas
consistent with Luther's teaching? Is it consistent with
Confessional Lutheran theology in the Formula of Concord?
Does Melanchthon's understanding of forensic justification,
third use of the Law, and Christian obedience have relevance
to contemporary Lutheran theological discussions? An
emphasis will be placed on utilizing Melanchthon's own
writings rather that those of his contemporary detractors or
his subsequent commentators. Secondary literature will be
noted as it contributes to the subject at hand, but the
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priority will be that Melanchthon speak for himself in
developing the interdependencies of his theology.
Thomas Aquinas is utilized as a representative
spokesman for the Augustinian tradition as it developed in
the Roman church of the sixteenth century. There is no
evidence to suggest that either Luther or Melancthon had any
deep acquaintance with Thomas' writings. Why then Thomas as
spokesman? First, Thomas, Luther, and Melanchthon each
shared a high respect for Augustine's theology. Secondly,
the Augustinian tradition as mediated by Thomas had achieved
a formative position in Roman theology, as evidenced by the
formulations of the decrees at the Council of Trent.29 It
was Cardinal Cajetan, before whom Luther was summoned at
Augsburg in 1518, whose conservative commentary on Thomas'
Summa began the great revival of Thomism in the sixteenth
century." Thirdly, both Luther and Melanchthon perceived
themselves as teaching a doctrine of justification, the Law,
and Christian good works at variance with the fides formata,
fides informata, and fides infusa expressed in "the new law
of the gospel" of Thomistic theology. The distinction of
29 The manifold and recurring influence of
Augustine at the deliberations of the Council of Trent is
stressed by Jedin. Specifically Jedin notes the common
appeal of Luther, Thomas and theologians at Trent to
Augustine regarding the future of sin (pp. 145-8) and
regarding justification (pp. 166-68, 185-88, 258-9, et al.).

""Cajetan, Thomas De Vio," in The Oxford
Dictionary of the Christian Church, ed. F. L. Cross (London:
Oxford University, 1961), p. 216.
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Law and Gospel, the differentiation of justification and
renewal, the affirmation of the sola 9ratia, sola fide,
forensic justification, and the discussion of the nature and
place of good works all represent a thrust of evangelical
theology at variance with Thomism. Thus it is precisely in
the interrelation of forensic justification, third use of
the Law, and Christian obedience that Melanchthon
articulates the distinctive evangelical emphases in
theology. Fourthly, Thomas' formulations in his Summa and
Melanchthon's Confessional writings and Loci played
significant roles in the continuing dialogue of Roman and
Lutheran theologians of the late sixteenth century and
throughout the period of orthodoxy.
Some attention is given to the formulations of
evangelical theology regarding justification, the Law,
repentance and new obedience prior to 1530. This emphasis
is necessitated by several factors. First, it underscored
the conservative and evolving theology of both Luther and
Melanchthon in these central areas of evangelical theology.
It becomes clear that the articulation of forensic
justification, the careful distinction of justification and
sanctification, Law and Gospel, and the instructional
function of the Law in relation to its theological function
emerged gradually during this period. Secondly, in this
period one sees Melanchthon and Luther doing theology not as
an abstraction, but as a habitus practicus focusing on the
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needs of the evangelical Christians and of the evangelical
church. Thus in Luther's catechisms and Melanchthon's
"Visitation Articles" one finds a formulation of evangelical
theology written for the care and nurturing of the
Christian, accenting the power of the Gospel and the
continuing validity of the Law. Thirdly, in the controversy
with Agricola one touches on issues at the heart of this
study: the understanding of justification, the role of Law
and Gospel in the salvific plan of God, the continuing
validity of the Law for the regenerate. The controversy
began with Agricola's attack on Melanchthon's insistence on
the preaching of the Law prior to repentance. It culminated
in Luther's Antinomian Disputations, where Luther clearly
articulates (as will be shown) a theology of forensic
justification and of the continuing validity of the Law
which parallels that of the mature Melanchthon. 31
In the years between the Romans Commentary (1532)
and the second edition of the Loci (1535) Melanchthon
achieved his mature position regarding forensic
justification, the instructional function of the Law, and
regenerate free will. Attention will be focused on the
31 This position will be documented is chapter III
& VI both with reference to the controversy whether Luther's
theology of the Law in its theological function also includes a pedagogical function and whether the pedagogical
function of the Law in Luther is in harmony with Melanchthon's third use of the Law, and with reference to the
"analytic" (made righteous) -- "synthetic" (declared
righteous) debate precipitated by Karl Holl at the beginning
of this century.
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Romans Commentary because of its clear development of
forensic justification. The 1535 edition of the Loci
introduces the term "third use of the Law" and Melanchthon's
juxtaposition of the Holy Spirit, the Word, and the human
will in the life of the regenerate. The Saxon Confession
(1551), Examen Ordinandorum (1553) and writings against
Flacius and Osiander provide continuing witness to the
stability of this mature position culminating in the 1559
Latin edition of the Loci, which appeared only one year
prior to Melanchthon's death.
In the final chapter the implications of this study
will be addressed. Did Melanchthon ossify and pervert
Luther's theology of justification with his forensic
vocabulary? Did Melanchthon replace the Gospel emphasis in
Luther with a legalistic ethic in his affirmation of the
third use of the Law? Did Melanchthon detract from the
theological function of the Law (second use) in his
affirmation of a positive function for the Law in the life
of the regenerate? Does Melanchthon's emphasis on free will
in the content of the Word and the Holy Spirit deny the
divine monergism of justification or rather express the
necessity of Christian choice in the process of renewal? Do
his formulations properly distinguish justification and
sanctification, or does he unduly separate justification
from sanctification? Is it accurate to distinguish Luther
as teaching an "effective" or "analytic" doctrine of
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justification and Melanchthon a "forensic" or "synthetic"
form? Finally, did Luther teach a function of the Law
paralleling Melanchthon's third use?
Such questions have been raised by modern
theologians. It is the purpose of this study to put these
questions in historical and theological perspective, and in
so doing to come to a better understanding of Melanchthon's
legacy to the church of the Augsburg Confession. It was the
prayer of Melanchthon that he might be spared the ravings of
theologians. It is the intention of this study to heed that
prayer and to study Melanchthon in view of his positive
contributions to evangelical theology, especially expressed
in the Formula of Concord, Articles IV, V and VI.

CHAPTER II
THOMAS AQUINAS ON JUSTIFICATION
AND THE NEW LAW OF THE GOSPEL
Justification
Thomas was an Augustinian and understanding Thomas
on justification requires recognizing his continuity within the Augustinian tradition. Like Augustine, Thomas
interprets justificare etymologically as ustum facere, to
make righteous or just.' Therefore, while justifica`Augustine writes: "For what else does the
phrase 'being justified' signify than 'being made
righteous,' by Him, of course, who justifies the ungodly
man, that he may become a godly one instead?" Aurelius
Augustine, "On the Spirit and the Letter," in A Select
Library of the Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers of the
Christian Church, first series, 14 vols, ed. Philipp
Schaff, trans. Peter Holms, vol. 5: "Saint Augustine's
Anti-Pelagian Works" (Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans
Publishing Company, 1971), chapter 45, p. 102. The Nicene
and Post-Nicene Fathers will be cited hereafter NPNF with
the title of the specific work, translator, chapter and
page number.
Augustine spoke of justification in two ways: (1)
being made righteous (as in citation above) and (2) the
forgiveness of sins (as in Enchiridion). In the
Enchiridion Augustine writes, "The death of Christ
crucified is nothing other than the likeness of the forgiveness of sins -- so that in the very same sense in
which the death is real, so also is the forgiveness of our
sins real, and in the same sense in which His resurrection
is real, so also in us there is authentic justification."
Aurelius Augustine, Enchiridion, in Augustine: Confessions
and Enchiridion, trans. and ed. Albert C. Outler
(Philadelphia: Westminster Press, n.d.), chapter 14, p.
369. This twofold understanding is also to be found in
37
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tion is the remission of sins, it is primarily the
creation of a just man who is united with God 2 as his
final end3 and his highest good. 4 In the instant of
justification God moves a man from serving sin to
St. Thomas, as indicated in the text. Augustine stresses
the "made righteous" understanding of justification, which
at that point is synonymous with renewal. In "On Grace
and Free Will," he writes: "Thus it is necessary for a man
that he should be not only justified when unrighteous by
the grace of God -- that is, be changed from unholiness to
righteousness -- then he is requited with good for his
evil; but that, even after he has become justified by
faith, grace should accompany him on his way, and he
should lean upon it, lest he fall." Aurelius Augustine,
"On Grace and Free Will," in NPNF, vol. 5: "Saint
Augustine's Anti-Pelagian Works," chapter 13, p. 449.
Augustine reiterates this view in The City of God. "For
He, abiding unchangeable, took upon Him our nature, that
thereby he might take us to Himself; and holding fast his
own divinity, He became partaker of our infirmity, that
we, being changed into some better thing, might, by
participating in His righteousness and immortality, lose
our own properties of sin and mortality, and preserve
whatever good quality He had implanted in our nature,
perfected now by sharing in the goodness of His nature."
Aurelius Augustine, City of God, in NPNF, trans. Marcus
Dods, vol. 2 "St. Augustine's City of God and Christian
Doctrine," Book 21, chapter 15, p. 465.
2 Summa, I-II, 111.1. English translations will
be from Thomas Aquinas, The 'Summa Theologia', trans. by
the Fathers of the English Dominican Province (London:
Burns Oates and Wasbourne, 1923). The "Blackfriars"
edition provides the Latin text with English translation
and includes notes, appendices, glossaries and
introductions. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae 60 vols.,
edited and translated by the members of the Blackfriars,
O.P. (New York: McGraw-Hill Company, 1963-1974). For ease
in reference to various editions, citations will be made
not by page number but by part, question, article and
reply.
3 lbid.,

I-II, 111.5.

4 lbid.,

I-II, 1112.4.
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justice. The justification of the ungodly is a miracle s
and the greatest work of God.6
Justification begins with the infusion of habitual
grace,' which is an operative grace, for God is the sole
mover. 8 By this infusion of grace, habitual grace
becomes an accidental quality of the human soul. This
infusion results in a transformation of man by which his
higher faculties are placed in subordination to God and
his lower faculties are placed in subordination to
reason.9 Bernard Lonergan describes Thomas' theology of
justification as a "shift" from "servitude to sin" to the
"liberty of the sons of God," "a change from one
spontaneity to another, a straightening out of man," which
"naturally gives rise to acts of free will, acts of faith
and repentance, that both acknowledge this change in
attitude and result from it."'°
Justification is a work of God and not an
accomplishment of man himself. Man is passive. However,
s Ibid.,

I-II, 113.10.

6 lbid.,

I-II, 113.9.

'Ibid., I-II, 110.2, 111.2
8

Ibid., I-II, 111.2.

9 lbid.,

I-II, 113.1.

'
°Bernard J. F. Lonergan, Grace and Freedom,
Operative Grace in the Thought of St. Thomas Aquinas, ed.
J. Patout Burns (New York: Herder and Herder, 1971), pp.
57-58.
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in moving a man to justice God acts in accordance with the
condition of human nature; therefore, the will must be
free and the mind must turn toward God in faith." The
infusion of habitual grace results not only in a change in
what man is but also in what man does. The infusion of
grace is evidenced, therefore, by a faith formed and
perfected in love."
Thomas distinguishes between operative grace (by
which God loves man to himself) and co-operative grace (by
which the soul is not only loved, but is itself a mover).
Justified man is enabled to co-operative grace and the
activity of his free will to perform acts of faith and
repentance pleasing to God.13 Through these acts of
faith and repentance man fulfills the will of God.
Ultimately the function of justification is the
fulfillment of the Law because the justification of the
sinner enables and empowers him to fulfill the Law in love
and obedience. Grace inclines the will to love the
fulfillment of the Law. Justification thus creates a man
of justice pleasing to God," who is just in his action
and just in his disposition." Sin is remitted because
Summa, I-II, 113.3.
"Ibid., I-II, 110.3.
13

-

Ibid., I-II, 111.2.

t4

Ibid., I-II, 111.1.

s- Ibid., I-II, 113.1.
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God is pacified toward the sinner and by grace has infused
his divine love. The mind and will are turned toward
God." The infusion of grace is effective in creating a
righteousness so that the soul is healed and enabled to
will what is good and pleasing to God. Moreover the soul
is empowered to carry out what it wills and to persevere
in good so that it finally attains to glory." The
transformation of the man, the acquisition of justice,
unites man with his highest good.
Citing Romans 8:30 Thomas affirms that, "the
remission of sins is justification."" In the
subsequent articles of Question 113 he describes the
process of justification which includes not only the
forgiveness of sins, but the renewal of man and the
acquisition of justice. "The remission of sin would be
meaningless if there were no infusion of grace," because,
although "the love of God is eternal, the effect of that
forgiveness is intermittent, because it is sometimes lost
and never regained."" That God does not impute sin is
an expression of his love, but the non-imputation of sin
also implies that grace has had some effect on the man
"Ibid., I-II, 113.3.
"Ibid., I-II, 111.3.
"Ibid., I-II, 113.1.
"Ibid., I-II, 113.2.
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whose sin is not imputed. The first stage of
justification is thus the infusion of habitual grace which
makes it possible for man to do what previously was
impossible, that is, to love God. In the second stage,
Thomas addresses the question of free will.
Since God moves a man to justice in a manner which
accords with the condition of his human nature, and it
is proper to the nature of man that his will should be
free . . . God never moves him to justice without the
use of his free will. With all who are capable of
being so moved God infuses the gift of justifying faith
in such wise that he also moves the free will to accept
it.20
This movement of the free will is also a movement of faith.
Justification requires the movement of the mind by
which it turns to God. But the mind turns to God in
the first instance by faith . . . . A movement of
faith is therefore required for the justification of
the ungodly. 21
However, this movement of faith "is not perfect unless it
is formed by charity."22

To understand why faith must

be perfected by love, one must understand the true nature
of faith.
Under Question two, Article nine, "the Act of
Faith," Thomas defines faith.
To believe is the act of the intellect as it assents to
divine truth at the command of the will as loved by God
through grace . . . . Faith is related to charity as a
disposition is related to the ultimate form which it
precedes. Now it is obvious that a subject or matter
cannot act except by the power of its form. Neither
2°Ibid., I-II, 113.3.
"Ibid., I-II, 113.4
22Ibid.
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can a preceding disposition alike act by the power of
the form, and the form is the main principle of action.
. . . Thus, without charity, neither nature nor faith
can produce a meritorious action. But when charity
supervenes, the act of faith becomes meritorious
through charity."
In making the Aristotelian distinction between "form" and
"matter" Thomas is enabled to describe faith as the
"subject or matter" which is incapable of action without
its "form." Love is the form, the formative principle,
which gives faith its power to act. Thus faith is
informed, perfected, by love.24 Faith itself is an
intellectual assent of the mind to divine truth
by the command and will of God through grace. The will
moves the intellect to assent to God's testimony of himself in his revealing Word. Faith comprehends the first
truth of God, that he has dealt with mankind in history
through Jesus Christ. This is what Thomas means when he
affirms that "an act of faith is required in the
justification of the ungodly to this extent, that a man
believe that God is the justifier of man through the
mystery of Christ."25 The truthfulness of that faith is
guaranteed by the truthfulness of God." Man is not
"Ibid., II-II, 2.9.
24Charles P. Carlson, Jr., Justification in
Earlier Medieval Theology (Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1975),
p. 120, footnote 33.
25

Summa, I-II, 113.4.

"Stephen Pfurtner, Luther and Aquinas on
Salvation, trans. Edward Quinn (New York: Sheed and Ward,
1964), pp. 68-72.
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justified only by faith and man cannot please God only by
faith, but "justification by faith" means justification by
faith as intellectual assent perfected by love. Man is
justified and pleases God ultimately not merely by his
intellectual assent to God as first truth, but by his love
through which he fulfills the law of God.
The third stage in the process of justification is
contrition.
The justification of the ungodly thus requires a
twofold covenant of the free will. It must yearn for
the justice which is of God. It must also abhor sin.
. . . It is thus by charity that we delight in God
and by charity also that we abhor the sins which
separate us from God.27
Justice and sin cannot co-exist in man; one cannot be
both transformed and not transformed.
The fourth stage is the remission of sins. "Now
the remission of sins is the end in the justification of
the ungodly.

. The remission of sins should not

therefore be omitted in the enumeration of things
required for the justification of the ungodly." The
remission of sins and the infusion of grace are
identical, "as referring to the substance of the act,
since God bestows grace and forgives guilt by one and
the same act."28 Remission of sins is the
consummation of the process of justification, but the

"Summa, I-II, 113.5.
28

Ibid., I-II, 113.6.
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whole process "is necessary for the justification of the
ungodly -- an infusion of grace, a movement of the free
will toward God in faith, a movement of the free will in
recoil from sin, and the remission of sin." 29 In this
way Thomas protects his theology from the charge of
Pelagianism, and yet also insists on the free will and
intellectual assent of man in faith and in the Christian
abhorance of sin.
Thomas is concerned that this process of
justification not be interpreted in a temporal
sequence. The infusion of grace and justification of
the ungodly are instantaneous. The four stages
necessary for salvation occur simultaneously in time.
But the infusion of grace is first, the movement of the
free will toward God is second, its recoil from sin is
third, and the remission of guilt is last. Only from a
human point of view does freedom of guilt precede the
reception of justifying grace. Ultimately, "grace is
the cause both of the remission of guilt and the
acquisition of justice."3°
The New Law of the Gospel
All law has its source in the Creator. Thus the
one who has established all law and the one who justi29

Ibid.

30 Ibid.,

I-II, 113.8.
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fies are the same, and both justification and the Law have
the same end: making a man righteous in order that he
might accomplish his created end: unity and blessedness
with God. Revealed Law and justification by grace through
faith in Christ therefore are complementary. The
fulfillment of justification is the life lived in the Holy
Spirit through the new Law of the Gospel. When a man is
justified, that is, made righteous, he is enabled by the
Spirit to love God above all things and his neighbor as
himself. This is faith working through love.
The old Law prescribed precepts set forth in the
natural Law which continue to be valid and binding on all
men for all time. However, the old Law also contained
precepts binding only on the Jews.31 This old Law was
given for two purposes: to restrain the hard hearted and
proud and to instruct the good who desire to do the will
of God. It is most appropriate that the old Law was given
as an intermediary between the natural Law and the new Law
of the Gospel:
With regard to good men the law was given to them as a
help; which was most needed by the people at the time
when the natural law began to be obscured on account of
the exuberance of sin: for it is fitting that this help
should be bestowed on men in an orderly fashion so that
they might be led from perfection to perfection,
wherefore it was becoming that the old law should be
given between the law of nature and the law of
grace. 32
31

Ibid., I-II, 98.5.

32

Ibid., I-II, 98.6.
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The final purpose of the old Law is to establish the
commandment of charity, that is, to establish friendship
between God and man and man and man. The necessity of the
old Law is located in man's sinful habitus which has
impeded man's natural reason. Ideally man's reason should
not have needed any additional revelation other than that
which was given in natural law, but human reason having
become "habituated to sin" began to obscure the will of
God. It was necessary that God through his divine Law
therefore rescue man from the evil of his impeded reason.
Because of this impediment, human kind has judged things
to be lawful that are in fact evil. Thus the old Law
belongs to the articles of faith, not as are the doctrines
of the Trinity and the incarnation because man's reason
cannot comprehend such mysteries, but because through sin
man's reason has become liable to manifold errors and must
be corrected. If all men had right reason the implication
is that the old Law would have been unnecessary. 33
The old Law has the teleological function of
directing mankind to God; as opposed to human law, which
is given to direct men in their relations to one another.
Within the old Law are to be found three kinds of
precepts: moral, ceremonial, and judicial. The moral
precepts are binding on all men and are equivalent to the
33

Ibid., I-II, 99.2.
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precepts of natural Law.34 But in addition to
instructing man in moral righteousness, the old Law also
directs men to the coming of Christ, "as the imperfect
disposes to the perfect, wherefore it was given to a
people as yet imperfect in comparison to the perfection
which was to result from Christ's coming. . . •“35 The
old Law thus consists of abiding commandments and of
divine promise.
The new Law is addressed to those who live in the
perfection of Christ's coming, the promise fulfilled. Its
efficacy is based on the grace of the Holy Spirit which is
given through faith in Christ.36 "Consequently, the new
Law is chiefly the grace itself of the Holy Ghost which is
given to those who believe in Christ."37 In this the
new Law differs from the old Law, being internal, within
the heart, whereas the old Law was an external precept.
But the new Law also contains (though this is of secondary
importance) precepts by which the faithful are instructed
in what they should believe and what they should do.
"Consequently we must say that the new Law is in the first
place a Law that is inscribed on our hearts, but that
34

Ibid., I-II, 99.4.

3s

Ibid., I-II, 99.6.

36
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secondarily it is a written Law." 38 It is according to
the inward grace bestowed by the Holy Spirit that the new
Law justifies. But it is as written Law that the new life
instructs in the teaching of the faith and in the
commandment of God which are to direct human affections
and human actions."
Saint Thomas gives three reasons why the old Law
was necessary and which explain why it was not appropriate
that the new Law was given at the beginning of time.
First, since the new Law consists chiefly of grace through
the Holy Spirit, it was not possible that it should be
given prior to the redemption of human kind through Jesus
Christ. Secondly, since the new Law is the Law of
perfection, it was appropriate that, "Because a thing is
not brought to perfection at once from the outlet, but
through an orderly succession of time . . ." that the new
Law was not given originally. Thirdly,
the new law is the law of grace wherefore it behooved
man first of all to be left to himself under the state
of the old law so that through falling into sin, he
might realize his weakness, and acknowledge his need for
grace."
The old Law and the new Law share the same end, namely,
man's subjection to God. They differ in how they
function. The old Law is like a pedagogue for children
38
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(Gal. 3:24) whereas the new Law is "the law of perfection" since it is the Law of charity (Col. 3:14).4' Thus
the new Law may be compared to the old Law as the perfect
is compared to the imperfect. That which is perfect
fulfills that which is lacking in the imperfect.
Accordingly the new Law fulfills the old Law by supplying
that which was lacking in the old Law.
What was lacking in the old Law was the capacity to
justify mankind. Because it is the purpose of every law to
make mankind righteous and because the old Law could
accomplish this end only in promise but not in fact, the
new Law was necessary in order that men might be justified
before God. The new Law fulfills the promise of the old
Law by justifying men through the power of Christ's passion
(Rom. 8:3,4). Because the new Law gives what the old Law
promised (2 Cor. 1:20; Col. 2:17), it is called the Law of
"reality" whereas the old Law is called the Law of "shadow
or of figure."42
Christ fulfilled the precepts of the old Law both
in his works and in his doctrine. By his willingness to be
circumcised and to fulfill the other legal observances
binding under the old Law he did the works of the Law (Gal.
4:4). In his doctrine he fulfilled the old Law in three
ways: (1) by explaining the true sense of the Law; (2) by
"Ibid., I-II, 107.2.
42
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"prescribing the safest way of complying with the statutes
of the old Law," and (3) by adding to the old Law his own
counsels of perfection (as for example, in his address to
the young lawyer, "If you would be perfect, go and sell all
that you have. .

Matt. 19:21). Thus while the old Law

placed on mankind the burden of external works, the new Law
relates to the interior motivations for virtue and
righteousness. For the virtuous man, virtuous acts are not
difficult. In this respect, then, the precepts of the new
Law are less burdensome for the righteous and more
burdensome for those who are not righteous, "Because the
new Law prohibits certain interior movements of the
soul which are not expressly forbidden in the old Law in
all cases. . • • .43 Accordingly, for the righteous man
the new Law is not burdensome, for John writes, "His
commandments are not heavy" (1 John, 5:3).
Righteousness is dependent on the gracious gifts of
the Holy Spirit by whom men become receivers of grace
through the incarnation of the Son of God. From the
Spirit's gracious gifts works of two kinds ensue. First,
there are the works which lead to grace in some way, such
as the sacramental acts instituted by the new Law in Holy
Baptism and in the Holy Eucharist. Secondly, there are
external acts which ensue as a result of grace. These are
of two kinds. There are those acts which necessarily

43
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contribute to or detract from a faith working in love.
These are the works prescribed or proscribed by the new
man. Secondly, there are those works which are not
necessarily opposed to or in keeping with a faith working
through love, but have been left by the new Law to the
discretion of each individual. In these areas one is free
either to choose to act or to refrain from acting. This is
why the new Law is also described as the Law of liberty.
In this the new Law differs from the old Law which "decided
many points and left few to man to decide as he chose." 44
Accordingly the new law is called the law of liberty in
two respects. First because it does not bind us to do
or to avoid certain things, except such as are of
themselves necessary or opposed to salvation, and come
under the prescription or prohibition of the law.
Secondly, because it also makes us comply freely with
these precepts and prohibitions, inasmuch as we do so
through the promptings of grace. It is for these two
reasons that the new law is called the law of perfect
liberty (James 1:25). 45
Grace is not by one's own efforts, but comes
through Christ alone who instituted the seven sacraments
whereby men receive grace. The right use of grace is
found in doing works of charity. Insofar as these works
of charity are essential to virtue and pertain to the
moral precepts, which is also part of the old Law, the new
Law adds nothing. But through grace Christ orders the
Christian's interior movements both as they relate to
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himself and as they relate to the neighbor. Grace
impinges then on both man's will and his intentions.
Man's will consequently refrains from both those acts
which are overtly proscribed by the Law and those works
and internal acts which might give occasion to evil
deeds. Christ by grace also directs man's intentions,
teaching that in our good works we should not seek human
praise or worldly riches but the good of the neighbor.
The Sermon on the Mount provides these words of
instruction from the Lord.
He mentions three works, to which all others may be
reduced, since whatever a man does in order to curb his
desires, comes under the head of fasting, and whatever
a man does for the love of the neighbor comes under the
head of alms-deeds; and whatever a man does for the
worship of God, comes under the head of prayer."
Revealed Law is necessitated by human sin. Even
among the upright "the light of man's natural reason [is]
clouded somewhat by the impulses of sinful desire.""
Sin is the disposition by which one sets one's heart on
earthly goods and chooses to ignore God. Therefore a
meritorious act consists in setting aside "the attraction
of creatures and holding fast to God..48

It

is by faith

that the Christian is enabled to acknowledge God as the
"Ibid., II-II, 22.1.
"Ibid., II-II, 104.3.
48
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author of the Law and as the one to whom submission in
life is due.49
Therefore, because of sin, the new Law admonishes
men to withdraw as much as possible from temporal occupations, even though these are not against the Law per
se, but which nevertheless distract the soul and impede
the movement of the heart toward God. It is only in
loving God with all one's heart that the Law is fulfilled. In reality the blessed in heaven alone are able
to love God at all times. For the Christian it is enough
that his heart is habitually directed toward God so that
it will never entertain anything that is against the love
of God. In this "perfection" is to be found the way to
heaven. Thomas notes in this regard that "venial" sin is
not contrary to the habitus of loving God, but only
hinders it in exercising itself." It is the new Law
that frees man's mind from its preoccupation with worldly
matters."
Man is motivated to obey divine Law in two ways:
through fear of punishment ("servile fear") and through
love of God ("filial fear"). It is this filial fear based
on one's reverence for God which serves as the source for
all other practices by which God is revered. The filial
49 Ibid.,

II-II, 44.4.

"Ibid., II-II, 95.3.
"Ibid., II-II, 22.2.
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fear of God, arising from love of God, is consequently the
motivating factor in the good works of charity which are
to characterize the Christian life." The change that
love works in a man's heart is threefold. First, there is
a rebirth to new life. Secondly, there is a reforming of
the life that has been ruined by sin. Thirdly, there is a
change toward living a more holy life.53 Thus merit
from obedience to God's will originates in reverence to
God and results in a hierarchy of moral virtues. "The
nobler the good the Christian foregoes for the sake of
God, the higher is the virtue." Least important is the
giving up of external possessions. Next is the offering
of one's physical well being. Above all is the sacrifice
of the will. In consequence the virtue of obedience is
more praiseworthy than any other moral virtue, "seeing
that by obedience a person gives up his own will for God's
sake.

vs
•

•
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The aim and end of the spiritual life is that man
is united to God. That union is achieved through love;
consequently everything else is subordinate. The
commandment to love, therefore, is the greatest of all
commandments. Indeed, all Ten Commandments are directed
to the love of God and the neighbor and are not
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dispensable. The commandment to love virtually includes
the commands about all other Christian acts." The
Christian's will which is therefore the principle of all
spiritual movement and which culminates in charity is that
which moves the intellect (mind), the desires (soul), and
the acting power (strength) whereby love is expressed.
When the Lord therefore commands in the great commandment
that one is to love God with all one's heart, mind, soul,
and strength, he is commanding,
that our full intent be on God; with all your heart,
that our intellect be subject to God, with all your
mind; that our appetite be ruled by God, with all your
soul; and that our exterior action be obedient to God,
with all your strength or power or might."
Likewise one is to love the neighbor in the manner
that he loves himself according to the Second Commandment.
First, "in respect to the end: he will love his neighbor
for God just as he loves himself for God," and thus his
neighbor-love is holy. Secondly, he will not yield to his
neighbor in things which might be harmful to the neighbor,
but only in those areas which work to his good. Therefore
his neighbor-love is just. Thirdly, he will not love his
neighbor merely to his own advantage or to please himself,
but he will love his neighbor for his own sake. Thus his
neighbor-love is true."
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Analysis of Thomas
Although Thomas is very careful to underscore the
primacy of grace in the regeneration of the Christian,
there are several ingredients in his theology which tend to
undercut divine monergism: his understanding of the nature
and function of the Law, his understanding of faith as
intellectual assent until formed by love, and his positive appreciation for the human will as it chooses what the
intellect offers. Analysis of Thomas on justification and
the new Law will therefore center in questions relating to
these areas.
One's understanding of the Law of God is reflective
of one's understanding of the nature of human sin, and
one's understanding of sin focuses attention on one's
understanding of the human condition. Sin for Thomas is an
"impediment to natural reason." The idea that the Law is
an accusing force that unremittingly convicts humankind,
regenerate and unregerate, of sin against God, is foreign
to Thomas. Although the old Law brings to man an awareness
of "weakness" and the new Law instructs a man in what he
should do through the promptings of grace, Thomas is not
able to share the pain of Saint Paul in Romans 7:12-25.
Thomas might agree that man's free will is in captivity
through sin,58 but he would nonetheless affirm that free
58Philip Watson, "Erasmus, Luther, and Aquinas,"
Concordia Theological Monthly, 40 (December 1969):755.
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will remains and that man continues to have the capacity to
resist sin. It is a matter of the disposition or ends to
which the will has inclined itself. Man's problem with sin
is his ungodly (not "God-ward") desire and in consequence
his defection from the will of God in the Law.59
Original sin and human concupiscence are related by Thomas
in such a way as to make sin a depraved tendency rather
than a description of a condition of utter depravity.

60

It is at this point that one feels most strongly
the Aristotelian influence on Thomas' theology. Justification is not the declaration of righteousness by which
God imputes the sinner righteous and holy by grace through
faith for the sake of Christ (Ephesians 2). Justification is perceived rather in classical ethical terms as
that which leads to the highest good through the remaking
of a man. It is this ethical presupposition which brings
about the diminution of sin and the emphasis on free will.
Secondly, Thomas describes justification as a transformation by which one is made righteous, "justifacere,"
rather than justification understood as the gracious
activity of God by which the sinner receives the
righteousness of Christ apart from works. In this Thomas
59 Frederick Copleston, Thomas Aquinas (New York,
Barnes and Noble, 1955), p. 235.
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is clearly following the conventional scholastic scheme of
processus justification. 61
For Paul, faith is essentially trust in the mercy
of God apart from the Law. For Thomas, faith culminates in
charity, the new Law. It is faith forced by charity which
justifies. The gospel is "a new Law" by which faith
expresses itself. There is a natural progression in
Thomas' thought which leads from "Law of grace" to "formed
faith" to "new Law" to "Law of liberty" which comprehends
the withdrawal of the Christian from the world and his
uniting with God in blessedness. Compare this to Saint
Paul in Galatians where Law is contrasted to Gospel and
God's activity in making the sinner just is clearly
distinguished from the sanctified activities of the
regenerate. The Gospel in Paul does not complete the Law
but overcomes its accusations in order that the Christian
may do, without the prompting of the Law, what the will of
God requires. For Paul the Law is fulfilled, not through
withdrawal from the world, but in service to the neighbor,
where the neighbor is to be found according to his needs
(Phil. 1:19-26; Rom. 13:8-10). This is not to imply that
Thomas is not concerned with the need of the neighbor, but
61
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his emphasis seems to be on the non-worldliness of the
cloister.
Ultimately then for Thomas, faith is not fiducia
but intellectual assent informed by love, a theological
virtue." Significantly, Thomas distinguishes
theological virtues from natural virtues in the gracious
activity of God. Like natural virtue, theological virtues
are also good habits or dispositions of the mind by which
one chooses to live righteously. But these theological
virtues do not derive from man's natural aptitude. Terence
Penelhum defines Thomas' understanding of theological
virtue as "a good disposition of the mind by which we live
righteously, of which no one can make bad use and which God
works in us without us."" But such faith is only a
first virtue. It must be interconnected with hope and with
charity.
Just as moral virtues can only exist imperfectly in a
man if isolated from one another, or in the absence of
prudence, so faith and hope can exist without charity
but not have the 'perfect character of virtue' without
it. Charity, on the other hand, is 'quite impossible'
without faith and hope. Charity, which is a friendship
of man with God, cannot exist unless men believe in God
and aspire to such fellowship with him.64
This distinction Thomas makes using the terms "formed"
and "unformed" faith. Formed faith is a "living faith that
"Terence Penelhum, "The Analysis of Faith in St.
Thomas Aquinas," Religious Studies, 13 (June 1977):135.
"Ibid.
"Ibid., p. 142.
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is found in the ongoing, sustained Christian life."
Unformed faith is "a mere intellectual assent which is
not, because of sin, pervaded by charity and does not bear
fruit in the Christian life." Both formed and unformed
faith come from the same disposition, but only one is a
virtue; only formed faith is a living faith. Formed faith
may be described as "justifying faith" but only because it
comprehends charity through the new Law of the Gospel.
Faith alone is dead. It is merely intellectual assent."
Although one follows the reasoning of Thomas here,
it is difficult to understand how this description of
faith accords with Saint Paul in Romans 5. "Therefore
since we are justified through faith we have peace with
God through our Lord Jesus Christ." Saint Thomas is reflecting the formula of Saint Augustine, "Credere est cum
assensione cogitare,"" but in this manner faith has
been reduced to an epistemological element in
Christianity, a function of the intellect, but not of the
heart.
Since the justification of the sinner and the
sanctified Christian life which follows are viewed as one
entity in the concept of "formed faith" (that is, unformed
faith informed by charity), Thomas makes no distinction
"Carlson, p. 119.
"cited in Tad W. Guzie, "The Act of Faith
According to St. Thomas," The Thomist 29 (July 1965):261.

62
between justification and sanctification. Indeed, there
is no locus on sanctification in the Summa. Sanctification is spoken of rather in the context of the
sacramental life of the church. Justification and
sanctification are subsumed and combined in "the new Law
of the Gospel." This provides opportunity for
misunderstanding. Charles Carlson writes in his
Justification in Earlier Medieval Theology,
Elsewhere (Summa Theol. III, q. 56, art. 2 and 4),
Thomas gives a more extended definition: ". . . quod in
justificatione animarum duo concurrunt: scilicet
remission culpae, et novitas per gratiam." He does not
elucidate the second part of this definition in any
other place (it does occur in his doctrine of the
atonement, but only incidentally in an obscure
responsio); this 'renewal by grace' was, however, the
definition taken up at the Council of Trent and was
given currency as the classic Thomist definition of
justification."
Because Thomas affirms that the human will moves
the mind and the desires (soul) and the acting power of
man toward its beatific end, he may be misinterpreted to
imply that this act of will also moves man initially into
his relationship with God. This is the position Scotus
was to take. Thomas denies this, but the confusion of Law
and Gospel in "the new law of the gospel," the combination
of justification and sanctification in "formed faith," the
emphasis on the will in the attainment of blessedness with
God, all contribute to the possibility that the position
of Thomas may be misunderstood as advocating the
"Carlson, p. 119, footnote 29.
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synergistic position that man is a co-worker with God in
the accomplishment of his salvation. Thomas specifically
denies this, but his theology has failed to do justice to
Paul's penetrating insight in Romans 3:21-31, that man is
saved apart from his own efforts at keeping the Law.
For Thomas, "it is appropriate" that the Gospel
and the new Law be intimately related. Together they
reflect the new commandment of the Lord "that you love one
another as I have loved you" (John 15:12). In recounting
the significance of Christ's obedience to the Law, Thomas
affirms that by his obedience Christ showed his approval
of the old Law and perfected it so that he might "free men
from subjection to the Law."'" As one imputed righteous
by grace through faith, Paul would affirm this
understanding in part, but would add that such an
understanding is not descriptive of the condition of sin
in which the redeemed continue to find themselves (Romans
7:13-24).
The basis of this problem would seem to lie in
Thomas' confidence in the power of human reason." Man
as a rational being, Thomas maintains, is able to act for
or against the natural law, having in himself the inclination to do good." In this, reason is hindered by

"Summa, III, 40.4.
"Lee, p. 435.

"Summa, I-II, 94.6.
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concupiscence71 and it is necessary that God reveal
moral concepts through the Ten Commandments. It is the
function of the old Law thus to provide through revelation the knowledge of God's will which is obscured by sin.
Through the new Law and the power of the Holy Spirit the
will of God is written upon the human heart in order that
man may know and choose the will of God. The assumption
here is that the human will, knowing the will of God, will
choose that will as its highest good.
But what of the sin of origin which remains in the
human heart? What of the ungodly desires (concupiscence)
which continue to draw away from God and into man himself? Are these eliminated in the regenerate? Thomas
recognized the necessity of repentance and contrition, but
he seems to affirm that by the power of the will these
desires directing one away from God can be conquered
through redemption by the greater love of Christ. The
evangelicals found the answers of Thomas and other
scholastics inadequate precisely at this point. In Paul
they found another answer, the answer of a righteousness
which is given to man from outside man, the righteousness
of another, the righteousness of Jesus Christ.

7l

Ibid., I-II, 94.6.

CHAPTER III
JUSTIFICATION, SANCTIFICATION, AND THE FUNCTION
OF THE LAW IN LUTHER (1519-1535)
Early Luther (1519-24)
Martin Luther's two commentaries on Galatians
provide opportunity to compare the early Luther of 1519
with the mature Luther of 1535. With its emphasis on
Saint Paul's understanding of Law and Gospel, Galatians
provides an ideal context in which to develop Lutheran on
Law, Gospel, justification, sanctification and good works
over the period of fifteen years at the heart of the
evangelical Reformation. As a result of controversy with
the theologians of Rome, and the antinomianism of John
Agricola, in the context of sharing in the evangelical
formulations produced at Schwabach (1529), Marburg (1529)
and Torgau (1530), in constant dialogue with Melanchthon
in the preparation of the Augsburg Confession, one finds
in Luther's later Galatians Commentary a sharpening of
theological vocabulary. This development culminated in
the Smalcald Articles and the Antinomian Disputations in
the second half of the 1530's. The "making righteous"
(effici) terminology and "being pronounced righteous"
(reputari) terminology which are used interchangeably in
65
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the early Luther are more clearly distinguished in the
mature Luther as the distinctions between Law and Gospel,
justification and sanctification, are defined.'
In his 1519 Galatians Commentary Luther develops
the theses of Law and Gospel, not viewed in a Thomistic
framework as complementary revelations by which justification may be described as "the new Law of the Gospel",
but as two different addresses to man from God having two
entirely different purposes. The Law increases sin, for
'It is beyond the scope of this study to do more
than indicate the process of definition whereby both
Luther and Melanchthon became increasingly precise in
their specification of the nature of justification,
sanctification, and the continuing validity of the Law for
the regenerate. Adolf Koeberle provides a helpful summary
of Luther's development with regard to the relationship of
justification as forgiveness and sanctification as
renewal. "A closer examination will further be able to
distinguish three periods in Luther's development, each
having a different emphasis in the treatment of the
constituent parts of this relationship. There is a first
period in which he so strongly emphasizes the effici
alongside of the reputari that he interchanges them
without any scruple or even speaks of a magis et magis
justificari. . . . Then, however, the emphasis begins to
fall ever more strongly on the Christus pro nobis. Here
(say in the commentary on Galatians of 1522-35 [sic.]) is
the real climax of Luther's creative activity. In the
later part of his life, as a result of his experiences he
approaches closer to the attitude of Melanchthon. The
justitia aliens which we already find clearly indicated in
the writings of 1520-21 is more and more placed in
contrast to renewal. It is certain, however, that Luther
at all times, though with varying degrees of emphasis,
held fast to the essential connection of justification and
sanctification, while at the same time marking clearly the
theological difference between the two conceptions."
Adolf Koeberle, The Quest for Holiness, trans. John C.
Mattes (St. Louis: Concordia Publishing House, 1982), p.
93, footnote 12: Excursus.
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the man who is a slave to the law is a slave to sin. 2
Only Christ can free man from the accusations of the Law.
As in Augustine, Luther emphasizes the effect of justification in actualizing a change in man by which he is
enabled to overcome the power of sin. Freedom from the
Law, in Christ, occurs spiritually, not in the manner of
human righteousness, by which the Law is changed, "but it
is Christian freedom when men are changed without changing
the law."3 Through the preserving power of the Holy
Spirit and for the sake of the vicarious satisfaction of
Christ, "the same law that was formerly hateful to the
free will becomes delightful, since love is poured into
our hearts through the Holy Spirit."4 It is Christ who
has overcome the Law and who gives to Christians his Holy
Spirit by which he makes them righteous and lovers of the
Law, "not because of their own works, but freely, because
it is freely bestowed by Christ."5
Nevertheless, the function of the Law remains one
of bringing the Christian to an awareness of sin.
z Martin Luther, D. Martin Luthers Werke, 94
vols. (Weimar: Herman Boehlaus Nachfolger, 1883-present),
2:560. Hereafter this work will be cited as WA. Luther's
Works, 55 vols., gen. eds. Helmut Lehmann and Jaroslav
Pelikan (Philadelphia: Fortress Press/St. Louis: Concordia
Publishing House, 1955-present), 27:325. Hereafter this
work will be cited as AE.
3

WA 2:560; AE 27:326.

4

Ibid.

5lbid.

68
Therefore, when under the guidance of the Law, you have
come to the knowledge of your sins, beware lest before
all else you presume henceforth to satisfy the Law as
one who intends to live a better life. But despair
altogether of your past and future life, and trust
boldly in Christ.6
Just as the sinner seeks to justify himself before God on
the basis of the law without reference to the grace of
Christ, so too the Christian is tempted to presume that he
can live a life pleasing to God apart from the grace of
Christ and according to the formulations of the Law.
Luther admonishes the Christian to pray to Christ, "that
sin may be destroyed also in your flesh and that the Law
may be fulfilled there too, just as it has been already
fulfilled in your heart through faith."' It is only
through faith that, after "receiving love, we keep the
Law, not under compulsion or because we are attracted for
a time, but freely and steadfastly."8 Since the Law has
not been changed, but the Christian man has been changed,
he is free from that Law only insofar as he is in Christ.
When the Christian man makes use of his flesh as a pretext
for evil (Luther here cites 1 Peter 2:16) he is no longer
free of the Law's indictment. Freedom from the Law
therefore does not mean that the Law has been nullified or
that it is no longer powerful in the accusation of sin.
Freedom means that, "we do what is good, not from com6

WA 2:562; AE 27:328.

'Ibid.
8

WA 2:574; AE 27:346.
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pulsion, but gladly and with no ulterior motive."9
Servitude to sin has been replaced by servanthood in
Christ, expressed in service and in love to the neighbor. Luther concludes,
Therefore what was said before is correct, namely, that
the servitude of the spirit and freedom from sin or
from the Law are identical with freedom from righteousness, or from righteousness and the Spirit. A
person goes from servitude to servitude, from freedom
to freedom, that is, from sin to grace, from fear of
punishment to the love of righteousness, from the law
to fulfillment of the law.'°
Luther's insights in this first Galatians
Commentary became a touchstone of the evangelical movement
through the publication and distribution of his The
Freedom of the Christian one year later. At the center of
the evangelical movement stands the relationship of Law
and Gospel in the justification and sanctification of the
Christian.
The treatise on The Freedom of the Christian
(1520), begins with a paradox. "A Christian is a
perfectly free lord of all, subject to none. A Christian
is a perfectly dutiful servant of all, subject to all. silt
This paradoxical truth concerning the temporal estate of
the Christian man is a reflection of the Christian's
twofold nature, spiritual and bodily.
9WA 2:575; AE 27:347.
'
°WA 2:576; AE 27:349.
"WA 7:49; AE 31:344.
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According to the spiritual nature, which men refer to
as the soul, he is called a spiritual, inner, or new
man. According to the bodily nature, which men refer
to as flesh, he is called a carnal, outward or old
man. 12
The spiritual man is a creation of the Holy Spirit, not
the product of his own works.
Wherefore it ought to be first the concern of every
Christian to lay aside all confidence in works and
increasingly to strengthen faith alone and through
faith to grow in the knowledge, not of works, but of
Jesus Christ."
Luther distinguishes between the Law and the promises.
ThroUgh the Commandments a man learns to recognize his
helplessness before the Law, which demands perfect
obedience. He finds nothing whereby he may be justified.
Here the second part of Scripture comes to his aid.
namely, the promises of God which declare the glory of
God saying, "If you wish to fulfill the law . . . come
believe in Christ in whom grace, righteousness, peace,
liberty and all things are promised you. . . ." That
which is impossible for you to accomplish by trying to
fulfill all the works of the law . . . you will accomplish quickly and easily through faith. . . . The
promises of God give what the commandments of God
demand and fulfill what the law prescribes so that all
things may be God's alone, both the commandments and
the fulfilling of the commandments."
Luther reasons that:
A Christian has all he needs in faith and needs no
works to justify him, and if he has no need of works,
he has no need of the law, and if he has no need of the
law, surely he is free from the law."
"WA 7:50; AE 31:344.
"WA 7:52; AE 31:347.
"WA 7:53; AE 31:348-9.
"WA 7:53; AE 31:349.
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He therefore concludes,
This is that Christian liberty, our faith, which does
not induce us to live in idleness or wickedness, but
makes the law and works unnecessary for any man's
righteousness and salvation."
Luther is speaking in the context of the freedom of the
Christian man; his conclusion concerns the Christian's
relationship to the Law. The Christian faith makes the Law
unnecessary because faith, not the Law, gives God what
belongs to him." Luther repeatedly affirms that faith
fulfills the Law without works." The First Commandment
of the Decalogue is fulfilled through faith alone. Thus he
concludes, the whole of the Decalogue is fulfilled by
faith."
What then of good works? Luther asks this question recognizing the inherent temptation for man to
conclude that if "faith does all this and is alone
sufficient unto righteousness . . . we will take our ease
and do no more work and be content with faith." 2° This
danger is the impetus for Luther's important distinction
between what is ideally the case and what is in fact the
case. In this focus Luther distinguishes his theology from
"WA 7:53; AE 31:349-50.
"WA 7:53-54; AE 31:348-51.
"WA 7:55-58; AE 31:353-56.
"WA 7:55-56; AE 31:353.
20 WA
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both Augustine and the subsequent Augustinian tradition (as
found in Thomas) through his realistic understanding of the
abiding validity of sin in the regenerate and the
impossibility of perfection in one who remains both flesh
and spirit. If Christian men were "wholly inner and
perfectly spiritual men" they would be free from all
works. But they are not, and so they are yet servants of
the Law.
As long as we live in the flesh, we only begin to make
some progress in that which shall be perfected in the
Insofar as [a Christian] is free
future life. . . .
he does no works, but insofar as he is a servant, he
does all kinds of works.21
Luther recognizes that in the Christian there is a
paradoxical duality. He is justified, and so free. He is
not perfect, but insofar as he is a servant, he does all
kinds of good works.
Luther concludes that it is true that, "good works
do not make a good man, but a good man does good works;
evil works do not make a wicked man, but a wicked man does
evil works."22

The Christian needs no good works for

his righteousness and salvation, but does good works so
that he may serve and benefit others in all he does,
"considering nothing except the need and advantage of his
neighbor."22
21

WA 7:59; AE 31:358.
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Although the Christian is free from all works, by
faith he finds a model for his new life in the life of
Jesus Christ.
he ought in this liberty to empty himself, take upon
himself the form of a servant, be made in the likeness
of men, be found in human form, and to serve, help and
in every way deal with his neighbor as he sees that God
through Christ has dealt with and still deals with
him.24
This is the Christian motive for good works; not the
demand of the Law, but the free Spirit of God.
I will therefore give myself as a Christ to my
neighbor, just as Christ offered himself for me; I will
do nothing in this life except as I see is necessary,
profitable, and salutary to my neighbor, since through
faith I have an abundance of all good things in
Christ."
Christians are to pray against the temptation of
thinking that "when laws are prescribed, that
righteousness must be obtained through laws and works,"
but rather pray that Christ might "write his law in our
so

hearts. .

26

Luther encountered a different problem in the
excessive zeal of Andreas Karlstadt. In his Letter to the
Christians at Strassburg, Luther argued against Karlstadt
on two fronts: (1) Karlstadt's deprecating of the Law of
God into a code of external formalities, and (2)
WA 7:65; AE 31:366.
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Karlstadt's misuse of freedom to undercut the integrity of
the Gospel. Luther refuses to tolerate "anyone
imprisoning Christian freedom by laws and laying a snare
for consciences "27 By no means does Luther intend by
this to be understood as abrogating the Law. In his
Against the Heavenly Prophets he numbers the Law as the
first of the articles "everyone" is to pay attention to
and hold fast.
The first is the law of God, which is to be preached so
that one thereby reveals and teaches how to recognize
sin (Romans 3:20 and 7:7), as we have often shown in
our writings. However these prophets do not understand
this correctly, for this means a truly spiritual
preaching of the law, as Paul says in Rom. 7:14 and a
right use of the law, as he says in 1 Tim. 1:8. 28
Karlstadt has chosen to make a law of external
things in which God gives freedom, making a commandment of
that which God neither commands nor forbids. Luther warns
in his treatise that "these prophets must not be allowed
to force you and forbid you."29 Luther maintains that
he would rather be a monk and return to the cloister than
resubmit to the bondage of humanly instituted rules.3°
Luther indeed refuses to distinguish between the Decalogue
and the ceremonial and judicial laws of the Pentateuch,
27

WA 15:395; AE 40:69.
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WA 18:65; AE 40:82.
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WA 18:142; AE 40:152.
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affirming that the whole Law of Moses has been
abrogated." "Why does one then keep and teach the Ten
Commandments? Answer, because the natural Laws were never
so orderly and well written as by Moses."32 The basis
of the Law is the natural Law written in the heart.
"Where then the Mosaic law and the natural law are one,
there the Law remains and is not abrogated externally,
but only through faith, spiritually, which is nothing
else than the fulfilling of the Law (Rom. 3)."33
Luther's conclusion: whatever "goes beyond the natural law
. . . is free, null, and void. . . . ., 3 4

The Law must be

preached, but not the law of Phariseeism. Rather, it must
be the Law which condemns sin. This is vital, for only
through the proclamation of the Law can hearts be prepared
to hear the Gospel. Luther continues:
Second, when now sin is recognized and the law is so
preached that the conscience is alarmed and humbled
before God's wrath, we are then to preach the
comforting word of the gospel and the forgiveness of
sins so that the conscience again may be comforted and
established in the grace of God, etc.35
One finds thus in the writings of Luther in the early and
mid-twenties a strong accent on the accusing function of
the Law and a continuing celebration of the freedom of the
"WA 18:76; AE 40:93.
32

WA 18:81; AE 40:98.
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Gospel. He very clearly expresses the necessity of the
Law for the conviction of sin in order that the Gospel
might be heard as the divine answer to the fallenness of
man's predicament, but the role of the Law for the
regenerate is less clearly defined. Luther finds in the
theology of Rome and the radicalism of Karlstadt this in
common -- that both would obscure the Gospel by making the
Gospel merely the basis of a new legalism. For Luther the
fulfillment of the Law in not found in the works of men,
but in faith, which comes in Christ. Luther's position
was to be largely distorted by the antinomianism of John
Agricola.
Agricola's Objection to the "Visitation Articles"
Concerned for the spiritual condition of the
evangelical churches, Luther, Melanchthon, and others with
the consent of the Elector began a program of visitation
in 1527. Melanchthon was asked to draw up a doctrinal
formulation to be used in these visitations. Luther wrote
its preface."
In the first article, "Concerning Doctrine,"
Melanchthon expressed the following concerning repentance:
Many now talk only about the forgiveness of sins and
say little or nothing about repentance. There neither
"Heinrich Bornkamm, Luther in Mid-Career
(1521-1530), ed. Karin Bornkamm, trans. E. Theodore
Bachmann (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1983), pp. 491-494.
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is forgiveness of sins without repentance nor can
forgiveness of sins be understood without repentance.
But some hold that nothing should be taught to precede
faith and that repentance follows from and after faith,
in order that our opponents might not be able to say
that we have recanted our former teaching. One ought
to remember that repentance and law belong to the
common faith. For one must of course first believe
that God is the one who threatens, commands, and
frightens, etc. So it is best for the unschooled,
common people, that such phrases of the faith retain
the name of repentance, commandment, fear, law, etc.,
so that they may better distinguish and understand the
faith in Christ which the apostles call justifying
faith, i.e., which makes righteous and takes away
sin."
Since this position was certainly that of Luther and of
the evangelical party, Melanchthon would not have expected
it to have become the source of controversy. However,
John Agricola, a student of Luther, saw in Melancthon's
formulation cause for concern that the evangelical party
was yielding to points of Roman theology through
Melanchthon's emphasis on the Law and repentance. In the
moment of conversion, Agricola asked, is conversion the
result of the Law's indictment of sin or the reality of
the Gospel's proclamation of forgiveness? Agricola argued
that the Law itself could only result in a misbegotten
search for God. The Gospel alone could complete what the
Law could not do. The human heart is conquered through
the confession of sin and faith. Therefore it is not the
37WA 26:202-3; AE 40:274-75; Robert Stupperich,
ed., Melanchthons Werke in Auswahl (Studienausgabe), 7
vols. (Guetersloh: Mohn and Co., 1953-present), 1:222-23.
Hereafter this work will be cited as St.A.
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terrors of the Law but the love of God which is given for
sinners which must be the true and holy preaching of
repentance. It is not the fear of punishment, but the
love of righteousness which is the root of all good. Love
is awakened only through love. Only through the preaching
of the mercy of God are hearts won. Agricola thus turned
the relationship of Law and Gospel around. First came
grace and the justification of the sinner, then the Law by
which one accomplished the will of God. Agricola did not
at this point deny the possibility for a function of the
Law in the life of the regenerate. Rather, his concern
was whether the Law should be preached prior to
conversion.38
Melanchthon wrote to Luther complaining of
Agricola's criticism and Luther responded in a letter
dated October 27, 1528.
You write that somebody is chastising you because you
have taught in your Visitation Articles that penitence
begins with fear of God. Agricola has written me
almost the same thing, but I think little of this war
of words, especially as it affects the common people.
For the difference between fear of penalty and fear of
God is easier to put in syllables and letters than to
recognize in actual fact and in the state of one's own
heart. . . . When we teach the fear of God, then, I
believe we are doing just what we do when we teach the
freedom of the Spirit. There are some who distort the
latter into security of the flesh, and so there are
38 Wilfried Joest, Gesetz Und Freiheit (Goettingen:
Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1968, pp. 46-47.
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some who distort the former into despair, that is, into
fear of penalty. Who can prevent them."
In the second article of the Visitation Articles
Melanchthon had been very clear that the preaching of the
Law must precede that of the Gospel.
The people are thus to be urged and exhorted to fear
God, to repent and show contrition, lest their ease and
life of false security be punished. Therefore Paul
says in Rom. 3:20: "Through the law comes (only)
knowledge of sin." True repentance is nothing but an
acknowledgement of sin.
Then it is important that faith be preached.
Whoever experiences grief and contrition over his sins
should believe that his sins are forgiven, not on
account of his merits, but on account of Christ. When
the contrite and fearful conscience experiences peace,
comfort, and joy on hearing that his sins are forgiven
because of Christ, then faith is present -- the faith
that makes him righteous before God.4°
Luther brought Melanchthon and Agricola together
in conference at Torgau (November 26-28, 1528) to seek
agreement on their views concerning the relationship of
repentance and on their views regarding the relationship
of repentance and faith." Seeming agreement was
reached by distinguishing between faith in a general sense
(fides generalis) which anticipated repentance and the
"justifying faith" Melanchthon had spoken of in Article 1
of the Visitation Articles, which grasps the righteousness
"Martin Luther, Luther's Correspondence, 2
vols. trans. and ed. Preserved Smith and Charles Jacobs
(Philadelphia: The Lutheran Publication Society, 1918)
2:418-19. WA BR 4:271-273.
40 WA
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of God and the forgiveness of sin by grace for the sake of
Christ. This apparent agreement was not to last.
Agricola maintained his position that repentance,
consciousness of sin, and fear of God were to be based on
the Gospel and not on the Law. 42
Melanchthon in the "Apology" and the
Loci on the Law
Although the distinction between "general faith"
and "justifying faith" had brought about a seeming
reconciliation of the conflict between Agricola and the
theology of Luther and Melanchthon, the term "Gospel"
continued to be used both in a broad and narrow sense
often with no indication as to which sense was intended.
In the Apology to the Augsburg Confession, under the title
"Faith in Christ Justifies," Melanchthon uses "Gospel" in
a broad sense. "The Gospel declares that all men are
under sin and are worthy of eternal wrath and death." 43
In a formulation regarding penitence Melanchthon speaks of
the Gospel in a way which must have been heartening to
Agricola.
We say that contrition is the genuine terror of a
conscience that feels God's wrath against sin and is
sorry that it has sinned. This contrition takes place
when the Word of God denounces sin, to offer the
forgiveness of sins and righteousness for Christ's sake,
42 Kawerau, G. "Antinomian Controversies," The
New Schaff-Herzog Religious Encyclopedia, 1:199.
43
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to grant the Holy Spirit and eternal life, and to lead
us as regenerated men to do good.44
On the other hand, "Gospel" is also used by Melanchthon in
the Apology according to its narrow, or proper, or strict
sense (that is, as that by which a man is justified by
grace through faith). An example is to be found in the
same article on "penitence" where Melanchthon questions:
What need is there of Christ if by our work we achieve the
forgiveness of sins? We, on the contrary, call men's
consciences away from the law to the gospel, away from
trust in their own works to trust in the promise and in
Christ; for the gospel shows us Christ and promises the
forgiveness of sins freely for his sake.45 Against the
Roman assertion of works that justify, Melanchthon is very
careful to distinguish the work of the Law and the work of
the Gospel.
This is a teaching of the Law and not of the gospel, to
imagine that a man is justified by the law before being
reconciled to God through Christ. . . . Paul on the
contrary, contends that we cannot keep the law without
Christ. Therefore we must accept his promise that by
faith we are reconciled to God before we keep the
law.46
Thus in the Apology, "Gospel" is used in a wide sense as
including the entire revelation of God, both Law and
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Gospel, and at other times it is used in a narrow sense to
distinguish God's act of salvation in Jesus Christ
(Gospel) from God's requirements of man (Law).
Luther had conceded to Agricola at Torgau that
Gospel in the wide sense may be understood as preceding
the preaching of the Law, insofar as apart from faith, the
only effect of the Law is to effect either work
righteousness or despair. However, in dialogue with the
Roman church, the evangelical party would speak in the
1530s less frequently of the Gospel in its wide sense,
restricting the use of the word "Gospel" generally to the
narrow sense in which Melanchthon had employed it in the
Apology when he wrote:
These are the two chief works of God in men, to terrify
and to justify and quicken the terrified. One or the
other of these works is spoken of throughout
Scripture. One part is the law which reveals,
denounces, and condemns sin. The other part is the
gospel, that is, the promise of grace granted in
Christ."
Perhaps as a consequence of the conflict with Agricola in
1527, and certainly in opposition to the scholastic mixing
of Law and Gospel, there was a gradual restricting of
terminology regarding the use of the word "Gospel" so that
it began to be used more and more only in its narrow sense
and in distinction from the Law (properly understood as
the accusation against sin).
"Ap XII, 53.
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The accusatory function of the Law was not in dispute between the evangelicals and Agricola. Agricola did
not object to Melanchthon's assertion in Article IV of the
Apology, that "the law always accuses and terrifies
consciences. It does not justify. .

.

.

u 4 8

As has been

seen, the question he raised was whether this accusatory
function of the Law had any relation to the salvific
function of the Gospel in justification. Agricola
contended that it did not. By extension the question now
was raised whether the Law had any function in the life of
the regenerate? Was the Christian under obligation to
keep the Law? Should the Law be preached at all, or
should only the Gospel (broad sense) be preached to bring
about sorrow over sin, contrition, repentance, and
forgiveness?
The evangelical position is explained in a section
of the Apology entitled "Love and the Keeping of the
Law." Although directed to the theologians of the Roman
Confutation against the Augsburg Confession, it is also
applicable to the questions Agricola had raised concerning
the Law.49 Melanchthon had maintained that the Law
always accuses and terrifies consciences -- it does not
48
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justify," now, therefore, he continues, "It is
impossible to keep the law without Christ; it is
impossible to keep the law without the Holy Spirit."5 '
Emphasis on the activity of the Holy Spirit in the life of
the Christian man pervades this section. Melanchthon
counters the charge that the evangelicals do not require
good works with the contention that "we not only require
them, but show how they can be done."52 Human strength
cannot keep the Law, "nothing else than Christ's power is
needed for our conflict with the devil."53 Christians
therefore keep the Law, "not because we live up to it, but
because we are in Christ."54 One cannot separate faith
and love; neither may one invert the order, faith -love. Love is a consequence of faith.
Melanchthon is concerned with countering the
contention that love justifies. "Selecting love, which is
only one of these effects of faith, our opponents teach
that love justifies. From this it is clear that they
teach only the law."55 Melanchthon's reasoning is
straightforward.
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If someone believes that he obtains the forgiveness of
sins because he loves, he insults Christ and in God's
judgment he will discover that this trust in his own
righteousness was wicked and empty. 56
Melanchthon acknowledges that "love is the keeping of the
Law and obedience to the Law certainly is righteousness,"57 but he distinguishes between a righteousness of
the Law and the righteousness of faith.
When this keeping of the Law and obedience to the Law
is perfect, it is indeed righteousness, but in us it is
weak and impure. Therefore it does not please God for
its own sake and it is not acceptable for its own
sake.58
One misunderstands the Gospel if he contends that
by faith Christians are justified, but that Christ ceases
to be the mediator following Christian renewal. "It is an
error to suppose that he merely merited 'initial grace'
and that afterward we please God and merit eternal life by
our keeping of the law."59 The Christian must return to
the promise and firmly believe that "we are accounted
righteous on account of Christ. . .
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we please God and that the works in themselves do not have
the value to please God."62 In this connection
Melanchthon cites Jerome. "Our righteousness does not
consist in our own merit, but in God's mercy."63
Although the Christian is still far from perfection in the
Law, yet in Christ the Law cannot condemn him.
Melanchthon sums up his position thus,
Good works should be done because God has commanded
them and in order to exercise our faith, to give
testimony and to render thanks. For these reasons good
works must necessarily be done. They take place in a
flesh that is partly unregenerate and hinders what the
Holy Spirit motivates, fouling it with its impurity.
Because of faith, they are nevertheless holy and divine
works, sacrifices, and the reign of Christ whereby he
shows his rule before the world.64
This citation summarizes the evangelical
understanding of faith and works, in contrast to the Roman
position as exemplified in Thomas Aquinas. Good works are
commanded by God. In this formulation Melanchthon is not
far from the vocabulary of the 1535 Loci where he first
articulated the terminology of the third use of the Law.
Good works are an exercise of faith, not to complete faith
as in Thomas, but in consequence of faith, which is
complete in itself. Good works are necessary as a witness
to faith and in obedience to the command of God, but not
as completing justification or as contributing to
62
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salvation. In a schema incomprehensible to Aquinas,
Melanchthon affirms with Luther that the Christian,
although justified before God, remains only "partly
regenerate." His flesh hinders his renewal, a reality
that becomes a significant factor in explaining the
instructional function of the Law in 1535. While the
flesh hinders the renewal of the regenerate, the Spirit
motivates the Christian to do good works, working through
the Gospel (faith) and not through the Law (coercion).
The "good" of good works describes not an inherent quality
of the work itself but the faith in Christ for whose sake
it is accounted good. Both justification and good works
reflect the grace of God, given not in response to human
merit or effort, but solely from divine love. The
Christian in response does good works, not to witness to
his own goodness, but to witness to the reign of Christ in
the world through his people.
Law and Gospel in Luther
(1532--1537)
Luther's writings in the period between the
Augsburg Confession and the antinomian controversy of 1537
reflect his continuing concern with the proper distinction
between Law and Gospel. Five works will be briefly
surveyed here to develop Luther's understanding of Law, of
Gospel, and of their relationship: The Commentary on Psalm
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51 (delivered in lecture June through August, 1532), the
Lectures on the first chapters of Genesis (1536), the
Lectures on Galatians (1535), the Disputation regarding
Justification (1536) and the Smalcald Articles (1537).
In his Commentary on Psalm 51, Luther
distinguishes between two kinds of sinners: (1) sinners
who do not consider themselves to be sinners and therefore
seek to justify themselves, persecuting the Word of God;
(2) sinners who feel their sins and the wrath of God and
are afraid before the face of God." It is the latter
group which is of interest to the purposes of this study.
According to Luther true theology teaches that those who
are terrified in conscience have truly felt the effects of
divine Law.
then one part of theology is finished, the part that
uses the Law and its threats. . . . We must not stop
here, but go on to the knowledge of the other part of
theology, that part that fulfills the whole of
theological knowledge: that God gives grace to the
humble (1 Peter 5:5).66
Although the power of sin is done away with through divine
mercy, sin itself nevertheless remains. "Wherefore both
statements are true: 'No Christian has sin; and every
Christian has sin.'"" With every Christian moreover
there remains two kinds of sin, "sin that is forgiven,"
65
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and "sin that remains."" "Once a Christian is
righteous by faith and has accepted the forgiveness of
sins, he should not be so smug as though he were pure of
all sins." He is righteous only by an "alien righteousness.
Those who presume perfection are led from the Word
and its gracious pronouncement of forgiveness for Christ's
sake into ungodliness. If one minimizes the remnants of
sin, he is likely to minimize the Spirit who cleanses him,
and his gift of healing. Luther consequently describes
justification as having two parts. Although regeneration
and renewal are both subsumed under the topic of justification, one notes the distinction between justification
(in the narrow sense) and subsequent sanctification.
The first is grace revealed through Christ, that
through Christ we have a gracious God, so that sin can
no longer accuse us, but our conscience has found peace
through trust in the mercy of God. The second part is
the conferring of the Holy Spirit with his gifts, who
enlightens us against the defilements of spirit and
flesh (2 Cor. 7:1).7°
Indeed, there is only one cause for justification,
the merits of Christ. But, "if someone wants to, he may
list the acknowledgement of sin as a second cause or as
the learned say, a causa sine qua non." 71 The Gospel is
"Ibid.
"Ibid.
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primary, but the conviction of sin is necessary. "If the
Law has frightened and whipped a heart until it has been
lead to a feeling of sin, let Christ come according to his
promise and let him console and lift up such a frightened
one again."'" The teaching of the Law is necessary for
both the regenerate and the unregenerate.
For the forgiveness of sins therefore this confession
or knowledge is necessary, that we believe and confess
that we are sinners and that the whole world is under
the wrath of God.73
Both Law and Gospel are the Word of God and are given that
Christians might know that they are sinners and are saved
by grace alone.
In the later Galatians Commentary Luther carefully
delineates the proper relationship between the Law and the
Gospel. Luther here defines two uses of the Law:
political and theological. "The first (political) is to
restrain those who are uncivilized and wicked."'" The
theological use is its spiritual use. True believers,
those justified by faith, do not rely on the Law for their
relationship with God, but on the merits of Christ alone.
A man cannot be a doer of the Law, unless he is first
justified "before and without the law, through
72
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faith."" Nevertheless the Law has a continuing and
abiding function, "to reveal to man his sin, blindness,
misery, wickedness, ignorance, hate, and contempt for God,
death, hell, judgment, and the well deserved wrath of
God."'" This function of the Law is not understood by
hypocrites and sophists who presume their own
righteousness. Because men are by nature legalists
(especially men who try to keep the Law to vindicate
themselves), "God cannot soften and humble this man or
make him acknowledge his misery and damnation in any other
way than by the law."" Luther summarizes his position
most clearly, "But the true use of the Law is this, that I
know that by the Law I am being brought to an acknowledgment of sin, and am being humbled, so that I may come
to Christ and be justified by faith."'"
This is the proper function of the Law. . . . The
sinner should know that the Law does not disclose sins
and humble him to make him despair, but that the Law
was instituted by God so that by its accusation and
crushing it might drive him to Christ. . . ."79
Although the Law kills, "God still uses this effect of the
Law, this death, for a good use, namely, for life."'"
"WA 40-1:430; AE 26:275.
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The regenerate sinner finds himself "divided this way into
two times."
To the extent that he is flesh, he is under the Law; to
the extent that he is spirit, he is under the Gospel.
To his flesh there always clings lust, greed, ambition,
pride, etc. So do ignorance and contempt for God,
impatience, grumbling, and wrath against God because it
obstructs our plans and efforts."
Luther counters the position of Agricola and the
Antinomians with a very specific question. "Why, then, the
Law?" He answers, ". . . When reason hears that
righteousness or the blessing is obtained on the basis of
grace and the promise, it immediately draws the inference, 'Then the Law is worthless."'82 Luther also
contests the position of Karlstadt and the radical right.
The matter of the Law must be considered carefully,
both as to what and as to how we ought to think about
the Law; otherwise we shall either reject it
altogether, after the fashion of the fanatical spirits
who prompted the peasant's revolt a decade ago by
saying the freedom of the Law absolves men from all
laws, or we shall attribute to the Law the power to
justify."
Luther's own position is this:
Both groups sin against the Law: those on the right who
want to be justified through the Law, and those on the
left, who want to be altogether freed of the Law.
Therefore we must travel the royal road, so that we
neither reject the Law altogether nor attribute to it
more than we should.84
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Luther expresses the dual nature of a Christian
as flesh (and therefore under the Law) and spirit (and
therefore under the Gospel). The abiding validity of the
Law (against "fanatical spirits") is not that it justifies
(over against Roman scholastic theology) but that it
accuses sin. As sinners, the regenerate remain under the
Law. As those justified in Christ, the regenerate have no
need of the Law. Luther would not reject the Law, for it
has a continuing function for the regenerate "to the
extent he is still flesh," nor would he attribute to the
Law more than one should (for, "to the extent he is
Spirit, he is under the Gospel"). It is precisely in
these terms that the Formula of Concord, Article VII, "the
Third Use of the Law," articulates the paradoxical reality
of the regenerate sinner-saint.85 Luther at this point,
however, does not draw the conclusion found in the Formula:
"Believers, furthermore, require the teaching of the
law so that they will not be thrown back on their own
holiness and piety, and under the pretext of the Holy
Spirit's guidance set up a self-elected service of God
without his Word and command."
In commenting on Genesis 3:15 in his 1536
Commentary Luther might be mistaken for an antinomian
himself. "If sin in abolished, then also the law."87
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The catch of course is that sin has not been abolished.
Luther's point is that the Law was given after sin.88
There are two kinds of promises: the promise of the Law
(with threats attached for disobedience), and the promise
of grace (which has no threats added to it).89 In his
Disputation regarding Justification of the same year,
Luther specifically articulates his simul Justus et
peccator paradox, and underscores the need for the Law.
Thesis # 23: For we perceive that a man who is
justified is not yet a righteous man, but is in the
very movement or journey toward righteousness.
Thesis # 24: Therefore, whoever is justified is still a
sinner and yet he is considered fully and perfectly
righteous by God who pardons and is merciful.9°
Contrition is necessary for forgiveness, but it does not
provide forgiveness." One cannot desire forgiveness
unless one confesses his sin.92 In the disputation on
Argument X, Luther responds to the assertion that,
"Righteousness depends on a condition of penitence.
Therefore it is the cause of justification."" His
response acknowledges that contrition is necessary for
faith, but also recognizes that true contrition cannot be
88
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made unless mercy and grace are present. One hears here
overtones of the conversation Luther, Melanchthon, and
Agricola shared at Torgau in 1527 on the nature of
repentance. Law must precede Gospel; contrition must
precede forgiveness, and yet for true contrition, there
must already be an expectation of forgiveness, or that
contrition will result in despair or work righteousness.
Much of what has been written above is summarized
succinctly by Luther in the Smalcald Articles.94 The
Law was given to restrain sin but man in his sin ignored
the Law or presumptuously thought he could keep the
Law.95 However, "the chief function or power of the Law
is to make original sin manifest and to show man to what
utter depths his nature has fallen and how corrupt he has
become."96 Luther is sensitive to the spiritual need of
man to be restored, having been crushed by the Law, and in
his article on "Repentance," Luther explains the dynamics
of true contrition over sin. The Law destroys human pride
with its unremitting judgment. "To this office of the Law
the new Testament immediately adds the consoling promise
of grace in the Gospel." Where the Law exercises its
office alone, there is only death and despair, but God
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offers forgiveness in many ways, and with God there is
plenteous redemption (Psalm 130:7).97 In Article III,
Part IV, Luther articulates the means by which the Gospel
comes to the repentant sinful Christian: the spoken Word,
Holy Baptism, the Keys, and the "mutual conversation and
consolation of the brethren."98 It is noteworthy that
John Agricola attached his name to these Smalcald Articles
as one of the signatories. Later that same year, however,
Agricola and the antinomian question again became the
center of focus in Luther's theological concern.
The Writings Against Antinomianism
Agricola's primary concern rested in the question
of whether the Law played a part in the repentance of the
sinner prior to his justification. His answer was that it
did not. Luther on the other hand maintained that the
question of the Law's relevance for the initial conversion
of the sinner also impinged on the Law's usefulness in the
ongoing life of Christian sanctification. If the Law had
no role in accusing man of sin prior to conversion, could
it have a role following conversion? The controversy in
the Lutheran church following Luther's death and
culminating in the Concord established through the
Formula, Articles V and VI, is evidence of the prophetic
nature of Luther's concern.
SA 111,111:8.
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In his Propositions of 1537, Agricola does not
treat of the role of the Law in the regenerate, but of its
role in bringing the unregenerate to the point of
acknowledging the need for a savior from sin. At this
point it is important to recall that both Luther and
Melanchthon had used the term "Gospel" in a wide and
narrow sense. In its broad sense Luther recognized that
"Gospel" is used in Scripture with reference to the whole
body of Christian truth. In its narrow or proper sense,
however, Luther insisted that Gospel be understood in the
sense of promise, that is, the gracious gift of
forgiveness by grace, through faith, for the sake of
Christ. Law in its proper sense he insisted must be
distinguished from Gospel in its proper sense as God's
demand for perfect righteousness, and the expression of
his wrath against sin must be distinguished from the
promise of grace and new life in Christ.
Agricola cited with approval those writings where
Luther had used the term Gospel in its wide sense, but
condemned the use of Gospel in its proper or narrow
sense. The effect was not so much to deny God's wrath
over sin, but to subsume it into a category of the
Gospel. Effectively, Agricola would have ended the
distinction between Law and Gospel, and in that process
would have returned the evangelical church to the basic
error of the Roman church -- the confusion of Law and
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Gospel.99 Yet it was Agricola's contention that he was
saving the evangelical party from alleged Romanizing
tendencies of Luther and Melanchthon, both of whom
insisted on the necessity of the Law's proclamation prior
to the justification of the sinner through the Gospel.
Agricola's Positions Circulated Among Brethren was
circulated anonymously and later printed by Luther with
his Disputations of 1537. Agricola maintains that
repentance must not be taught on the basis of the
Decalogue, but on the basis of the Gospel. This is in
accordance with Christ's words in Luke 24:26; 46-47 and
John 16:8, and Mark 16:15 and Saint Paul in Philippians
2:5 and 12.

. . Repentance must be taught from the

remembrance of Christ, not the Law" (#5). Since men are
justified without the Law, solely through the Gospel,
Agricola concludes that the Law is unnecessary and should
not be taught "for the beginning, the middle, or the end
of justification" (#9). Against Luther and Melanchthon
Agricola concludes, "Thus for the preservation of purity
of doctrine those must be resisted who teach that the
Gospel is not to be preached unless the soul is first
shaken and made contrite by the Law" (#13). Agricola
defines the activity of the Law in a way that might well
have come from the pen of Luther or Melanchthon. "The Law
99
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only accuses against sin, and indeed without the Holy
Spirit, therefore it accuses to condemnation" (#16).
Agricola argued that since the Law cannot save, it has no
place in the preparation of the sinner for justification.
And since the Gospel is the power of salvation, Agricola
contends that any message apart from the Gospel is
irrelevant to justification.
Thesis # 17: However it is the task of teaching that it
not only condemn with great efficacy, but also that it
save at the same time. However, this is the Gospel
which teaches repentance in connection with the
forgiveness of sins.
Thesis # 18: For the Gospel of Christ teaches the wrath
of God and heaven, and at the same time the
righteousness of God, Romans 1. For this is a
preaching of repentance in connection with the promises
which reason cannot hold to naturally, but through
divine revelation.'"
Franz Pieper insightfully writes of this argument,
Agricola wants contrition or repentance taught from the
Gospel and not from the Law, because a contrition or
repentance from love of God can come only from the
Gospel. The last part of this sentence is true of
course. . . . [But] he is actually making trust in
God, or faith, in the remission of sins follow on
contrition which proceeds from love of God, hence
dependent on renewal and sanctification.'°'
In so doing he has denied the function of the Law and put
the teaching of the Gospel in uncertainty, for the
►0OWA 39-1:342-345. The Antinomian Disputations
are not translated in the AE. Translations are the
author's own. For ease in reference, individual thesis
numbers will be cited in the main body of the text using
parentheses.
'
°'Francis Pieper, Christian Dogmatics, 4 vols.
trans. and ed. Theodore Engelder (St. Louis: Concordia
Publishing House, 1950-57), 3:227, emphasis added.
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"Gospel" that reveals sin is not the "Gospel" that
forgives sin -- and the sinner is left without any Gospel
at all. Luther and Melanchthon would certainly agree with
Agricola that the Law accuses of sin and that only the
Gospel justifies, but they would contend that only the one
who has an awareness of his wretchedness before God as
sinner can acknowledge his need for the savior who
forgives sin, when the Gospel is proclaimed to him. Apart
from the Law's accusation, there is no need for the Gospel.
In order that he might document his position
Agricola cites writings of both Luther and Melanchthon to
seek to show that these reformers have departed from their
initial position in their affirmations of a continuing
need for the Law both in the justification and in the new
life of the Christian. The "pure" statements of Luther
and Melanchthon which Agricola cites, upon reading, are
those statements where the reformers were stressing the
Gospel as that which enables Christian freedom and the
love of God and of the neighbor -- situations in which
they were using justification in the context of renewal
and the term "Gospel" in its broad sense. The "impure"
statements Luther and Melanchthon are accused of making
relate to the distinction of the Law and Gospel and the
continuing need for the Law in order that man as sinner
might acknowledge his sin. Luther adds to this series
fourteen propositions of his own which characterize the
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antinomian position or draw out implications of that
position.
The First Disputation Against Antinomianism was
set for December 18, 1537. 102 Agricola was not
present. The arguments of this first Disputation provide
in themselves an excellent summary of Luther's understanding of the relationship between Law and Gospel.
Repentance consists of two parts, sorrow over sin and
resolution to live a better life (#1). Repentance,
understood as sorrow over sin, is the work of the Law
(properly understood) (#4). The resolution to live a
better life is the work of the Gospel (in its narrow
sense). "Therefore to the Law must be added the promise
(that is, the Gospel), which comforts and encourages the
terrified conscience, so that a man can propose to do
good" (#7). Sorrow over sin is only partial repentance
and when one perseveres only in this part of repentance,
the result is despair and destruction (#8-9). Although
scholastic theologians understood repentance as consisting of sorrow over sin and resolution to live the
better life, they imagined that such sorrow over sin came
as the result of man's own efforts and free will (#10-16),
and that the resolution to live a better life flowed from
human choice and powers (#17).
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In Theses 18-22 Luther gives his own position:
that sorrow over sin comes from the Law and that the
resolution to do good is a gift of the Holy Spirit through
the Gospel. Luther also rejects those who "perniciously
teach that the Law must be abolished from the church,"
because "the whole Scripture teaches that repentance is
begun from the Law. . . • " (#24-25). The remainder of the
first Disputation consists of illustrations from Scripture
and from the lives of Adam, David, Paul and Christ
himself, underscoring that "sin and death do not come
through the word of grace and comfort, but must
necessarily be shown through the Law" (#31).
In the second Disputation"3 Luther begins with
statements which of themselves might be misinterpreted as
antinomian.
Thesis # 1: The Law is not only unnecessary for
justification but is entirely useless and utterly
impossible.
Thesis # 8: In summary, the Law must be separated from
justification as far as heaven in distant from earth.
But his purpose is to distinguish Law as entirely impotent
in justification from the grace of Christ which declares
sinners to be saints. "And nothing should be taught,
said, or thought concerning justification unless it
exhibits only the Word of the grace of Christ" (Thesis
#9). But these opening theses dare not be misunderstood.
""WA 39-1:347-350.

103
Luther is just as firm as always that the Law remains a
necessity in the church. "However, it does not follow
from these things that the Law must be abolished and
removed from the teaching of the church" (#10). Why?
Because man in his pride must be brought to see his
unrighteousness and humiliation before God (#11-14). If
this is not done, man in his presumption of innocence will
condemn himself (#13-16). Therefore the Law is "greatly
necessary and useful" (#17) and "whatever points out sin,
wrath, or death, performs the work of the Law, whether it
is in the Old Testament or in the New Testament" (#18).
This statement underscores the dynamic concept Luther has
of divine Law. The Law is not merely a code or a rule; it
is the means by which God addresses each man in his sin
and condemns him.
The Law is to be proclaimed to the secure, those
without repentance. The Gospel is to be announced to
those who sorrow over sin in repentance. Luther
continues, "For to reveal sin is not, and cannot be,
anything other than the Law or the effect and most proper
power of the Law" (#19). Without the Law, sin is not
revealed (#20-24) and if sin is not revealed, there is no
need for forgiveness and no need for a savior (#25-29).
Because the Law too is a Word from God the Holy Spirit, to
forbid. the Law is to forbid the truth of God (#38). The
statements of Agricola and others are thus destructive to
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the Law, the Gospel, and salvation. Luther summarizes his
position with these words: "For as the Law was before
Christ, it certainly accuses us, but it is placated under
Christ by the forgiveness of sins and henceforth fulfilled
through the Spirit" (#45).
Luther underscores the theme of the third
Disputation 104 with his seventh thesis, almost a
verbatim citation of the first of the 95 Theses (1517):
"When Christ rightly says to all his own 'Repent,' he
intends that the entire life of the believer should be
repentant." The Christian does not choose to commit sin,
but nevertheless does sin and must plead for the mercy of
God (#16). In demonstration of the continuing validity of
the Law, Luther cites the Lord's Prayer as a prayer of
repentance. The name of God is not made holy by us, nor
is the kingdom brought by us, nor is God's will done by us
of our own accord, but only in mercy (#18-21). What the
Christian prays for in the Lord's Prayer is what the Law
commands (#22-25). Although the church is holy, it is
also sinful and must continually repent.
On this account even the Lord's Prayer itself teaches
that the Law is before, during, and after the Gospel
and for this reason repentance must begin with the Law
itself. (#27)
Therefore, if the Antinomians would abolish the Law, they
must also abolish most of the preaching of Christ himself
104 WA 39-1:350-352.
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from the Gospel (#31). Christ does more than merely
repeat the Decalogue, he perfects it. "He also repeatedly
accuses, rebukes, threatens, terrifies, and exercises
similar duties of the Law of the Gospel" (#34).
It is interesting to note that Luther uses at this
point the phrase, "Law of the Gospel," delineating Gospel
in its wide sense. This phrase is used by Thomas Aquinas
to describe how Christ perfects the Law of the Decalogue
and to underscore the continuing validity of the Law for
Christians. However, Saint Thomas does not connect the
"Law of the Gospel" with Law as that which accuses,
rebukes, threatens and terrifies, but only as that Law
which in the New Testament completes the Law given in the
Old Testament.'" Luther concludes his third
Disputation by denying the antinomian proposal that sin
can be known from somewhere other than the Law (#37). One
may abolish the Decalogue, but one cannot abolish the Law
of God written on the human heart (#40).
Luther begins the fourth Disputation"s warning
against the Roman error by which it is taught that one
cannot be certain of the forgiveness of sins, for the
Gospel is denied and man is thrown back on his own good
works rather than on the death of Christ on behalf of
"
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sinners (#1-13). But this error is not as severe as the
error of those who would completely deny the Law and leave
no room for repentance (#14-15). The effect of this
antinomian contention, that the Law of Moses is
unnecessary and should not be taught at the beginning, the
end, or the middle of justification would mean a denial of
Paul, a dishonoring of parents and those who govern, in
short, the end of God's structure for both the Kingdom of
heaven and the kingdom of this world (#16-23). Against
this Luther maintains with Saint Paul, "that all men are
sinners (that is the task of the Law), and . . . they must
be justified in Christ" (#24). Man is not convicted as a
sinner except by the Law (#25) and the Law requires that
the entire debt of disobedience be paid (#26-31). The Law
must be taught until it is fulfilled by Christ (#24).
Only faith justifies, fulfills the Law, accents the
forgiveness of sins and does works freely in love
(#35-36). This it does without the Law (#37-38) and in
fulfillment of the Law (#39). Thus the Law is not
abolished, for apart from the Law, the Gospel has no
meaning or purpose. Indeed, Christ restored the Law and
improved the Law (#41).
The fifth Disputation continues the argument with
which the fourth Disputation concluded."' The Law
""WA 39-1:354-357.
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rules as long as sinful man lives. To be free of the Law
unregenerate man must die. This is because sin rules in
man as long as he lives and the Law is the power of sin
(#1-9). Only in Christ is the Law fulfilled, sin
eliminated, and death destroyed. Therefore, insofar as
the Christian is in Christ, he is no longer under the Law,
but insofar as he is a sinner, outside Christ, he is under
Law, sin and death (#12). To abolish the Law, therefore,
one must first abolish sin and death (#17). If the Law is
necessary for those who are Christians, how much more is
it not necessary for the ungodly (#27-29). Denial of this
is the insanity and ignorance of the antinomians (#30),
who would deny the preaching of the Law prior to
justification and as it relates to the life of Christian
renewal. As for Christians:
In this life they are always both just, living in the
flesh, and also evil, combined with the just in greater
numbers. Therefore since the Law is established, it
can hardly be doubted that it should be taught, not
abolished, for by it they came to know sin and death,
that is, the wrath of God. (#33-34)
Thus the law must be taught to the pious and the godless
(#42).
To the godless, that being terrified they may be shown
their sin, death, and the inevitable wrath of God. . .
. To the pious, that they may be admonished to crucify
their flesh with its concupiscence and vices, and not
become secure. (#43-44)
Only in relation to God's declaration of forgiveness has
the Law been removed, not as a result of some formal or
substantial principle. Again, Luther reiterates,
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What the Law does, it does by terrifying and killing,
that it may drive one back to himself, that is,
knowledge of himself. (#59)
For if the Law is abolished it is not known what Christ
is or did, that he fulfilled the Law for us. (#61)
Therefore the teaching of the Law is necessary in the
church and should be entirely retained, for Christ
cannot be retained without the Law. (#66)
Finally, the Law is fulfilled . . . in Christ, but it
is not possible to teach this unless you teach that the
Law is unfulfilled in us. (#68)
In summary, to abolish the Law but leave sin and death
is to obscure the disease of sin and death to the
destruction of men. (#69)
These theses affirm Luther's mature position and provide a
precise understanding of the relative functions of Law and
Gospel, functions in which they are essential to each
other and yet must be carefully distinguished from one
another.
In the sixth Disputation l " Luther underscores
the consequences of the antinomian position: no sin,
therefore no punishment or forgiveness; no punishment or
forgiveness, therefore, no wrath or grace; no wrath or
grace, therefore, no divine or human government; no divine
or human government, therefore, no God and no man; neither
God nor man, therefore there is nothing, "except perhaps
the devil" (#1-6). Luther is not impressed that the
antinomians consider themselves excellent teachers of God,
Christ, grace, and the Law, for in Luther's mind
their doctrine has only taken God's name in vain, as does
""WA 39-1:358.
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the teaching of the false demons and false prophets
(#7-11). Law has no function, politically or
theologicaly, apart from its accusation of sin, thus all
the antinomian fine words about the Gospel mean nothing,
leading to the very most "pestilent villany." They are
not the servants of Christ, but serve themselves and
expect to be served by others, seeking the glory of man in
this life (#20).
Agricola was not present for the first of the
public Disputations (December 18, 1537) but he was present
for the second Disputation (January 12, 1538) after which
he recanted.'" In spite of the public reconciliation
between Luther and Agricola there were rumors of
insincerity on Agricola's part. Agricola was again absent
from the third Disputation (September 6, 1538). In
December of that year Agricola sought reconciliation with
Luther, asking that Luther prepare the text of a
recantation that he would sign. Luther's treatise Against
the Antinomians contained this retraction.
Master John Eisleben wishes to withdraw what he taught
and wrote against the law or the Ten Commandments and
to stand with us here in Wittenberg as the Confession
and Apology did before the Emperor at Augsburg; and if
he should later depart from this or teach otherwise, it
will be worthless and stand condemned."°
In the treatise Luther expresses his bewilderment that
1°9AE 47:103.
"
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anyone should think that he himself was antinomian, citing
his exposition of the Ten Commandments in both the Large
and Small Catechisms. Antinomianism is untenable, he
asserts, for "whoever abolishes the law must
simultaneously abolish sin. If he permits sin to stand,
he must most certainly permit the law to stand. .

•

.'

Moreover, if there is no sin, then Christ is nothing. Why
should he die if there were no sin or Law for which he
must die?'"
Luther connects the necessity of the Law and the
necessity of the atonement; indeed, Luther's understanding
of the atonement informs his understanding of the Law, and
vice-versa. The two are correlative, and each expresses
the sinner's relationship to God, the Law in terms of the
sinner's own righteousness (with the consequence that he
is condemned), and the Gospel in terms of Christ's
righteousness (with the consequence that the sinner is
declared righteous through faith).
Even if we did not require the law for ourselves, or if
we could tear it out of our hearts (which is
impossible) we would have to preach it for Christ's
sake, as is done and has to be done, so that we might
know what he did and suffered for us. . . . For the
law terrifies me more when I hear that Christ, the Son
of God, had to fulfill it for me than it would were it
preached without mention of Christ and of such great
torment suffered by God's Son, but were accompanied
only by threats.'"
"'WA 50:471; AE 47:110.
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The problem the Antinomians have is that their
"new method" by which they "preach grace first then the
revelation of wrath"'" in actuality makes grace of no
consequence. In effect, what they want to do is to
eliminate the Law yet teach the wrath of God, which is the
function only of the Law. "Thus they merely discard the
few letters that compose the word 'law' meanwhile
affirming the wrath of God. . ,

• .0114

Luther

sarcastically characterizes the antinomian position as one
in which it is contended,
"We are sheer spirit, we have taken captive our own
flesh together with the devil, so that all our thoughts
and ideas are surely and certainly inspired by the Holy
Spirit, and how can it be found wanting." 15
In this Luther approaches the concern of the third
function of the Law (as described by Melanchthon), that it
is necessary for the regenerate (because they are
spiritually weak) to be instructed by the Word in those
works which please God, and not rely on their own
opinions, good intentions, supposed spirituality or
spiritual intuitions. The third use of the Law thus
affirms the Scriptures as the means by which the Holy
Spirit teaches, reproves, corrects, and trains in
righteousness (2 Timothy 3:16).
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At this same time Luther also expressed his
concerns about the antinomians in his treatise on the
Councils and the Church (1539). Although the antinomians
preach with real sincerity about the forgiveness of sins
and the doctrine of redemption, "they flee as it were the
very devil the consequences that they should tell the
people about the third article, about sanctification, that
is, of the new life in Christ. 41116

In this writing

Luther's concern is not related directly to the function
of the Law in the accusation of sin, so that the sinner
might be prepared to hear the gracious message of the
Gospel, but rather with the effects of antinomian teaching
on the life-style of the regenerate.
They think one should not frighten or trouble the
people but rather always preach comfortingly about
grace and the forgiveness of sins in Christ. . . .
You want to be a Christian and at the same time remain
an adulterer, a usurer, envious, vindictive, malicious,
etc.! Instead they say, though you are a whoremonger,
a miser, or other kind of sinner, if you but believe,
you are saved, and you need not fear the law. Christ
has fulfilled it all.'''
Luther's conclusion: "They may be very fine Easter
preachers, but they are very poor Pentecost preachers, for
they do not preach de sanctificatione et vivificatione
Spiritus Sancti. . • ." 118
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invalidating the work of Christ by despising the Law, but
they are also making of no avail the ministry of the Holy
Spirit, "because they propose to let the people continue
in their old ways and still pronounce them saved."'"
In discussing the nature of the church, Luther
again criticizes the antinomians for their disregard of
sanctification. Christians are holy people, "not only
through the forgiveness of sin acquired for them by Christ
(as the antinomians foolishly believe), but also through
the abolition, the purging, and the mortification of sins
on the basis of which they are called a holy
people..120

In consequence the antinomians only

strengthen those who remain in their sins, failing to
teach them of the errors of sin, since they are all
removed by Christ."' Preaching Christ, they destroy
Him through their teaching. One cannot affirm the first
great table of the law ("about comfort, grace, and
forgiveness of sins") and not also give heed to the works
of the Spirit in the second table.'22
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Forensic Justification in Luther
Agricola had argued that the Law had no validity
in the conversion of man because only the Gospel could
awaken a love for God. This argumentation was valid only
if justification were understood effectively as the making
righteous of the unrighteous. In arguing for the necessity of the proclamation of the Law prior to the conversion of the unregenerate, Luther was inevitably placing
justification in its forensic setting, as the nonimputation of sin and the imputation of the righteousness of Christ. In carefully distinguishing Law and
Gospel, Luther was also distinguishing justification as
the declaration of Christ's righteousness from renewal as
the effective consequence of man's new relationship with
God.
One is not surprised then to note that, although
Luther speaks of justification in an effective sense prior
to the antinomian controversy, as an infusion of
righteousness by which the unrighteous become righteous,
following the controversy Luther tends toward the language
of forensic justification, stressing the non-imputation of
sin and the imputation of Christ's rightousness. Since
the Large Catechism is written at the beginning of this
controversy (indeed, one notes many similarities between
the Visitation Articles and Luther's two Catechisms) one
finds there a theology of justification which speaks in
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effective terms. The Smalcald Articles on the other hand
were written near the end of the controversy with
Agricola, and reflect a forensic understanding of
justification.
In the Large Catechism one notes a certain degree
of ambiguity with regard to the distinction between
justification and sanctification. Speaking of the
activity of the Holy Spirit in the third article Luther
writes, "Therefore to sanctify is nothing else than to
bring us to the Lord Jesus Christ to receive these
blessings which we could not obtain by ourselves."` 23
Employ the word "justify" in place of the word "sanctify"
and the sentence does not change meaning. This
understanding is confirmed in Luther,
The Holy Spirit reveals and preaches that Word and by
it he illumines and kindles hearts so that they grasp
and accept it, cling to it, and persevere in it. 124
Justification as acceptance and sanctification as
perseverence are not distinguished but viewed in a continuum of regeneration. The Holy Spirit must "awaken
understanding in the heart" and "make us acceptable to the
Father."'" "Forgiveness is needed constantly,'1126
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for without forgiveness there can be no holiness.'"
Meanwhile, since holiness has begun and is growing
daily, we await the time when our flesh will be put to
death, will be buried with all its uncleanness and will
come forth gloriously and arise to complete and perfect
holiness in a new, eternal life. Now we are only
halfway pure and holy.'"
Throughout the Christian life the Spirit continues to work
through the Word until the day of resurrection when
forgiveness is no longer necessary. Luther's vocabulary is
unmistakably Augustinian ("justum facere"), and he
describes justification and sanctification similarly in the
fourth section of the Large Catechism, concerning the power
and effect of Baptism,
which is simply the slaying of the old Adam and the
resurrection of the new man, both of which actions must
continue in us our whole life long. Thus a Christian
life is nothing else than a daily baptism, once begun
and ever continued.'"
One immediately notes a difference in vocabulary in
the Smalcald Articles with the extensive citation of the
forensic vocabulary of Saint Paul in Romans 3.
Moreover, "All have sinned," and "they are justified by
his grace as a gift, through the redemption which is in
Christ Jesus, by his blood" (Rom. 3:23-25). . . .
Inasmuch as this must be believed and cannot be obtained
or apprehended by any work, law, or merit, it is clear
and certain that such faith alone justifies us, as St.
Paul says in Romans 3, "For we hold that a man is
justified by faith apart from works of law" (Romans
LC 11:56.
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3:28), and again, "that he [God] himself is righteous
and that he justifies him who has faith in Jesus"
(Romans 3:26).'"
In Part III, section XIII, Luther describes justification
in clearly forensic terms.
by faith . . . we get a new and clean heart and . . .
God will and does account us altogether righteous and
holy for the sake of Christ, our mediator. Although the
sin in our flesh has not been completely renewed or
eradicated he will not count or consider it. 131
Not only is the Christian initially accounted righteous but
even in the renewal which follows, his works are good only
by the imputation of Christ's righteousness.
Good works follow such faith, renewal, and forgiveness. Whatever is still sinful and imperfect in
these works will not be reckoned as sin or defect for
the sake of the same Christ. The whole man, in respect
both of his person and of his works, shall be accounted
and shall be righteous and holy through the pure grace
and mercy which has been poured out upon us so
abundantly in Christ.'32
The Galatians Commentary (1535) and the Disputation on
Justification (1536) signal a similar change in vocabulary.
A helpful digest of the mature Luther's doctrine
of justification is found in his 1535 Commentary on
Galatians 2:16. "Yet you know that a man is not justified
by works of the law but through faith in Jesus Christ."
True Christian repentance and righteousness is in the
Christ, "who is grasped by faith and lives in the heart,"
SA 11:1-4.
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and "on account of which God counts us righteous and
grants us eternal life."'" This faith which grasps
Christ "is counted for righteousness...134
Here it is to be noted that these three things are
joined together: faith, Christ, and acceptance or
imputation. Faith takes hold of Christ and has Him
present, enclosing Him as the ring encloses the gem.
And whoever is found having this faith in Christ, who
is grasped in the heart, him God accounts as righteous.
This is the means and merit by which we obtain the
forgiveness of sins and righteousness . . . . Thus God
accepts you or accounts you righteous, only on account
of Christ in whom you believe.'"
The imputation of Christ's righteousness is necessary not
only in the initial conversion of the sinner, but also in
the ongoing life of sanctification. "Now acceptance is
extremely necessary, first, because we are not yet purely
righteous, but sin is still clinging to our flesh during
this life. God cleanses this remnant of sin in our
flesh."'36 With Christ as the mediator between God and
man by faith, "all our sins are sins no longer." 37 But
without Christ there is no forgiveness, only the "sheer
1.136
imputation and condemnation of sins.
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The non-imputation of sin and the imputation of
the righteousness of Christ do not mean a passivity in
Christian love. "Because you have taken hold of Christ by
faith through whom you are righteous, you should now go
and love God and your neighbor."'" This the Christian
can easily do for he has been "liberated from the burden
and sting of sin," and consequently, "because everything
is sweet and pleasant within, he willingly does and
suffers everything. H140
A Christian is not someone who has no sin and feels no
sin; he is someone to whom, because of his faith in
Christ, God does not impute his sin . . . . It is not
in vain, therefore, that so often and so diligently we
inculcate the doctrine of the forgiveness of sins and
the imputation of righteousness for the sake of
Christ.`"`
The Christian is above the Law and sin because in his
heart Christ is present. When the Law accuses him he
looks to Christ and has him present within him, the victor
over the law, sin, death, and the devil.'42 Se . . . Sin
is forgiven and righteousness is imputed to him who
believes in Christ." This makes him "a son and heir of
God." "Through faith in Christ . . . everything is
"'Ibid.

"'WA 40-1:235; AE 26:133.
'42WA 40-1:235; AE 26:134.

120
granted to us -- grace, peace, the forgiveness of sins,
salvation, and eternal life."'"
Commenting on the second half of Galatians 2:16
("Even we have believed in Christ Jesus, in order to be
justified by faith in Christ and not by works of the Law")
Luther strictly distinguishes between justification and
sanctification. "Since we are now dealing with the topic
of justification we reject and condemn works, for this
topic of justification will not allow any discussion of
good works.li144

His definition of justification is a

classic forensic description. "We are pronounced
righteous solely by faith in Christ, not by the works of
the law or by love."'45
Luther's understanding of "flesh" plays a part in
this understanding of justification.

. 'Flesh' means

the entire nature of man, with reason and all his powers.
This flesh . . . is not justified by works, not even by
those of the law."'" Luther is not speaking here only
of sins against the Law, but is maintaining that "flesh"
is not justified by works done in accordance with the Law
"works that are good."'"
143
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process of renewal because even the good works of man are
of the flesh and consequently of no merit.

II
•

•

. 'Flesh'

means the highest righteousness, wisdom, worship,
religion, understanding and will of which the world is
capable.„148 The papists, Zwinglians, Anabaptists and
all those who either do not know about the
righteousness of Christ or do not believe correctly
about it . . . [teach]: "Faith in Christ does indeed
justify, but at the same time observance of the
Commandments of God is necessary. . . ." Here
immediately Christ is denied and faith is abolished,
because what belongs to Christ alone is attributed to
the Commandments of God or to the Law."'49
Later, in his commentary on verse 2:20, Luther
sums up his position. "In short, this life is not the
life of the flesh although it is a life in the flesh; but
it is the life of Christ, the Son of God, whom the
Christian possesses by faith."'" The Christian and his
Lord share a union through faith by which life itself is
shared; whatever belongs to Christ ("grace, righteousness,
life, peace, and salvation") now belongs to the Christian.
"I must be so closely attached that He lives in me and I
in him."'" All this is the Christian's possession "by
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the cementing and attachment that are through faith, by
which we become as one body in the Spirit."'"
The imputation of the righteousness of Christ is
no static exoneration of a guilty man, but an intimate
union by which the Christian and his Lord share a common
life. Anyone who seeks a righteousness apart from faith in
Christ "is nullifying the grace of God and despising the
death of Christ, even though he may speak otherwise with
his mouth."'" How does one reconcile this vocabulary
with the vocabulary of the earlier Luther and the imagery
of the Catechisms? Luther offers help in this regard in
his Disputation on Justification (1536), in which he
clearly articulates a forensic theology of justification.
though sin remains, He [God] considers us to be
righteous and pure, and that a man is so absolved as if
he had no sin, for Christ's sake. We truly thank God
because his imputation is greater than our impurity.
And sin which in substance is not being removed, shall
be imputed as having been removed and shall be absorbed
by the goodness of God who conceals it on account of
Christ who overshadows it, although it remains in
nature and substance.
The adversaries do not want to admit this.
Therefore they laugh when we say that faith justifies
yet sin remains. For they do not believe that
incredible magnitude of God's power and mercy beyond
all mercy. He who is righteous is willing to concede
this, but he who is not righteous wants to consider
himself righteous. This imputation is not something of
no consequence, but is greater than the whole world and
the holy angels. Reason does not see this for there is
a kind of neglect of the Word of God. But we should
give thanks to God, I say, because we have such a
I52
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Savior who is able to cover us and to count our sin as
nothing. For God's mercy is pardoning and love is
meanwhile forgiving, and God really takes sin in such a
way that it does not remain sin, because he begins
materially to purge and to forgive completely. On no
condition is sin a passing phase, but we are justified
by the unmerited fprgiveness of sins and by the
justification of God's mercy. Sin remains, then,
perpetually in this life, until the hour of the last
judgment comes and then at last we shall be made
perfectly righteous. For this is not a game or
delusion, that we say, 'Sins are forgiven by faith and
only cling to us, because that newness of life has
miraculously begun.' In short, the term 'to be
justified' means that a man is considered
righteous.'"
Here is a clear description of Luther's understanding of
the non-imputation of sin and the imputation of the
righteousness of Christ. And yet, remarkably, in the
citation immediately before the above quotation, Luther
writes in a manner which initially seems completely at
odds with a forensic view of justification. "I reply to
the argument, then, that our obedience is necessary for
salvation. It is therefore, a partial cause of our
justification."'" Luther clarifies what he means when
he writes, "Works are necessary to salvation, but they do
not cause salvation because faith alone gives life. On
account of the hypocrites we must say that good works are
necessary to salvation."'" Works save outwardly; that
is, they show evidence that the Christian is righteous and
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that there is faith in the Christian that saves inwardly.
It is as Paul says, "Man believes with his heart and so is
justified, and he confesses with his lips and so is
saved."'" Luther has made a distinction between two
kinds of righteousness: the inward rightousness of faith
and the outward righteousness of works. However he uses
the word "justification" to describe both inward and
outward righteousness.
Luther explains the distinction and the necessity
of the affirmation of two kinds of righteousness.
For the Christian shows his life and that he has been
made a Christian by love and good works and flees all
vices. . . . Love merits forgiveness of sins, that is,
love reveals that his sins have been forgiven.
Christ is there speaking of both kinds of
righteousness, first because above all we should know
that by faith in Christ our sins are forgiven in the
sight of God, and this is called inward righteousness.
Next, after the forgiveness of sins, love ought to
follow. This love shows all men that we have the
remission of sins and that we have been pronounced
righteous by God, and this is called outward
righteousness. This righteousness follows, the former
precedes, since the order is a priori, that is, from
the efficient cause of justification
Spiritual justification then is twofold in nature.
Where justification is between God and man, this is
from the efficient cause. The other is corporal and
outward, which takes place between man and man; this is
from the effect. Before God, faith is necessary, not
works. Before man, works and love are necessary, which
reveal us to be righteous in our own eyes and before
the world. We concede then that man justifies himself,
as to the effective cause, but not with respect to the
efficient cause. For this cause is from God alone and
without works, by faith alone in Christ. . . . 158
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As one reads through the extensive Disputation on
Justification one is immediately impressed how this
distinction between inward and outward righteousness
clarifies the ambiguities which otherwise seem so
contradictory within Luther. Although Luther uses the
word "justification" to cover both kinds of righteousness,
he is sharply distinguishing between justification as the
imputation of the righteousness of Christ (an "alien
righteousness" which is "outside us and foreign to us" and
"cannot be laid hold of by our works)" 159 and
sanctification which justifies before men ("because it is
necessary for us to be as certain before man through the
evidence of our faith, as we are certain before
God"). 160

Luther is using "justification" both to

describe man's relationship to God in the inwardness of
faith (justification in its narrow sense) and to describe
man's relationship to man in the outwardness of works
(justification in its broad sense).
Luther maintains that the two doctrines, "promise
and the law," are correlatives. "Law has works. Promise
has faith." Faith alone justifies, "but we should give
evidence of it and show it through works, because fruits .
. and works testify that perfect faith is present in
us."161

Justification is a continuing activity, not in
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the sense of a progress in renewal, but in a recurring
imputation of the righteousness of Christ and a continuing
non-imputation of sin.
Summary: Luther on Justification and the Law
Does Luther teach a third use of the Law? It is
clear that he does not use third use of the Law
vocabulary. Werner Elert has convincingly demonstrated
that the single reference to a three part division of the
Law in Luther's Antinomian Disputations'62 is in fact an
interpolation from Melanchthon's 1535 Loci (second
edition).163 Granted then that Luther does not use the
phrase "third use of the Law" and nowhere divides the Law
into three functions (civil, theological, and
instructional), does this mean as Elert and others would
contend, that Luther does not teach an instructional
function of the Law? 164 A yes or no answer in Luther is
not easy to establish.
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164The position of Elert and others who deny
that there is a legitimate third function of the law in
Lutheran theology will be discussed in chapter VI. The
question at this point is whether Luther describes a
pedagogical function of the law as in any sense distinct
from the theological function of the law which always
condemns the sinners even in its instruction.
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Luther functions with a very dynamic understanding
of the Law in relation to man, both man as unregenerate
sinner and man as regenerate sinner-saint. For Luther the
Law is never merely a code or a rule; it is a part of the
fabric of creation. The written Law of Moses possessed
its authority because it is the divine explication of the
natural Law God has written in human hearts. The question
of an instructional function of the Law does not arise of
course in a discussion of the Law in relation to the
unregenerate. Here Luther affirms only the accusatory
function of the Law, with the result that the unregenerate
ignore the Law, modify the Law, or despair of the Law and
are confirmed by the Law in their sin. With regard to the
regenerate Luther recognizes the existential duality of
the Christian who is simulteneously saint and sinner,
totally saint, totally sinner. As saint, the Christian is
in the Law by grace and has no need of the Law. As
sinner, the Christian is under the Law and feels the
weight of its constant accusation. However, the
accusation of the Law has a different effect in the
regenerate. While in the unregenerate the Law's
accusation results in either legalism or despair, in the
Christian the accusation of the Law brings the believer to
his knees before Christ, seeking in faith the forgiveness
only Christ can give. Thus the Law is fulfilled for
Luther, not in works, but by faith, alone. Good works are
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not the effect of the Law, but the fruits of the Holy
Spirit who motivates the Christian to have the mind of
Christ and to live according to his new commandment,
loving others as he has been loved by Christ himself (John
15:12). But being motivated by the Holy Spirit to seek to
do the will of God and knowing what that will is are two
different things.
In his duality as sinner-saint the Christian in
his desire to know the will of God is constantly
frustrated by his own sinful nature. Luther explains this
existential reality in which the Christian finds himself
with the simple words of the Small Catechism regarding the
ongoing significance of baptism.
What does such baptizing with water signify?
Answer: It signifies that the old Adam in us together
with all sins and evil lusts, should be drowned by
daily sorrow and repentance and be put to death, and
that the new man should come forth daily and rise up,
cleansed and righteous, to live forever in God's
presence. 165
The drowning of the old Adam is a function of the Law as
it accuses sin. What function, if any, does the Law have
for the "new man" who desires to live "cleansed and
righteous . . . in God's presence?"
Perhaps nowhere does Luther give his answer more
clearly than in his explanation to the Decalogue in his
two Catechisms and in his explanations for the first three
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petitions of the Lord's Prayer (which as has been seen are
closely associated in Luther's mind). With the exception
of the First Commandment, Luther explains each commandment
in three parts. First, Luther affirms the relationship
that exists between God and man by grace through faith:
"We should fear and love God. . . ." Second, Luther
describes what the commandment proscribes (". . . that we
may not . . ."). Third, Luther affirms what God wills for
his people (". . . but rather . . ."). Certainly the
proscription (". . . that we may not . . .") of the
commandment is an accusation of sin for everyone doing
such things, and the affirmation of what God requires
(". . . but rather . . .") condemns those who have not
sought to do this will of God. In both cases the sinner
has failed to keep the First Commandment, that he should
"fear, love, and trust in God above all things. 0

1 6 6

But

if the fulfillment of the First Commandment is faith, and
the Christian in faith seeks the will of God, then
Luther's positive affirmation of God's will ("• . . but
rather

. .") is not an imperative, but an indicative.

Having the righteousness of Christ and the forgiveness of
sins, the believer seeks the will of God revealed in his
Word. The Law for the believer not only proscribes sin
but describes God's immutable will.
'
66 AC 1:2.
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It is in this second part of the explanation (".
. but rather . . .") that Luther is connecting the
teaching of the Decalogue with the Natural Law written in
the human heart. If mankind were not perverted by sin and
man would naturally seek those things which are of God,
there would be no need for the proscription of the Law
(". . . that we may not . . .") and man would happily do
what God desires (". . . but rather . . ."). Since the
fall, however, only those in Christ can choose to do what
Gdd wills. When Luther writes in the Large Catechism that
faith is the fulfillment of the first commandment and of
the whole Law, 167 he is describing this positive
function of the Decalogue in which God testifies to his
will for his people. It is in the Preface to the Large
Catechism that Luther writes, "This much is certain,
anyone who knows the Ten Commandments perfectly knows the
entire Scriptures." 168 Luther's insight in this regard
is supported by the Hebrew text, in which the "ten words"
of the Law are written not in the imperative but in the
indicative. Because you are my people, God says, you will
live thus . . . (Exodus 20:3-17).
Luther's explanation to the Third Commandment may
be used as an example of this emphasis. He does not
LC 1:13-15.
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understand this commandment to require a particular day
for worship or to require particular activities to
sanctify the day. Again, locating the commandment in the
creation and stressing its origin in the divine rest the
seventh day, Luther focuses in his explanation on the
divine Word. What defines the Sabbath is not its location
on the calendar but it is that time set apart for the
people of God to hear the Word. Every day is a sabbath
when the people of God hear the Word, hold it as holy and
gladly learn it.169 Certainly Luther held the
assembling of the saints for worship as important, but the
accent in his explanation is on the need of the Christian
to live (every day) in the Word of God. This emphasis on
hearing and learning the Word accords with his positive
view of the Law as describing what the saints of God will
seek to do in their desire to live according to the
creative and re-creative will of God. In the Word alone
that will of God is to be found.
The same emphasis on the Scriptures as the Word
which reveals the will of God is present in Luther's
explanations for the first three petitions of the Lord's
prayer. When Christians pray that God's name would be
holy among them, they are praying that the Word of God
might be taught clearly and purely, so that they might
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live holy lives in accordance with it.'" One could
hardly hope to find a more specific reference to the
instruction or pedagogical function of the Word of God in
relation to Christian living. If a Christian would keep
the Second Commandment, he must learn to pray the first
petition of the Lord's Prayer, for God's name is hallowed
only when God's Word is taught clearly and purely and
Christians live lives in accordance with it.
When Christians pray that the kingdom of God might
come, they are praying for the coming of the Spirit of God
so that "by his grace we may believe his holy Word and
live a godly life. . . ." 171 God's kingdom comes
through the Word empowered by the Spirit. The Spirit uses
means, and if the Christian would participate in the
coming of the kingdom, he must utilize the means the
Spirit gives. God's will is not to be found apart from
the Word he has given. The will of God is mediated
through that Word, and not by private illumination or
through the fanaticism of those who set themselves up as
above the Word (Karlstadt, Muenzer, and the Zwickau
prophets, for example). The Spirit works through His Word
to create faith and to empower the Christian for godly
living. One cannot keep the Third Commandment, gladly to
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hear and learn the Word, without praying the Second
Petition of the Lord's Prayer, that through the Spirit of
God mediated in the Word he might believe the gospel and
live a Christian life.
Similarly, the Third Petition of the Lord's Prayer
centers in the will of God, revealed in the Word of God.
The Law accuses sin, "when God curbs and destroys every
evil counsel and purpose of the devil, of the world, and
of our flesh which would hinder us from hallowing his name
and prevent the coming of his kingdom. .

Of
•

•

But through

the Gospel the Holy Spirit "strengthens us and keeps us
steadfast in the Word and in faith. .

,172

1

• •

The basis

of these petitions is the relationship that already exists
between God and his people, who believe "that he is truly
our Father and we are truly his children. .

,, 1 7 3

Just as the basis of the Commandments is to be found in
faith, "We should fear, love and trust in God above all
things."0174

For the regenerate, this filial fear of God

is joined with faith which consoles the anxious heart. It
is not the "servile fear" of the unbeliever who has no
faith and can find no comfort in the Word."' For those
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"'Thomas makes the distinction between "filial
fear" and "servile fear" in the Summa, see above, chapter
II. Melanchthon also makes this distinction in Ap X11:38.
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who love God as sons and daughters by faith, the Law does
not condemn, but instructs in the Word of God as an
instrument of the Holy Spirit.
With Luther's dynamic concept of the Law, the Law
is not merely a code, but the revealed will of God which
the Christian sinner-saint will seek with all his heart.
Both Law and Gospel express the will of God. That which
affirms God's expectation of man is the Law. That which
conveys God's promise of salvation by grace through faith
in Christ Jesus is the Gospel. Only the Christian can
keep the Law because only the Christian lives by grace
through faith in the imputed righteousness of Jesus
Christ. The Law of God is immutable. There is no change
in the Law. But through the Gospel there is a change in
man so that his will is no longer turned against God but
is turned in faith toward God. Regenerated by grace
through faith, he seeks what the Law commands, not by
coercion, but in loving obedience. With this change in
the heart of man the Law serves a positive, instructional
function in revealing God's will so that believers may
know with certainty how they may please God. The Law has
accused these sinner-saints in their sin. Now, forgiven
in Christ these sinner-saints find in that same Law, not
condemnation, but the revelation of God's will. Their
response is not one of despair or work righteousness but
rather one of thanksgiving, praise and love. As those who
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are already God's people the Law instructs them in the
righteousness of God, so that they are not dependent on
private opinion. In this Luther is reflective of the Old
Testament concept of Torah as embracing both command and
promise. Luther's understanding of the Law for the
regenerate is that of the Psalmist who, as one who loves
God, meditates on God's Law day and night (Psalm 1:2).
Nothing is so effectual against the devil, the world,
the flesh, and all evil thoughts as to occupy oneself
with the Word of God, talk about it, meditate on it.
Psalm 1 calls those blessed who "meditate on God's Law
day and night." You will never offer up any incense or
other savor more potent against the devil than to
occupy yourself with God's commandments and words and
to speak, sing, and meditate on them. This indeed, is
the true holy water, the sign which routs the devil and
puts him to flight.'76
The Law has nothing to do with justifying the
sinner. Only the Gospel can do that. The Law does not
motivate obedience, only the Gospel can do that. The Law
does not make the works of the Christian good. Only the
imputation of the righteousness of Christ by grace through
faith can do that. But the Law does testify to the
Christian of those works which God desires and in love the
Christian seeks to do God's will according to both tables
of the Decalogue. Thus Luther can speak in his Antinomian
Disputations of "the new Law of the Gospel" -- not as did
Thomas who denied the sola fide (in an evangelical sense)
-- in accordance with Saint Paul when he wrote to the
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Philippians, "And I am sure that he who began a good work
in you will bring it to completion at the day of Jesus
Christ" (Philippians 1:6). Being "partakers . . . of
grace" (Philippians 1:7), Paul can pray for his Christian
friends
that your love may abound more and more, with knowledge
and all discernment, so that you may approve what is
excellent and may be pure and blameless for the day of
Christ, filled with the fruits of righteousness which
come through Jesus Christ, to the glory and praise of
God. (Philippians 1:8-11)
Knowledge and discernment come through the Scriptures as
Paul pointedly reminds the young pastor Timothy, "All
Scripture is inspired by God and profitable for teaching,
for reproof, for correction, and for training in
righteousness, that the man of God may be complete,
equipped for every good work" (II Timothy 3:16).
With this understanding of the relationship of
faith and works, Luther refuses to separate grace in
Christ (by which a man is declared righteous before God)
from grace in works (the external righteousness of love's
response). Righteousness is descriptive of man only by
grace through faith. This is true not only of the inward
righteousness of the Christian heart, but also of external
righteousness expressed in the subsequent good works of
the Christian. The Christian is good before God by grace
through faith; so also his works are good before God by
grace through faith. God gives what God requires.
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Therefore, for Luther, justification may be described in
its narrow sense as the inward righteousness of the
regenerate in relation to God or justification may be
understood in its wider sense as the external
righteousness embracing both regeneration and renewal,
expressed in a life of loving God and the neighbor. Both
internal and external righteousness, regeneration and
renewal, are by grace alone, through faith alone. Man's
efforts neither change his relationship with God nor make
his works good.
In summary, three aspects of Luther's theology
impinge on his understanding of justification,
sanctification and the continuing validity of the Law for
the regenerate. First, Luther uses "justification" in a
broad and narrow sense. Second, Luther often does not
carefully distinguish between justification (in the narrow
sense) and sanctification as renewal, since all is by the
grace of God, alone. Third, Luther uses the Augustinian
"make righteous" effective vocabulary of justification in
a very non-Augustinian way. Justification is descriptive
of what God's grace does in both regeneration and renewal:
it makes people holy before God and it makes their works
holy before God through faith. Grace is not an infused
quality that transforms man and enables him to do good
works. Grace is rather the gift of God which transforms
the relationship between God and man so that God accounts
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the man and his works as good, for Christ's sake. Adolf
Koeberle writes of Luther:
With Luther the primary question was likewise not that
of making holy but of being accounted holy. The
communion with God that has been interrupted by guilt
can only be again restored through the removal of guilt.
. . . Besides the idea of the imputation of the
righteousness of God we always find associated with it
in Luther's ideas the belief in the commencement and
continuation of a progressive renewal in life, but with
the righteousness of faith ranking above the renewal. .
. . He wanted to distinguish between "external"
righteousness and "inner" sanctification but without
separating them from each other. His linking together
of the two while at the same time maintaining their
correct inner sequence will always remain the ideal
solution to the problem. So, and only so, will
justification be preserved from the danger of quietism
and sanctification from the danger of perfectionism."'
The instructional function of the Law in Luther as
a result is reflective of Luther's understanding of the
grace of God in Christ Jesus and the reality of the
Christian condition as one who is a sinner-saint. Aquinas
describes grace as an infused quality which transforms man
so that he is no longer a sinner but is holy, having by
grace a habitus by which he is able to do works which are
holy in themselves. Luther denies that grace is a habitus
or that faith infused by love is a virtue of the Christian
himself. Rather, Luther sees grace as descriptive of the
ongoing relationship of forgiveness imputed by God, who
continues to restore the sinner-saint to himself and who
"'Koeberle, Quest for Holiness, p. 92, footnote
12:Excursus.

139

accords the works of that man as good, not because of an
inherent goodness in the man himself or in his works, but
because he is imputed righteous by grace and his works
done in faith are accounted good by God's gracious
acceptance.
In all of this Luther remains governed, not by
humanistic or scholastic presuppositions, but by his
abiding concern to be faithful to the Scriptures. He
strongly denounces (1) the enthusiasm of "fanatical
spirits" who esteem their private revelations and
understandings as above that of Scripture; (2) the
antinomianism of Agricola who denies the Scriptures when
he denies the continuing validity of the Law for the
regenerate; (3) the Romanists, who distort the clear
teachings of Scripture by their scholastic and
Aristotelian presuppositions; and (4) "those lazy bellies
and presumptuous saints" who think they are learned
theologians and do not know the biblically based teachings
of the Catechism."$ The Decalogue has abiding validity
for the Christian because it remains the Word of God and
the will of God.
It is no small task to synthesize Luther's
prophetic insights into an effective format for the
instruction of the church. How does one structure
178
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Luther's theology against those who disproportionately
emphasize one aspect of his teaching over another or
against others who play off one statement against
another. It was Melanchthon's often avowed intention to
remain faithful to God's Word and Luther's teaching as he
created a dogmatic synthesis that would preserve the
Scriptural insights of the reformation and refute the
distortions of its theology by other evangelicals and by
its opponents. Whether he was successful in the
implementation of this intention remains the focus of this
study. His synthesis in the Loci and other writings
regarding forensic justification, the third use of the
Law, and regenerate free will becomes the next topic of
study.

CHAPTER IV
FORENSIC JUSTIFICATION, THIRD USE OF THE LAW,
AND REGENERATE FREE WILL
IN MELANCHTHON (1532-1535)
The relationship of faith to love, justification
to good works, stood at the heart of the controversy
between the evangelicals and Rome. That relationship
received classical formulation in the Confession made at
Augsburg (1530) and in its Apology (1531). Article IV,
"On Justification," follows immediately brief articles on
the Holy Trinity, original sin, and the person and work of
Jesus Christ. Summarizing who God is, what man has
become, and what Christ has done for mankind, Melanchthon
follows immediately with a description of how man is
restored to God by grace, through faith, for the sake of
Christ. Men cannot be justified before God, "by their own
strength, merits or works," but "are freely justified for
Christ's sake, through faith. .

e.1

"This faith God

imputes for righteousness in his sight." 2 The
righteousness God requires of man is the righteousness God
`AC, IV, 1-2.
2

AC, IV, 3.
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imputes to man through faith in Jesus Christ. The verb
imputare stresses the "otherness" of the righteousness
which now characterizes regenerate man. It is not his
own. It is not from works. It is the righteousness of
another who is himself righteous and has acted on behalf
of mankind.
Although imputare had been used previously by
Melanchthon in the negative with reference to the
"non-imputation of sin," the positive use of imputare in
the Augsburg Confession would be expanded in the Apology
and especially in the Romans Commentary to emphasize the
forensic nature of justification and the imputation of the
righteousness of Christ. In the Augsburg Confession,
however, it is faith in Christ which is imputed (imputare)
for righteousness, a use of imputare which does not differ
from the use of reputare (to repute or account righteous)
which had been commonly used prior to this time. Man is
accounted or reputed righteous for Christ's sake through
faith.
Righteousness before God is a gift. God is
active; man is passive. The faith which passively accepts
the righteousness of God in Christ, however, actively
seeks to do God's will. Faith "is bound to bring forth
good works, . . . it is necessary to do good works
commanded by God."3 Faith acting in love to the
3
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neighbor is a necessary consequence to faith which depends
upon the righteousness of Christ. Good works do not merit
justification before God, "for forgiveness of sins and
justification are apprehended by faith. . . ." 4 One
notes that faith (fides) here is used in opposition to
works to underscore the divine monergism of justification,
and not primarily to express the nature of faith as that
which trusts (fiducia) in the righteousness of Christ. As
Melanchthon in the Apology and in the Romans Commentary
begins to utilize imputare to express the imputation of
the alien righteousness of Christ, he also utilizes
fiducia to express the personal relationship which
characterizes the believer's confidence that Christ's
righteousness is his own by God's acceptance and favor.
The article on justification and the theology of
justification found in the Augsburg Confession were
attacked by the Roman party in its Confutation issued
slightly more than a month after the Diet at Augsburg.
The Confutation agreed that, "our works of themselves have
no merit, but that God's grace makes them worthy of
eternal life."' This Roman position manifestly differed
from that of the evangelicals:
4
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'Confutatio Pontificia, in Johann Michael Reu,
The Augsburg Confession: A Collection of Sources (Chicago:
Wartburg Publishing House, 1930), part II, p. 350.
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if anyone should intend to disapprove of the merits
that men acquire by the assistance of divine grace, he
would agree with the Manichaeans rather than with the
Catholic Church. For it is entirely contrary to Holy
Scripture to deny that our good works are
meritorious.6
The sola gratia of the evangelical party is denied in
favor of the fides formata (faith formed by love).
In defending Article IV of the Augsburg
Confession, Melanchthon in the Apology speaks more
extensively concerning justification in its relation to
renewal and good works. The real issue remains the need
to express the biblical teaching that men are justified
only by grace through faith on account of Christ:
because of Christ by faith itself we are truly
accounted righteous or acceptable before God. And to
be justified means to make unrighteous men righteous or
to regenerate them, as well as to be pronounced or
accounted righteous.'
In his defense of the evangelical position Melanchthon
gives rise to what Otto Ritschl in a famous essay has
termed "Der doppelte Rechtfertigungsbegriff in der
Apologie der Augsburgischen Confession."8 The ambiguity
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'Ap, IV, 72.
80tto Ritschl extensively examines the
distinction between Gerechtmachens and Gerechtsprechens in
his article, "Der doppelte Rechtfertigungsbegriff in der
Apologie der Augsbugischen Konfession" (Zeitschrift fuer
Theologie and Kirche, 20 [1910]: 292-338). Ritschl
maintains that a careful distinction between these two
concepts would be a misunderstanding of Melanchthon, who
made no such distinction. Melanchthon's point is that no
quality in man originated man's relationship with God.
Edmund Schlink (Theology of the Lutheran Confessions,
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of the texts suggests that Melanchthon did not intend to
distinguish what has come to be identified as "forensic"
or "effective" vocabularies of justification. To impose
such distinctions on Melanchthon in the Apology is
trans. Paul Koehneke and Herbert J. A. Bouman,
[Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1961], pp. 90-116) includes
a helpful summary of the literature on the subject.
Citing the research of Eichorn and Thieme, Schlink
contends that "to be declared righteous is the same as to
be made righteous and vice versa." "'Justum effici
regenerari, vivificari' are other terms for 'iustum
reputari, remissionem accipere, Deo acceptum esse,' but
one and the same event takes place" (p. 94, fn. 13).
Holsten Fagerberg (A New Look at the Lutheran Confessions
[1529-1537], trans. Gene J. Lund [St. Louis: Concordia
Publishing House, 1972], pp. 149-155) understands iustos
effici and iustos reputari to be complementary terms which
support the one sustained idea of Apology IV, that faith
alone justifies. With careful use of sources, Fagerberg
comes to the conclusions that, "The righteousness of
Christ imputed to man forms the basis of the forensic
declaration of justification" (p. 155). Michael Rogness
in his Reformer Without Honor: Philip Melanchthon
(Minneapolis: Augsburg Publishing House, 1969) contends
that Melanchthon never thought in the alternatives put
forth by the later debate. Had he intended to outline two
doctrines of justification, he would have done so. "The
truth of the matter is that for him, 'to be righteous' was
the same as 'to be pronounced righteous.' . . . The key to
understanding this is Melanchthon's use of the word
'regeneration.' He thought of regeneration and
vivification . . . in terms of their literal meanings in
Latin. . . . This is precisely what justification does:
trusting in Christ, our sins are forgiven, we are
reconciled and accepted by God, who imputes Christ's
righteousness to us and pronounces us righteous. This is
our justification and our regeneration." (pp. 114-115)
Vinzenz Pfnuer (Einig in der Rechtfertigungslehre?
[Wiesbaden: Fran Steiner Verlag, 1970], pp. 169-181) gives
extensive treatment to the question of the two
descriptions of justification. He concludes that the
iustum reputari is not an isolated term for Melanchthon,
but is understood in the context and under the assumption
of iustum effici (p. 181). It is an oversimplification to
contend that iustum effici represents the Catholic
position and iustum reputari represents the Lutheran
position. Rather, Melanchthon does not wish to make a
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anachronistic. In fact, Melanchthon expresses the
evangelical theology of justification in both ways. In
places, he uses a vocabulary consonant with an "effective"
or "analytic" concept of justification.
Therefore we are justified by faith alone, justification being understood as making an unrighteous man
righteous or effecting his regeneration.'
by faith alone we receive the forgiveness of sins for
Christ's sake, and by faith alone are justified, that
distinction between being justified and becoming
justified, but between justification as beginning, a one
time act, and justification as a continuing act.
Melanchton's concern is to maintain that forgiveness is
God's act, not man's, and he wishes to affirm man's
continuing need for forgiveness after rebirth (p. 178).
For Melanchthon, faith, Christ, being reputed righteous
and being made righteous are all bound together (pp.
180-181). Horst Georg Poehlmann also looks at
Melanchthon's concept of justification in the context of
the Roman-Lutheran debate (Rechtfertigung [Guetersloh:
Gueterslohe Verlagshaus, 1971], pp. 28-30, 320-323).
Poehlmann understands Article IV of the Apology to stand
or fall on its christological base, and contends that
Melanchthon must be understood in this context.
Justification is the center of theology and Christ is the
center of justification. Melanchthon has made synonyms of
justificare, salvare, and regerari because his concern is
always justification for the sake of Christ, for the honor
of Christ (p. 28). Poehlmann contends that Melanchthon's
concept of justification is paradoxical: a vivificari and
a pronuntiari, a regerari and a reputari, an effici and an
accipere remissionem. Being declared righteous and being
made righteous are not two events in Melanchthon's
theology, but two sides of one event. It is not a being
spoken righteous and then being made righteous, but rather
a being spoken righteous and with it a being made
righteous (p. 321). The conflict between the forensic and
effective elements in justification is a paradox (p. 322).
Regeneration is identical with justification, being
understood as Christ dwelling in the Christain (p. 323).
9
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is, out of righteousness we are made righteous and
regenerated men."
Melanchthon's focus is on the gracious gift of forgiveness and acceptance by which one is justified by grace,
through faith, for Christ's sake. As a document asserting
the historic continuity of evangelical teaching with that
of the church catholic, the Apology utilizes a vocabulary
consonant with Augustinianism while expressing also the
distinctive Pauline emphasis on justification as a
forensic declaration. Later in Apology IV, when
Melanchthon does define justification in its biblical
context, he speaks in forensic terms.
"to be justified" . . . does not mean that a wicked man
is made righteous, but that he is pronounced righteous
in a forensic way, just as in the passage, "the doers
of the Law will be justified.sell
Later, Melanchthon affirms in the same vein,
In this "justify" is used in a judicial way to mean "to
absolve a guilty man and pronounce him righteous," and
to do so on account of someone else's righteousness,
namely Christ's, which is communicated through faith.
Since in this passage our righteousness is the
imputation of someone else's righteousness, we must
speak of righteousness in a different way here from the
philosophical or judicial investigation of man's own
righteousness, which certainly resides in the will."
Philosophical virtue and external morality ("man's own
righteousness") lie within the framework of man's ability
'
°Ap, IV, 117.
"Ap, IV, 252.
"Ap, IV, 306.
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to choose. In this he has free will. Melanchthon's
concern here, however, is with the spiritual righteousness
of the sinner before God. This righteousness is not the
product of man's action based in free choice, but "is the
imputation of someone else's righteousness. .
Recognizing that the righteousness of a Christian
is the imputed righteousness of Christ Himself does not
mean indifference about the life of the regenerate. Justification as the "imputation of someone else's righteousness" cannot be separated from the new life of
sanctification which is to characterize the Christian.
After we have been justified and regenerated by faith,
therefore, we begin to fear and love God, to pray and
expect help from him, to thank and praise him, and to
submit to him in our afflictions. Then we also begin
to love our neighbor because our hearts have spiritual
and holy impulses."
Justification and regeneration describe the same divine
activity on man's behalf." Although Melanchthon uses
"Ap, IV, 125.
4

On Melanchthon's identification of justification with regeneration, Rogness writes: "This is our
justification and our regeneration. Being justified
before God, we are made alive again. . . .' It is not
something altogether apart from us, for it has a profound,
transforming effect within us. In this context
Melanchthon could write, 'Justification is regeneration.'
This is not to say that justification includes the good
works which followed. . . . But it is not separated from
good works either, because this regeneration and vivifying
effect of justification was both reconciliation and 'the
beginning of our renewal.' For him this regeneration was
the rebirth from which works flowed. . . . Though
Melanchthon might have opened the door to a more abstract
concept of justification with the terms 'pronounce' and
'impute,' he apparently did not intend to make it less
1
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temporal terms to distinguish justification from renewal,
as in the citation of Apology, IV, 125, above ("After . .
. we begin . . . then. . . .") his purpose is not to
provide a chronological ordo salutis which would separate
renewal from justification, but rather he would "properly"
distinguish justification from renewal, justification
being the necessary antecedent for renewal, and renewal
the necessary consequence of justification. Melanchthon
makes this point in his article on penitence:
we put into penitence the parts that properly belong to
it in conversion or regeneration and the forgiveness of
sin. Worthy fruits as well as punishments follow
regeneration and the forgiveness of sin. We have put
these two parts in order, to emphasize the faith that
we require in penitence."
Thus, "to be pronounced righteous" and "to be made
righteous" have ultimately the same meaning for
Melanchthon in the Apology. However, the vocabulary of
forensic justification eliminates the Law-Gospel confusion
of scholasticism by making the non-imputation of sin and
the imputation of the righteousness of Christ received
through faith, the basis of Christian renewal.
Therefore we reject the Pharisaic opinions of our
opponents that we do not receive the forgiveness of
sins by faith but merit it by our love and works,
and that we ought to set our love and works against
than something effective within the believer by drawing a
curtain between it and the restoration of good works."
Rogness, pp. 115-116.
'5 Ap, XII, 58.
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the wrath of God. This is a teaching of the Law and
not of the Gospel, to imagine that a man is justified
by the Law before being reconciled to God through
Christ. . . . 16
Melanchthon's careful distinction between Law and gospel
provides the focus of his Romans Commentary the following year. Here Melanchthon employs extensively a forensic
vocabulary of justification and investigates exegetically
the relationship of justification and the functions of the
Law in explicating the theology of Saint Paul.
Forensic Justification in the
Romans Commentary (1532)
The Romans Commentary develops the exegetical
basis of the theology of justification and renewal
formulated in the Augsburg Confession

and its

Apology." Melanchthon divides Saint Paul's Epistle to
the Romans into two parts: (1) a disputation on
justification and (2) precepts of moral admonition. It is
Paul's discussion of justification which is most important
to the church because, "it contains the chief and proper
locus of Christian doctrine; it teaches us of the proper
office of Christ, of the remission of sins, of
XII, 84.
"In Ap IV, "On Justification," Romans is cited
63 times. The Romans Commentary develops on an exegetical
basis the insights regarding justification which are
systematically expressed in the Ap. One result of this
careful study of Pauline theology is a sharpening of the
forensic vocabulary of justification which is to characterize the theology of Melanchthon after 1532.
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justification before God."" In this locus on
justification the Gospel is properly discerned and
distinguished from the teaching of philosophy, the Law,
and Decalogue. Man cannot fulfil the Law. While the Law
harangues about compassion it always adds a condition,
that is, that it must be fulfilled. The Gospel continues
to promise the forgiveness of sin and justification by
grace. Perfect obedience to the Law is impossible and
therefore cannot be a completion of the Gospel. "That
indeed we would be accepted is not because of the
implementation of the Law, but by the promise of Christ,
on account of whom we please God, although we are
unworthy.""
In the first part of Romans Paul denies that man
can satisfy the Law. All men are truly under the wrath of
God and eternal punishment because human nature is corrupt
and fights against the Law of God. Ignorance of God,
contempt of God, doubt about God, hatred of God and other
vices are inherent in human nature. Therefore man is not
able to be just through the implementation of the Law.
Certainty of reconciliation to God and justification
before God cannot depend on a condition of human
"Robert Stupperich, eds, Melanchthons Werke in
Auswahl (Studienausgabe), 7 vols. (Guetersloh: Mohn and
Co., 1953-present, 5:30. Hereafter this work will be
cited as St.A.
"St.A., 5:31.
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worthiness, but only on the promise of God, who for the
sake of Christ pronounces the sinner righteous.
Righteousness is contingent on grace, not the Law.2°
Later in the epistle Paul hands down precepts concerning
good works. The Gospel preaches repentance and which good
works are necessary, although those good works are not
efficacious in making one righteous. Obedience under the
Law is not a precondition of the Gospel, but the Gospel
proclamation is a precondition to obedience. Christians
are righteous following the remission of sins and are
reputed righteous, that is, they are accepted by God.21
Melanchthon begins his commentary with a
Prolegomena de iustificatione in which he explains Paul's
understanding of Law and Gospel and provides a definition
of Pauline terms. There are two chief parts to Scripture:
the Law and the promise of reconciliation. The Law
requires perfect obedience. The Gospel is the promised
mercy of God given for the sake of Christ. There would be
no difference between the Law and Gospel if the promise of
mercy depended on a condition of the Law. The Law teaches
mercy and shows God to be merciful but adds a condition of
its own: perfection. The Gospel offers free remission of
sin and pronounces the sinner righteous and acceptable to
God, although he has not satisfied the Law.
2° Ibid.
21 St.A.,

5:31-32.
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Melanchthon distinguishes the biblical position
from that of Rome, which teaches that men's sins are
forgiven if they are sufficiently contrite. When this
condition is added, however, one cannot but doubt whether
he has the forgiveness of sins or pleases God. For this
reason it is necessary that one know that what God has
promised on account of Christ does not depend on an
individual's repentance or works. The scholastic view
"transforms the Gospel into Law."22 Moreover, when one
speaks of the Law, it is necessary that one recognize that
natural man is not truly obedient to the Law of God, which
requires perfect obedience of the heart toward God.
Therefore the opponents of Luther do not teach correctly
when "they dream that men through their natural strength
are able to satisfy the Law of God. .

•

• "23

Sin dare

not be understood merely as a working against the Law. It
is a natural corruption in which all mankind is born. 24
The theological method of Melanchthon is one of
definition and epitomization. Having outlined the
distinction between Law and Gospel in relation to the
grace of God and human works, he now sets forth the
definitions of justification, righteousness and faith that
are operative in Paul's epistle.
22

St.A., 5:36.

22

St.A., 5:37.

24

St.A., 5:37-38.
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Therefore Paul teaches of justification: The Gospel
preaches repentance and accuses sin and offers
forgiveness of sins and justification and eternal life
to all, not for the sake of our worthiness or our works
or habits or virtues, but through mercy on account of
Christ. . . . By faith alone men are justified (sola
fide homo iustificature).25
To be justified properly signifies to be reputed
righteous, that is, to be reputed accepted by God. 26
One notes the use of "Gospel" in its broad sense as
incorporating both repentance and forgiveness of sins (in
keeping with his earlier Visitation Articles, which
occasioned the indignation of Agricola). This should not
be read as indicating some confusion in Melanchthon's mind
between what the Law is and what the Gospel is, but as
explicating the necessity of the Law's work in accusing
man of sin in order that the essential or proper work of
the Gospel might be accomplished: reputing the sinner
righteous and acceptable to God by grace, through faith,
on account of Christ.
In defining righteousness, Melanchthon
distinguishes between the iustitia legis (righteousness of
the Law, centering in man's obedience) and the imputatio
iustitia (the imputation of another's righteousness,
centering in the obedience of Christ imputed to men). The
righteousness of the Law is one's voluntary obedience of
the Law of God and includes both virtues and actions. It

25

St.A., 5:38-39.

26

St.A., 5:39.
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is identical with philosophical righteousness. Imputed
righteousness is the righteousness of Christ which accepts
the sinner by grace alone and not for the sake of his own
virtues, which are unworthy. Faith is trust (fiducia) in
this promised mercy of God. Such faith is not merely an
historical knowledge, but is properly an assenting to the
divine promises of mercy, reconciliation and
justification. For the sake of faith in Christ sinners
are pronounced righteous. Faith which apprehends the
grace of God becomes a principle or cause of all other
virtues. While such new virtues ought to be effected in
the Christian, only faith justifies. "Sola fide
iustificamur."22
There are three aspects to justification: the
remission of sins, justification, and the gift of eternal
life. Melanchthon emphasizes that Scripture is replete
with testimonies affirming that the forgiveness of sins
must depend on faith in Christ and not one's own merits or
worthiness. For this reason, Melanchthon stresses the
sola of grace and faith, although that term (sola) is
offensive to the Roman party. The exclusive nature of
faith must be maintained, "because consciences would be
perpetually in doubt concerning the forgiveness of sins if
it depended on a condition of our worthiness."28 Nor
St.A., 5:40-41.

27
28
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does it follow that subsequent to the forgiveness of sins,
sinners are pronounced righteous for the sake of their new
virtues or works. Those who are justified are sons of God
and coheirs with Christ having the gift of eternal life.
In this life there ought to be Christian virtues because
the Gospel preaches repentance and faith is not able to
exist except in repentance. However, one must distinguish
between the individual and his works. Even the works of
the regenerate are far from the perfection of the Law,
nevertheless, on account of Christ the regenerate are
reputed to keep the Law.29 When the Gospel preaches
repentance and reconciliation it offers eternal life,
which encompasses both new life now in the Holy Spirit and
eternal life forever with God.
"Certainly it therefore requires good works and
obedience toward God because eternal life is spiritual
life and obedience toward God. . . . And the Holy
Spirit is given for this, so that when we grow through
the Word and are consoled, this new and heavenly life
and obedience in us might be effected.""
The Christian, although he is pleasing to God by
grace through faith, will seek to keep the Law as an
effect and consequence of his reconciliation with God. To
be justified is to be pronounced righteous, pronounced as
having righteousness. Therefore a man ought to have both
a righteousness of faith and a righteousness of works.
29

St.A., 5:45.

30

St.A., 5:46.
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"But this later righteousness, when it does not satisfy
the Law is not to be judged to be righteousness, except
that that person is now accepted in mercy by faith." 31
Melanchthon expands this theme in his commentary
on Romans 12. "Those who are reborn in Christ are reputed
righteous, not for the sake of their implementation of the
Law, which follows renewal, but for the sake of Christ, by
faith."32 The sacrifices which God requires in the New
Testament are not those of money or ceremony, but the
continuing effects of the Holy Spirit in the regenerate
heart. Such spiritual works include all the works of the
Decalogue: fear of God, belief in God, prayer, acts of
kindness, confession, patience in afflictions, obedience
to those who govern, and chastity. Because the New Testament offers the spirit of righteousness and eternal life,
it requires such spiritual sacrifices. The gift of money,
the use of ceremony, indeed, no work is valid ex opere
operato, without fear of God and faith. Life in the
Spirit grows through fear of God, prayer, faith,
mortification of the flesh, patience, and love.33
Those who are in Christ, although they sin, yet
because they believe in Christ, remain in grace. They
have the favor of God and nothing in them is condemned.

31

St.A., 5:49-50.
St.A., 5:283.
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St.A., 5:290.
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Commenting on Romans 8:1 Melanchthon notes that the text
does not say, "There is no sin in those who believe," but
there is no condemnation. This is because sin, which is
present also in the believer, is forgiven and not imputed
for the sake of Christ. Believers are reputed just, not
for the sake of their previous implementation of the Law
(indeed, they still have sin in the flesh) but for the
sake of Christ.34
In the fifth chapter of Romans Paul deals
extensively with the consequences of justification.
"Being justified by faith, we have peace with God through
our Lord Jesus Christ" (Romans 5:1). The sentence may be
understood as reflecting both the cause and the effect of
justification.
First he repeats the principal proposition of cause,
that we are justified by faith. Then he adds the
effect: we have peace with God, etc.35
This is the principal proposition of the entire
epistle," "that we might be certain that we are reputed
righteous before God through mercy for Christ's sake, and
not on account of our works or our virtues. . . ."37 In
his examination of Romans 3:21 Melanchthon had previously
affirmed that to be justified simply and properly means to
34

St.A., 5:226.

35

St.A., 5:156.

36

St.A., 5:98.

37

St.A., 5:99.
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be reputed or pronounced righteous or accepted by God.
Faith is trusting (fiducia) in the certainty of mercy.
Therefore we are justified by faith. Melanchthon rejects
the scholastic addition of formata to fide, that is, the
proposition that we are justified by faith for the sake of
love ("fide iustificatur propter dilectionem") because
Paul clearly adds that faith does not depend on a
condition of our love ("fidem non pendere ex conditione
nostrae dilectionis").38
It is in this context that Melanchthon argues in
Romans 5:1 that the Christian is justified by faith alone.
As long as consciences are angry against the judgment of
God, they flee from God and hate God and they
despair.39 The doubting conscience does not have
peace. The scholastic notion of "satisfaction" and works
undermines the certainty which comes only through the
gracious mercy of God in Christ. Likewise, ". . . When
scholars dispute concerning the forgiveness of sins they
distinguish between the forgiveness of guilt and the
forgiveness of penalty. . . " Melanchthon denies such
distinctions, rejecting scholastic discussions of
satisfaction and purgatory and maintaining that,
in the forgiveness of sin there follows joy and peace
toward God. Wherefore, there is not left the terrors

38

Ibid.

39

St.A., 5:157.
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of purgatory, but faith, when it accepts the forgiveness of guilt and encourages and revives consciences
terrified by guilt.40
Eternal death is abolished, not by our satisfactions, but
by the victory of Christ. Afflictions are part of the
Christian life and they come from God but they are
mitigated by God for the sake of repentance and faith,
"without the authority of the church or the loosening of
the church."'" It is therefore through faith in Christ
that the Christian has access to God (Romans 5:2).
Scholastics teach much about works; about faith, they have
nothing to say. But it is faith which apprehends the
promise of God in Christ. The grace of God is not a
quality or a gift infused in man, but the favor of God,
"the remission of sin and the imputation of righteousness
and the effecting of new virtues in us."42
The Christian glories in hope although burdened by
sin. Christ promises eternal life, that is, new and perfect righteousness. "But it appears somewhat distant in
those who believe. Not only are they held back by death
and other calamities, but sin also adheres in them."'"
Nevertheless, Melanchthon finds consolation in Saint
4
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Paul's understanding of righteousness, not as the
consequence of human effort, but as the effect of divine
monergism.
Above he has said that we are now righteous, but he
understands righteous not as a quality in us, but as
relative to being accepted by God. . . .
Although Christians do not have completely new lives,
they have a gift . . . a hoping that God is glorified
in us. Certainly we know we eagerly seek eternal life
and a new nature, in which there is no sin, although
meanwhile we carry around an obnoxious nature in sin
and death.44
The Christian is accepted by God, "but we are also foul,
and we await perfect renewal."
Although renewal begins in this life, however, since
sin always adheres in us, the conscience is established
in us so that we know we are righteous, not for the
sake of renewal, that is a quality in us, but through
mercy. . . . What sort of renewal is this? To the
extent we have renewal and life, to that extent we have
faith. Wherefore we hold and exercise faith by mercy
and at the same time, also renewal grows. But in those
with great and horrible terrors, when the conscience
knows the magnitude of sin and the wrath of God, the
work is this, by consolation, that he is clearly
righteous that is, we are accepted, not for the sake of
our renewals but for the sake of Christ."
Even death and other calamities are glorious for the
Christian, for he knows they are not designed for his
ruin, but for his health. Afflictions cannot happen
without the counsel and will of God and God calls
Christians through these afflictions to repentance so that
"we are cheered up and call upon him." By this alien work
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of God he afflicts and terrorizes, so that he may save and
serve.
When, therefore, we believe this to be the purpose of
afflictions, not that we are ruined, but that we may
seek mercy, then afflictions are good and gifts and
signs, not of wrath, but of grace."
By faith the Christian expects and receives help from God
in all these afflictions, not doubting God but loving God
in patient submission.
In explicating the text of Romans 5 Melanchthon
distinguishes between "philosophical patience" and
"Christian patience." Philosophical patience is "obedience
of a kind to reason without hope or faith in the mercy and
help of God." Christian patience consists of obedience and
faith. It trusts in the mercy of God and demonstrates
faith as it patiently tolerates afflictions. 47 The
Christian thus lives in hope, "which is a certain,
continuing trust and expected event," based in the promises
of God. "So that the conscience would be certain, we
understand that faith and hope do not have their cause in
our dignity, but rather in the divine promise." The object
of faith and hope is not the quality or virtue of the
individual, but the love of God.
Wherefore it is held that the object of faith and hope
is not our qualities, not our virtues, but the love of
46
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God toward us shown in certain and infallible
49
promises.
Through faith and hope the Holy Spirit prepares to move in
the hearts of the pious beginning a life of joy and peace
of conscience.5°
Romans 5:6-9 affords Melanchthon an opportunity to
treat of the relationship of Law and grace. "The chief
question of the conscience concerning the will of God," he
asserts, "is whether God loves us and whether he is in
fact angry."51 The answer to that question lies in the
sacrifice of Christ. "Christ's death is neither from a
debt nor in any way for the sake of himself."52 With
the comparison of Christ and Adam in verses twelve to
nineteen, Saint Paul touches on the three chief points of
Christian doctrine regarding God's wrath and his love;
these topics are sin, Law, and grace.
Paul's theology does not support scholastic
distinctions. When Paul speaks of original sin here he
does not distinguish between the "names" original and
actual sin, because "simultaneously they are completed as
basis and fruit, namely a total sin, a corruption of
49

St.A., 5:166.
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nature and a fruit of the corruption of nature."3
Reason cannot comprehend the filth inherent in natural man
or the horrible power of sin inherent within man's nature
(including ignorance of God, contempt for God, and hatred
for God). Basing their view in philosophy and ignoring
Christian doctrine, scholastics affirm that sin is not sin
unless it is voluntary. On the other hand, it is the
teaching of Scripture that the strength of body and soul
are so corrupted that man is not able to obey or satisfy
the law of God.
Original righteousness is not imputed or approbated to
man, but is an integrity of man by which body and soul
were able to obey truly the Law of God. But after the
fall of Adam natural man spoiled this integrity. This
ruin followed the corruption so that now natural man of
himself neither truly believes God nor truly fears nor
is able to love God, but he understands and loves the
good subjects of the senses. He is ignorant and
contemptuous of God; he flees from God and has hatred
for the judgment of God. He trusts in temporal things
and does not trust God. This sickness has not lessened
nor is it a fickle kind of stupidity, but it is a
horrible impulse of the soul and body against the Law
of God.54
This corruption makes it impossible for man to do the
Law of God.
Although reason in the things subject to it (the things
which are subject to the senses) is able to do the
civil and external works of the Law, nevertheless in
man there is horrible ignorance of God, contempt and
hatred for God. 55
53
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Those who would lessen or disregard the doctrine
of original sin also undermine the doctrine of grace.
Melanchthon identifies scholastic teaching with that of
the Pelagians, who imagine that a man of his own natural
strength is able to satisfy the Law and to obey the Law
of God and that the concupiscence of man can be lessened
by right will. "This they call tinder and do not teach it
to be sin, but scarcely the punishment of original
sin."" For Paul original sin is truly sin. This is
the testimony of the whole of Scripture. Because the
scholastics do not understand sin, they cannot understand
justification as the imputation of righteousness.
Plainly the scholastics' judgment is preposterous.
Justification in the Gospel is the imputation of
righteousness even if there is an inherent fault in
nature, because the Gospel pronounces us righteous for
the sake of Christ and not for the sake of our own
virtues. Original sin as a thing in itself is not
imputed, but is a fault in our own nature, fighting
with the Law of God. But the scholastics teach against
original sin that it is by imputation; righteousness in
the Gospel they deny to be an imputation of righteousness and they teach that by our own virtues we are
pronounced righteous before God. See, reader, the
scholastics invert the doctrine of Law and Gospel.
They do this not only in this controversy, but in many
others.57
Melanchthon recognizes that many clever men laugh
at this evangelical understanding of original sin.
However, these men do not mock the evangelicals, but
Scripture itself. ". . . This is the proper, simple,
understanding of Scripture concerning original sin that we
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follow." Moreover this interpretation has the testimony
of church fathers and other knowledgeable teachers of the
church.58
Sin is no slight defect in man that can be corrected by right reason and resolution of the will, but is
something worthy of the wrath of God and his condemnation." Man's reason blindly fails to recognize that
death is the consequence of sin and not merely a natural
phenomenon. Therefore Melanchthon rejects "those who dispute that original sin damns no one, although it is a
condition of mortality. . . . n60

Original sin fights

against the whole Law of God, offers death, and brings
eternal damnation unless it is conquered by trust in the
benefits of Christ.
In commenting on Romans 5:13-15 Melanchthon
develops his understanding of the Law and of its function
for both believer and unbeliever. Sin is not abolished by
the Law. Only the Gospel can accomplish this. What then
is the profit of the Law? Briefly, it accuses sin.
Through the Law comes recognition of sin. Not if the
law, however, accuses sin, certainly it is not
abolished but aggravated so that it terrifies us,
judges us, and condemns us, driving us to death."
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The Law does not console the sinner; it does not revive
the conscience burdened with death, but it oppresses the
sinner with infinite terrors. The Gospel alone abolishes
death because through Christ the resurrection is promised
to all believers. The Gospel alone lifts up and consoles
and brings new life to men. Thus the Law must be
understood as the antithesis to the grace of God, as in
the antithesis Saint Paul draws between those who are
children of Adam and those who are reborn in Christ. In
Adam all men are accused. In Christ, all who believe are
pronounced righteous." This is God's gracious act
(Romans 5:15).
"Grace" continually means for the Hebrews: forgiveness,
mercy, favor, to be pleased, as has been said, gracious
acceptance. This is the appropriate and most true
interpretation of the word grace. Therefore grace
ought to be understood as acceptance, as mercy, as the
benevolence of God toward us, and it ought not be
understood as a quality or virtue of our own toward
God. Grace is completed by these two things: forgiveness of sin and the imputation of righteousness. 63
What is "given through grace" is the gift of the Holy
Spirit and eternal life.
Now the Gospel at the same time offers in the forgiveness of sins the Holy Spirit, who through faith is
accepted. When the conscience is stirred up and
consoled, he prepares new impulses and new life."
Thus, both justification as a forensic proclamation and
62
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renewal as the bestowal of the Holy Spirit undergird the
monergism of divine grace.
Although sin continues "to adhere in our nature,"
it does not invalidate the gift of grace because it is the
pronouncement of another's righteousness.
To such a degree Christ has power over the reign of sin
so that grace covers up present sin. . . . The renewed
are pronounced righteous not for the sake of the
implementation of the Law, but for the sake of Christ,
although nature continues to contain faults."
The promise of the Gospel is that grace abounds over sin.
"Christ is far greater and has overcome the universal
reign of sin."66 Christian consolation rests not in
one's own obedience or good works, but in the Gospel
promise, that "we are pronounced righteous by the merits
of another, because of Christ, and not because of our own
virtues."'
Romans 5:18-20 occasions an excursus on the nature
of the Law itself. There are two functions of the Law.
The first is the civil function which coerces man by
external discipline to obedience. Such external
righteousness merits physical rewards in this life.
Disobedience brings punishment in this life and in the
next. Melanchthon identifies this Law with "the Law of
morals or the universal philsophy of morals, in so far as
"St.A., 5:189.
"Ibid.
St.A., 5:190.
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it follows right reason."" This "natural judgment" is
divinely instituted and arises not only in the mind of
many but as "a divinely imparted light." That human
philosophy and right reason may attain to such natural Law
does not lessen "that they are the Law of God, just as the
Decalogue in the divine Scriptures, and plainly the same
still continue as Law, since God inscribed them earlier in
the mind of men.""
The other function of the Law is spiritual. "It
shows sin; it accuses and terrifies consciences with the
judgment of God." This is a Law no one satisfies, for no
one fears and loves God with his whole heart. Not only
does the Law not console human hearts, but it does not
reconcile men to God. Indeed, the Law only increases sin
and enmity against God. But this does not leave the
Christian without comfort.
We can have as much sin as we please, however, we know
grace, mercy, to be more productive. We do not allow
the magnitude of sin to oppress us or to conquer the
glory of the mercy of Christ. We would not imitate the
voice of Cain who said, "My sin is greater than I am
able to bear." But we oppose that voice with this
sentence, "Where sin abounds, there grace abounds more."
Grace reigns through righteousness to life eternal;
that is, through mercy at the same time we are reputed
righteous and we are given life eternal, not for the
sake of our virtues, but for the sake of Christ. Here
you see clearly the conjunction of justification and
eternal life so that we certainly know eternal life is
given through the forgiveness of sins, and if it is
68
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given not because of our worthiness or merits, but for
the sake of Christ, then it is necessary that it be
grasped."
As an evangelical theologian and a northern
European humanist, Melanchthon brought together both the
biblical insights of the Lutheran reformation and the
considerable skills of a pilologist to his study of Saint
Paul's Roman epistle. Theologically, Melanchthon began
his study recognizing that Saint Paul cannot be understood
properly apart from a careful distinction of Law and
Gospel. This distinction Melanchthon found self-evident
in Saint Paul's formulation of justification as a forensic
declaration by which the righteousness of Christ is
imputed to the penitent sinner. Utilizing the Greek text
in the best edition then available (the Novum Testrumentum
of Erasmus) Melanchthon sought to elucidate Saint Paul
according to the clear and simple meaning of the
text.'" In this Melanchthon was willing to utilize the
insights of Augustine and earlier church fathers, but he
"St.A., 5:196-97.
71 In a chapter entitled "The Perspicuity of
Scripture," Peter Fraenkel characterizes Melanchthon's
doctrine as including, ". . . its absolute purity of
doctrine and its absolute antiquity; the direct vocation
of the authors; the 'incarnation' of the Gospel in
authoritative human statements in which God is the
speaking subject. . . . They have been written down by
the commandment of God and more particularly in view of
the certainty, permanence and security which belong to the
written word." Peter Fraenkel, Testimonia Patrum: The
Function of the Partistic Argument in the Theology of
Philip Melanchthon (Geneva: Librairie E. Droz, 1961), p.
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was unwilling to compromise the text to accommodate
theological traditions and scholastic perceptions not in
accord with the Word of God. 72
The Romans Commentary accents Law and Gospel as
the central doctrines of Christianity. Departing from
Saint Thomas Aquinas and later scholasticism, Melanchthon
understood Saint Paul to utilize the terms Law and Gospel
not as complementary messages by which man accomodates
himself to God through an infusion of grace and a
perfection of his own qualities, but as antithetical
messages of judgment and promise by which man is accused
of sin by the Law and made righteous by grace through
faith in the imputation of Christ's righteousness. A
biblical understanding of justification necessarily
excludes all human merit and worthiness and affirms the
monergism of divine acceptance by which the righteousness
of Christ is imputed to those who trust only in the mercy
of God.
Scholastic theology, on the other hand, reflects
both an inadequate view of the Law and a disregard for
208. "A close corollary of this emphasis on certainty is
that on the perspicuity of Scripture which after all is
nothing more than the fact that God lets us know with
certainty the Scripture's import and meaning. . . ."
(Fraenkel, p. 209).
"An extended treatment of this theme is found
in Melanchthon's De ecclesia et de autoritate verbi Dei
written in 1539. For a discussion of this writing, see
chapter V, pp. 217-20.
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Paul's forensic theology of justification by grace through
faith. Original sin is not merely imputed to man. Man is
sinful in himself; incapable of loving God and incapable
of doing God's will. Melanchthon's emphasis is on the
wholeness of sin: sin as reflecting the complete
alienation of man from God. Sin reflects not only the
"actual" doings of the sinner, but the "origin" of sin in
man's rebellion against God, in his failure to love and
trust in God above all else. Righteousness cannot come by
the Law because natural man cannot love God and in
consequence cannot keep God's Law perfectly.
If man is to be righteous before God, it can only
be through the non-imputation of man's sin and the
imputation of Christ's righteousness. Stressing that
man's righteousness is not his own but is the
righteousness of another, Melanchthon consistently
utilizes the verb imputare. Man is reputed or accounted
righteous (reputare) by grace through faith. But how?
Imputare stresses the forensic nature of justification.
The righteousness of the regenerate is the imputed
righteousness of Christ himself. Justification is not a
divine fiction by which God ignores the sin of man and
declares the unrighteous to be righteous. The penalty of
sin is death and man is justified by death:" The grace
73 Werner Elert, Lowell C. Green, and Arthur Karl
Piepkorn all note significantly that the word justification does not imply for St. Paul or for sixteenth
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of God is that favor of God by which He is willing to
accept the death of His Son as payment for the Law's
curse. The righteous dies for the ungodly in order that
the ungodly may be declared righteous. The accusation of
century thinking what it implies for twentieth century
English speaking people, that is: innocence. "To be
justified" in contemporary society implied that one has
been falsely charged or accused or that there was "good
reason" for a particular act. In sixteenth century
Germany, "to be justified" denoted that one has received
the due penalty of has act. No presumption of innocence
is implied. "Saxon law could speak, for example, of 'the
body of the person justified by the sword,' meaning
thereby corpse, minus sword-severed head." Arthur Karl
Piepkorn, Profiles in Belief, 3 vols. (New York: Harper
and Row, 1978), 2: 62. Lowell C. Green cites Werner Elert
similarly. "Werner Elert clarified this problem in the
light of legal history. In the legal code of Luther's day
the concept of justification was not applied at all to one
who showed himself innocent of a crime. In sixteenth
century German, justification '. . . denoted either the
painful trial by ordeal, which might go so far to claim
the life of the person being tried, or more commonly the
carrying out of a penal sentence, especially the execution
of the one convicted.' Elert noted that during the
seventeenth century it was still common to speak of the
expenses to the state for corporal punishment as the
'coats of painful justification,' and that mention is made
of '. . . the body of one justified with the sword.'"
Lowell C. Green, How Melanchthon Helped Luther Discover
the Gospel (Fallbrook, CA: Verdict Publications, 1980) p.
206. See also Werner Elert, Der Christliche Glaube
(Hamburg: Furche Verlag, 1956), pp. 459,470,472; and
Werner Elert, "Deutschrechtliche Zuege in Luthers
Rechtfertigungslehre," Zeitschrift fuer Systematische
Theologie 12 (1934-35): 23-26; Robert C. Schultz, "Baptism
and Justification." Una Sancta, 18 (Easter, 1960):
11-14. It is with this understanding that Melanchthon
writes in Apology IV, 305: "In this passage 'justify' is
used in a judicial way to mean 'to absolve a guilty man
and pronounce him righteous' and to do so on account of
someone else's righteousness, namely, Christ's, which is
communicated to us though faith." This opinion reflects
St. Paul in many places: Romans 6:3-7; Romans 5;
1 Corinthians 15, 2 Corinthians 5:21, Galatians 3:13. In
light of the above, Green's summation is helpful.
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the Law is satisfied by the death of Christ. The
righteousness of Christ is given by grace to those who
believe. Thus justification consists of both the
non-imputation of sin and the imputation of the
righteousness of Christ. For this reason Melanchthon
frequently identifies justification with the forgiveness
of sin (non-imputation of sin) and regeneration (the
imputation of the righteousness of Christ and the bestowal
of the Holy Spirit). He identifies grace with divine
favor and acceptance. He identifies faith with trust
(fiducia) in the promises of God. The scholastic
distinction between fides

formata and fides

informata is

denied. The scholastic concept of grace as an infused
quality (gratis infusa), of sin as merely concupisence,
and of satisfaction (of the Law's penalty by penitence and
works) are likewise rejected. They deny the sola qratia,
sola fides of Scripture.
Melanchthon affirms both a righteousness of the
Law and a righteousness of God. Righteousness of the Law
"Through the forensic declaration man is removed from the
unjustified to the justified state. This is a profound
change. However, justification means no outward change in
the qualities of the individual. . . . Thus, justification by imputation of alien righteousness need not be
called a fiction, but something that actually takes place
in the decision of God, something that alters the destiny
of the individual. God regards him as a just person. For
the sake of Christ God is pleased to regard the sinful
self as purged. God reckons his faith to him for
righteousness." Green, How Melanchthon Helped Luther
Discover the Gospel, p. 208.
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is not an imputed righteousness, but a righteousness of
works, demanding perfection. The righteousness of God is
the righteousness of another, imputed by grace through
faith. Those who are righteous by grace through faith are
not perfect according to the Law for they continue to
sin. Nevertheless, by God's favor and acceptance, they
remain in grace. The regenerate thus remain sinners while
declared saints. But the regeneration of the sinner by
the grace of God does result in a new man who lives in the
Spirit of God. This man, reborn by grace through faith
and the bestowal of the Holy Spirit, reflects the mercy of
God in his life now. His heart moves in new ways. Faith
which trusts in the favor of God becomes also the source
of new virtues by which a man seeks to do that which
pleases God. Good works are a necessary consequence of
faith and reflect the effects of the Holy Spirit in the
life of the regenerate.
The Law of God is written in the minds of all men,
although now obscured by rebellion against God and sin.
This natural Law is identicel with the revealed Law of the
Decalogue. Philosophers are capable of formulating morals
based on the natural Law, although inadequately. What
philosophy cannot discern is the spiritual function of the
Law, which accuses man of failure to love God, trust God,
or obey God. This discernment is available only to those
who have received the Spirit of God by faith and who
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recognize the enmity of God against sin, as revealed in
the Scriptures. Consequently, only those in Christ can
truly repent of sins and seek to do the will of God. For
this reason Melanchthon frequently includes in the term
Gospel not only the promises of God, but repentance as
well. Repentance is an essential part of the life of the
regenerate, who feel the accusation of the Law and
trustingly turn to the favor of God, confident in the
righteousness of Christ which is theirs through
justification.
Recognizing the civil or political function of the
Law in governing the affairs of all men, and the spiritual
or accusing function of the Law which brings recognition
of sin and continuing dependence on the mercy of God in
Jesus Christ, Melanchthon emphasizes the continuing
validity of the Law for both regenerate and unregenerate.
Moreover, when one recognizes that the spiritual function
of the Law in bringing about repentance is essential to
life in the Spirit of God (renewal), it is not surprising
that Melanchthon should begin to emphasize the didactic
function of the Law in training the regenerate in
righteousness.
By grace through faith, the First Table of the Law
has become a divine indicative describing the believer's
love of God, instead of a divine imperative accusing the
sinner of rebellion against God and of failure to love and
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trust God. The Law, of course, continues to accuse the
regenerate of their sin. As Melanchthon notes regarding
Romans 8:1, Paul does not say there is no sin in those who
believe, but there is no condemnation. The regenerate,
however, possessing the Spirit of God, are motivated to do
the will of God, not from fear, but from love, not in
order to justify themselves before God, but as fruits of
the righteousness already imputed to them by grace. In
the regenerate, then, the Law has a new function; not
merely the civil ordering of human conduct, not only the
spiritual accusation of sin, but that of a guide to those
works which please God and reflect the indwelling of the
Holy Spirit. The Law has nothing to do with the seeking
of righteousness before God. Righteousness is already the
possession of the regenerate whose sins are forgiven and
to whom the righteousness of Christ is imputed. But in
those who believe, the Law has to do with the effecting of
righteousness as the fruit and consequence of faith
itself. The Law does not motivate Christian obedience,
but it reveals God's will. These insights into the nature
and function of the divine Law become fixed in the second
edition of the Loci (1535) and are subsequently described
as the "third office of the Law."
The Third Use of the Law in the Loci (1535)
Fragmentary student notes of Melanchthon's lectures
on the Loci (1535) "de lege Dei" add nothing to the
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excursus on the Law in the Romans Commentary as summarized
above." In 1535 Melanchthon himself published an
expanded version of the Loci communes theologici. The
extended locus de lege divina is subdivided into topics
dealing with the division of the Law (Divisio legum), the
Ten Commandments (Decalogus), the natural Law (De lege
naturae), the uses of the Law (De usu legis divinae), the
distinction between commandment and counsel (De discrimini
praeceptorum et conciliorum), of poverty (De paupertate),
and of chastity (De castitate). The first four subtopics
contain Melanchthon's teaching concerning the Law as it
relates to justification and renewal. The introduction to
the topic de lege divina reiterates the text of the Romans
Commentary and the lecture fragments recorded by
Pommerani. The Law commands what one is to be, what one
is to do, and what one is to omit in life. It requires
perfect obedience to God and condemns those who do not
present to God such perfect obedience. Melanchthon
provides a catalogue of scholastic errors and Saint Paul
is cited against these "pharisaical opinions." The Law of
"These student notes from Pommerani are
contained in Melanchthon's Corpus Reformatorum, 28 vols.,
compiled by Carol Bretschneider, ed. Henry Bindsell
(Brunswig and Halis: C.A. Schwetschke and Son, 1842-1858),
21: 253-332 and are listed as belonging to the second
edition of the Loci although the second edition was not
published until 1535. The locus de lege Dei in
Pommerani's notes is found on pp. 294-95. Hereafter this
work will be cited as CR.
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God not only requires civil or external works, but perfect
obedience toward God. It accuses not only actual sin, but
man's inherent depravity. Unless one knows this, he is
not able to understand the benefits of Christ:"
In the first subtopic, Divisio lequm, Melanchthon
distinguishes between natural law, divine Law, and human
law, but it is with the divine or Mosaic Law that he is
chiefly concerned. The Law of Moses contains moral Law,
civil Law, and ceremonial Law, but only the moral Law
appertains to all mankind. This is true, not because the
Law was given by Moses, but because the moral Law
(Decalogue) coincides with the natural Law, and because
the moral Law is cited in the gospels as teaching
spiritual righteousness and obedience toward God. The
moral Law thus illustrates and interprets the natural Law.
The two tables of the Decalogue are distinguished
in that the First Table focuses on the spiritual nature of
righteousness, and the Second Table teaches what one ought
to do toward the neighbor (civil righteousness). Although
Melanchthon instructs his reader in all the commandments,
he emphasizes the First Table. The explanation to the
First Commandment stresses the forensic nature of
righteousness, that for the sake of Christ the Christian
is pronounced righteous. Therefore the First Commandment
75
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is fulfilled by the imputation of the righteousness of
Christ. Without the Gospel one is not able to keep the
First Commandment, for one is not able to trust God
without Christ. The Law itself always accuses and
condemns. The highest and chief work of the First
Commandment is to command an internal (spiritual) worship
of God.76
The Second Commandment teaches of external worship
and of the effects of faith in the proper use of God's
name. It requires prayer, acts of kindness, preaching of
the Word of God, and confession. The Third Commandment
relates to the external ceremonies of worship. The Word
of God commands that ceremonies ought to be preserved
which serve the ministry of the Word. They pertain to all
mankind in all times and places so that the public
ministry of the Word of God might be preserved."
The Church of Rome distorts these commandments of God. It
violates the First Commandment when it denies the natural
corruption of man and fails to teach of faith (fiducia)
which trusts in the gracious mercy of God. It violates
the Second Commandment by destroying true prayer and
worship in insisting on the idolatry of the mass and
monasticism. It violates the Third Commandment when it
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teaches that the perfunctory use of ceremonies merit the
remission of sin ex opere operato without faith."
The Second Table of the Mosaic Law pertains to
those virtues which are necessary for society including
obedience of civil authorities and of parents. All the
promises of the Law are conditional, and it is only
through the Gospel that, "when we are pronounced righteous
by grace, through faith, for the sake of Christ that we
are reputed to implement the law."'" Natural Law is the
knowledge of the divine Law placed in human nature."
This knowledge of divine Law has been obscured by original
sin," nevertheless vestiges of this implanted knowledge
remain, for the conscience testifies that there is a God
who blesses righteousness and punishes unrighteousness.82
It is under the title, De usu legis divinae, that
Melanchthon introduces the threefold office of the Law.
He begins this subtopic by reiterating what he has already
established concerning the use of the Law. The Law of God
requires the perfect obedience of human nature. But
perfect obedience is not possible; consequently, man is
"Ibid., p. 395.
"Ibid., p. 398.
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not righteous because of the Law, since sin always adheres
in natural man. Under the subtitle Legis officia,
Melanchthon sets forth the threefold office of the Law
with regard to man's corrupt nature. The first office of
the law is the civil office, which coerces human
discipline and establishes a condition of peace in which
the Gospel might be proclaimed. The second, proper, and
principle office of the Law is to show sin, to accuse,
terrify, and condemn sinful consciences. It is this
function of the Law to which Melanchthon usually refers
when describing the effect of the Law. Through the
accusation of the Law the sinner is prepared to hear the
gracious promises of the Gospel. The second office of the
Law must be understood always in its relation to
justification.
The third office of the Law relates to the
function of the Law in the lives of those who are
justified in Christ and seek to do the will of God.
The third office of the Law is in those who are
righteous by faith, so that it might teach them of good
works, seeking the works which please God. It commands
certain works in which obedience toward God is
exercised.83
One notes that this office of the Law, like the first and
second offices, is for those who continue to exist in the
natural corruption of the flesh. All men are sinners.
However, the third use of the Law pertains only to those
Ibid., p. 406.
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sinners who are declared righteous by faith. The third
use of the Law thus applies to sinners to whom the
righteousness of Christ is imputed by grace. Melanchthon
emphasizes the duality of the corrupt sinner who has been
justified by faith when he continues, "although we are far
from the Law as it pertains to justification, however, as
it pertains to obedience, the Law remains. Justification
is necessary in order to obey God."84 Those justified
by the imputation of the righteousness of Christ begin in
part to do the Law; they begin to be obedient. The nature
of this obedience Melanchthon does not discuss at this
point (under the locus, De lege divina) but only later
under the locus, De bonis operibus, concerning good
works. Between this discussion of the Law and the later
discussion of good works, Melanchthon develops the meaning
of the Gospel (De evangelio), grace and justification (De
gratia et de iustificatione).
Although the third function of the Law is an
office of the Law and therefore included under the topic
De lege divina it exists only for those who have received
the promises of the Gospel, being justified by grace
through faith. The third function of the Law is not to be
understood in the scholastic sense as a fides formata, a
faith formed by love, describing how man is justified
before God. With regard to justification, the Law has
84Ibid.
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only one function: to accuse and condemn sin. But in
those who are righteous by faith the Law teaches of good
works which please God and of those works in which God
commands obedience. Melanchthon thus distinguishes
between the accusatory function of the Law and the
function of the Law which teaches obedience. Only those
reborn in Christ have imputed to them the righteousness of
Christ and are capable of loving God. Only when a person
is imputed righteous can he do works acceptable to God.
The second function of the Law is necessary in
order that a sinner might know his estrangement from God
and seek forgiveness by grace through faith. The third
function of the Law is a fruit and consequence of
justification. Having the favor and acceptance of God
already by grace through faith, the believer seeks
instruction in the Word of God concerning those works
which please God and by which he may exercise obedience in
faith. Therefore the third office of the Law, while
included under the locus concerning the Law, does not
relate to the chief and proper use of the law (second
office) which relates to justification, forgiveness, and
the imputation of the righteousness of Christ. Rather,
the third office of the Law relates to sanctification,
good works, and the effects and fruits of the Holy Spirit
within the hearts of believers.
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The locus De bonis operibus underscores
Melanchthon's emphasis on the centrality of justification
understood as the divine favor of God and acceptance for
the sake of Christ. Believers are not given eternal life
for the sake of good works, but for the sake of Christ.
"Good works" refers to the civil or external righteousness
which reflects obedience to the Second Table of the Law,
but more importantly, "good works" consist of the
spiritual works of faith. Melanchthon affirms that,
"obedience must follow reconciliation,"" but adds that
it is not enough to teach that obedience is necessary for
the Christian. One must also continually repeat that for
the Christian also the Law never loses its proper and
chief function of accusing sin, because ". . . no one is
able to satisfy the Law."86
"Obedience must follow reconciliation," but even
for those reconciled to God in Christ perfect obedience is
impossible. Nevertheless the believer's obedience is
pleasing to God, although it is imperfect, because he is
reconciled to God by faith. God does not abolish the Law
by faith, but effects it so that he is pleased. "It is
necessary, therefore, that the reconciliation of the
person come first, and this is reconciliation . . . by
faith, which is given, not for our worthiness, but through
85
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mercy."87

Following reconciliation the works of the

Christian truly please God and obedience follows, because
he is in Christ. Thus, Melanchthon insists, "it is not
for nothing that a person is distinguished from his
works."88
Good works are done then in the exercise of faith
to the glory of Christ. Faith is especially exercised in
prayer, repentance and the growth of confidence before God
in the midst of dangers. Obedience is a fruit and effect
of faith. The Law in its chief and proper use continues
to show even regenerate man that he cannot keep the
commandments of God. The Gospel promises that God will
not look at the works of the believer, but at the faith of
the believer who trusts in Christ and has received the
imputation of the righteousness of Christ.
Although the believer is imperfect and his works
are imperfect, they are accepted by grace, through faith,
and reputed good, for Christ's sake. Certain of
reconciliation to God by grace and no longer seeking
reconciliation through works, the believer willingly seeks
to do that which pleases God and is commanded by God, not
through the coercion of the Law but by the gift of the
Holy Spirit. In this the Christian is instructed by the
87
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Law (the same Law that accuses sin), knowing that in
Christ he is imputed righteous (although a sinner) and
that eternal life has now already begun in him. The
Christian trusts not in what he has done, but in what he
has become, by grace, and in what he has received, through
the imputation of the righteousness of Christ. The
renewed heart of the Christian, once bound by sin, has
been freed to choose those works which please God and are
commanded by God. These three, the revealed Word of the
Law, the efficacious power of the Holy Spirit, and the
regenerate heart of the Christian enable the believer to
live in obedience to the Law and in the fruits of the
Spirit, to the glory of Christ. By grace, Christian
obedience although imperfect has begun.
Free Will in the "Loci" (1535)
The first comprehensive statement of the
evangelical church on the subject of free will was written
by Melanchthon in his first edition of the Loci (1521). 89
Melanchthon maintains that since all things happen through
necessity according to divine predestination, the human
will (voluntas) is not free. Consequently there is no
free choice (arbitriurn). Human reason affirms that there
89St.A., 2, pt. I, pp. 8-16. English
translation: Philip Melanchthon, "The Power of Man,
Especially Free Will," Loci Communes Theologici in
Melanchthon and Bucer, trans. Lowell J. Satre, ed. Willman
Pauck (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1969), pp. 22-30.
Hereafter cited "1521 Loci."
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is free will in external things, "But Scripture tells
nothing of that kind of freedom since God looks not at
external works but at the inner disposition of the
heart."9° The affections are not under the power of the
will for by experience people discover that the will
itself cannot control love, hate, or similar affections.
Affections are able to be overcome only by more powerful
affections. Since the will is itself the source of
affections, Melanchthon opposes the scholastic teaching
that the will (voluntas), "by its very nature opposes the
affections or that it is able to lay an affection aside
whenever the intellect so advises or warns."91
Although one affection can overcome another
affection, Melanchthon denies "that there is any power in
man which can seriously oppose the affections." 92 God
requires purity of heart (in biblical language) or of the
will (in philosophical language), therefore whatever
freedom man may seem to have in external acts is of no
importance, since man cannot control his own affections.
When free will (voluntas) is related to predestination,
there is no freedom in either external or internal
activity, since all things take place according to divine
St.A., 2, pt. I, 13.
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determination. However, according to natural judgment,
there seems to be a certain amount of freedom in external
things. On the other hand, when the will is related to
human affections, there is clearly no freedom, even to
natural judgment, because "when an affection has begun to
rage and seethe, it cannot be kept from breaking
forth. 93
In this first edition of the Loci Melanchthon is
clearly deterministic. Free will in both external and
internal activities is denied. In contradistinction to
scholastic teaching (as seen in Aquinas, for example) it
is denied that the intellect moves the will by presenting
its object to it. The will is not capable of opposing the
affections. Moreover, there is no free choice because the
affections are not free. Melanchthon avoids using words
like "reason" and "free will" choosing instead to speak of
"the cognitive faculty" and "the faculty subject to the
affections."
In the locus on sin which follows immediately the
locus on the will the question of free will and sinful
affections are drawn closely together. Sin is "a depraved
affection, a depraved activity of the heart against the
Law of God."94 This depraved affection results from a
Ibid., p. 17; Ibid., p. 30.
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force within man driving him toward sin. There is no will
in natural man to oppose this affection. However, "in
those who have seen justified by the Spirit, good
affections struggle with the bad.

• • • n 9 5

Con-

sequently, Melanchthon denies the position of medieval
scholasticism.
What works of free will will you preach to us and what
power of man? Do you not imagine that you are denying
original sin when you teach that a man is able to do
something good in his own strength? A bad tree cannot
bring forth good fruit."
The scholastics focus on external works and judge those
works according to the letter of the Law. But God judges
the heart and its affections. The affections of natural
man have been perverted by sin, and the cognitive faculty
of man's intellect cannot conquer the affective faculty of
man's sinful heart. Man cannot will or do what is good.
He has no free will. Even in those who have been
justified, the good affections must struggle with the bad.
The notes of Pommerani based on Melanchthon's
lectures in 1533 expand this theme.97 Evangelical
doctrine destroys free will because it teaches that in man
there are horrible corruptions which struggle against the
Law of God. This corruption within man, however, human
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will is not able to destroy. The will of natural man is
neither able to effect nor to fulfill obedience to the Law
of God. Apart from the Holy Spirit, the human will cannot
dispel doubts about God, have true fear of God, or grasp
true faith in the mercy of God. Scripture teaches
everywhere that human nature is subjected to sin, and that
without the Holy Spirit man is incapable of truly fearing
God or trustingly believing the promises of God. The
human will cannot make natural man spiritually alive.
Without the Holy Spirit men cannot please God, be
righteous before God, or have eternal life.
One notes in these lectures that the strict
determinism of the 1521 Loci is abandoned. Melanchthon
does acknowledge that the will has some liberty in natural
man. The unregenerate are able to effect to some extent
the external works of the Law. Nevertheless, Melanchthon
continues to label as false the scholastic teaching that
natural man is able to satisfy the Law of God without the
Holy Spirit. Against the scholastics he affirms that sin
is inherent in man; he denies that a man can be righteous
before God for the sake of his good morals or merit,
either de congruo or de condigno; he denies that the
forgiveness of sins is given for works of mercy or that
natural man is able to love God apart from God's gracious
gift of his own Spirit. The scholastics further err when
they say that man is able, without the Holy Spirit, to
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love God above all things or to have true faith in God or
similar spiritual impulses.
The second edition of the Loci (1535) incorporates
the less deterministic view of the will with regard to
external works found in the 1533 lectures. In man is
found reason (that is, a mind which judges) and will
(which is either obedient to or struggles against that
judgment). The will commands the lesser powers of man:
the senses and sensual desires (affections). This
position markedly differs from that held in the first
edition, where Melanchthon writes,
If you relate the will to the affections, there is
clearly no freedom, even to natural judgment. When an
affection has begun to rage and seethe, it cannot be
kept from breaking forth.98
The freedom of the will is conjoined with the power of
reason. If natural man were not corrupted by sin, he
would have a certain and clear knowledge of God. He would
have true fear, true faith, and obedience to the Law.
Now, however, man is oppressed by death, filled with doubt
and error and he does not truly fear God. The Law of God,
moreover, requires not only external, civil obedience, but
perpetual and perfect obedience of the heart.
With regard to the power of human will, Melanchthon
asks, "by what means is human will able, by its own
strength, without renewal in some way, to do the external
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works of the Law?" He answers that question by affirming
the power of human will to do the external works of the
Law. "This is free will (voluntas) which the philosophers
rightly attribute to man." Because the Scriptures teach
that there is carnal righteousness to some extent,
Melanchthon concedes that human will is able to effect
civil righteousness to a limited extent without
renewal.99
Although Melanchthon appears to have changed his
position from one of holding that there is no freedom of
the will with regard to the affections, to holding that
there is a freedom of the will with regard to the
affections, the change is more apparent than real. In
1521 Melanchthon is describing the reality of natural
man's condition. "When an affection has begun to rage and
seethe, it cannot be kept from breaking forth." In 1535
Melanchthon is describing man's ideal condition in which
the will either acquiesces to or struggles against the
judgment of human reason. Melanchthon is clearly less
deterministic about the ability of natural man to effect
works of civil righteousness. But he is no less
deterministic about the ability of natural man to do what
pleases God spiritually, as is clearly seen in the
development of the locus regarding free will in the second
edition of the Loci.
99

CR, 21:373-378.
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In human nature there is a horrible corruption
which fights against the Law of God. The human will
cannot eliminate this corruption from the nature of man.
In consequence, man is not able to satisfy the Law of God,
which requires not only external obedience, but internal
beauty, fear, faith, highest love of God, and perfect
obedience. The human will cannot, without the Holy
Spirit, effect the spiritual affections God desires: true
fear of God, true faith in the mercy of God, obedience,
tolerance of afflictions, love of God, and so forth.
The Holy Spirit is efficacious through the Word,
as Saint Paul writes in Romans 8:26: "The Spirit helps us
in our infirmity." The regenerated human spirit (anima)
is encouraged so that it is enabled to retain the Word.
It is not discouraged, because it is taught that the
promise of the Gospel is universal and we ought to
believe. In the context of Romans 8:26, Melanchthon
continues, "We see conjoined these causes, the Word, the
Holy Spirit, and the will, which is certainly not idle,
but fights against its infirmities." Citing Basil of
Cesarea, "Only will, and God has come before hand."
Melanchthon continues, "God anticipates us, he calls, he
moves, he delights, but we shall have seen and shall not
have resisted. Sin constantly begins with us and not from
the will of God." Chrysostom says, "He draws, but he
draws the one who wills." Melanchthon warns his readers,
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"We ought not indulge in indifference or natural
desires. 0100

Melanchthon concludes this locus with the

understanding that obedience to the Law is possible
through grace. This interpretation is necessary so that
one might understand that the obedience of the pious is
distant from the perfection of the Law, but that the
regenerate are pleasing to God for the sake of Christ."'
Three developments can be identified in this
edition of the locus on free will. First, Melanchthon
uses "mind" and "will" rather than "cognitive faculty" and
"voluntary faculty" in describing the two parts of man.
Fagerberg suggests that this is the result of Aristotelian
influence and a desire to adopt a more precise terminology. The will and the affections which were identified
with one another in the first edition are now separated
and the affections subordinated to the will.102 This
observation is helpful. Melanchthon is more positive
about the usefulness of philosophy and especially
Aristotle in developing definitions. It is less clear
that the will and affections are identified in the first
edition. Clearly they are separated in the second edition
although one looks in vain for substantiation to the
assertion that the affections are subordinated to the
°°Ibid.,

p. 376.
p. 378.

t 0 2

Fagerberg, p. 127.

196
will. Secondly, Melanchthon specifically allows for free
will in works of civil righteousness without the addendum
in the first edition that ". . . there is freedom in
neither external nor internal acts, but all things take
place according to divine determination." 103 Thirdly,
Melanchthon emphasizes a more positive role for the will
in the regenerate. In natural man the affections cannot
be overcome. But by the power of the Holy Spirit,
regenerate man is empowered to make choices (arbitrium)
which reflect his rebirth: choices not to sin, choices to
do the will of God. This positive function of the
regenerate will does not happen in man innately, but in
the context of the Word and the efficacious power of the
Holy Spirit. "We see conjoined these causes, the Word,
the Holy Spirit, and the will, which is not idle, but
fights against its infirmities."
If Melanchthon had conjoined the Word, the Holy
Spirit, and the will in the context of justification, his
position would clearly be one of synergism. This however
is not the case. Melanchthon is speaking of the new life
of the regenerate following justification and the
reception of the Holy Spirit. Forensic justification
includes both the imputation of the righteousness of
Christ, by grace through faith, and the gift of the Holy
St.A., 2, pt. I, 17.
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Spirit, who effects a new life of love and obedience in
the Christian. That this is the context of this
conjoining of causes (the Word, the Holy Spirit, and the
regenerate will) is attested by the following. First,
Melanchthon strongly affirms in the preceeding paragraphs
that the human will cannot satisfy the Law of God or bring
about faith, love of God, or the other spiritual
affections that God desires and requires. Secondly,
Melanchthon uses Romans 8:26 in the immediate context of
the conjoining of causes, a text which addresses itself to
the Christian condition following justification, not the
initial conversion of the unregenerate. Thirdly,
Melanchthon emphasizes that it is the Holy Spirit who
helps the Christian spirit "retain the Word." Fourthly,
the context immediately following the three causes exhorts
the Christian not to indulge in indifference and natural
desires. Finally, the locus concludes with a discussion
of how obedience to the Law is possible by grace through
faith so that the pious live pleasing to God for the sake
of Christ. This is also the emphasis in the locus
concerning the third use of the Law.
Thus by 1535 Melanchthon has developed (1) his
forensic vocabulary of justification; (2) a concept of
free will in the regenerate by which those who have
imputed to them the righteousness of Christ by grace
through faith and have received the gift of the Holy
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Spirit are enabled to choose to do the will of God in
loving obedience; and (3) the distinctive third office of
the Law which describes the function of the revealed Law
in the Word of God in the lives of those imputed
righteous, having the Holy Spirit within their hearts and
in consequence, a changed heart or will. For those in
whom are conjoined the Word of God (Law and promises), the
gift of the Holy Spirit, and a regenerate free will -true fear of God, true love of God, and obedience to the
Law of God are begun. Because this good work of God is
only begun and not accomplished, the second, chief, and
principal function of the Law remains. The Law continues
to accuse the regenerate also of sin. But for the
Christian the accusation of the Law results in neither
despair nor work righteousness but rather in repentance
and in dependence on the righteousness of Christ, imputed
by grace. Forgiven and restored the Christian utilizes
the Word of God, the Spirit of God, and his own regenerate
free will (renewed heart) to choose that which pleases
God. Resolving not to sin again and instructed by the Law
in the abiding and immutable will of God, the believer
freely chooses those works which please God and in which
God would have him exercise obedience.

CHAPTER V
FORENSIC JUSTIFICATION, THIRD USE OF THE LAW,
AND REGENERATE FREE WILL IN THE 1559 LOCI
The final edition of the Loci was published in
1559, one year prior to Melanchthon's death. What had
begun in 1521 as a theological handbook had now become a
major dogmatics of evangelical teaching. Although the
years between 1535 and 1559 had been filled with
theological controversy among the evangelical, Roman, and
reformed parties, and within the evangelical party itself,
the final edition of the Loci in 1559 does not
theologically differ from that of 1535. What one does
find is a reiteration, often verbatim, of the theological
positions put forth in 1535.
The emphasis on justification as a forensic
proclamation, on the instructional function of the Law for
the regenerate, and on the role of the renewed will in
choosing the will of God, were already intact by the
second edition as seen above. The expansive final edition
of the Loci provides Melanchthon's definitive explication
of those themes which had shaped his theology for the past
forty years: Law and Gospel, sin and grace, faith and
obedience, justification as the imputation of the
199
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righteousness of Christ, and renewal as the efficacious
activity of the Holy Spirit within the obedient hearts of
those who trust in Christ.
Of Grace and Justification
The locus, De gratis et de iustificatione, is
divided into four parts: De vocabulo fidei, De vocabulo
gratiae, De bonis operibus, and De argumentis
adversariorum. One notes Melanchthon's juxtaposition of
grace, faith, and good works under the rubric of
justification. In so doing it is not his purpose to
confuse justification and renewal or to separate
justification by grace through faith from renewal and good
works, but to distinguish them. The content of the locus
is the biblical relationship between the imputation of the
righteousness of Christ and the response of obedience
manifested in those who trust in Christ. This locus comes
midway in the Loci. Melanchthon thus far has developed
the loci regarding the Trinity, creation, the cause of sin
and its effects, free will, original sin and actual sin,
the divine Law, and the Gospel. These loci are replete
with references to and definitions of grace, faith, and
justification. With the locus "on grace and
justification" Melanchthon provides a summation of his
theology of justification and begins to direct the
attention of his reader to the effects of justification
for those renewed by grace through faith.
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The loci which follow focus on what may be
described as practical or functional questions. What is
the church? What is the meaning of repentance? What are
the number and benefits of the Sacraments? Other topics
addressed include predestination, the resurrection of the
dead, prayer, ceremonies in the church, the mortification
of the flesh, Christian liberty, and the place and
function of civil authority. In this locus regarding
grace and justification Melanchthon conjoins the
imputation of the righteousness of Christ with the new
obedience effected by the Holy Spirit in the regenerate.
Melanchthon emphasizes the priority of the first
subtopic, De vocabulo fidei, for the task of doing
theology. This topic contains the summation of the Gospel
and points to the chief benefit of Christ, which
distinguishes the church of God from all who would imagine
that man is justified by the Law or by self-discipline.
Recognizing that there is a difference of opinion
regarding this topic, he describes this difference as one
that exists between those who adhere to the word of God
and those who follow human opinion or judgment and neglect
the simple teaching of the prophets, of Christ, and of the
apostles. When the clear teaching of Scripture is
neglected, theology is transformed into philosophy and it
is imagined that there is no difference between
philosophical righteousness (righteousness by works) and
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Christian righteousness (justification by grace through
faith).'
Ignorance of Christ's work and benefits has often
obscured the true teaching of the church as can be seen in
the Old Testament and the subsequent history of the New
Testament church. The Pharisees thought themselves to be
righteous according to the Law and in consequence could
find no need for the coming of the Messiah. Thinking that
he would be established as a ruler by the world, they did
not understand that it was right that he should be a
victim for all people to placate the wrath of God against
sin. Righteousness would be a gift; not something of
themselves but from another. The prophets sought to
appraise the people of God of this error, proclaiming that
sin is not removed by the righteousness of the Law since
it remains in human nature. They affirmed that righteousness is believing, hearing, and receiving eternal life
from God for the sake of the promised savior. This is
clearly taught in the psalms of David (Ps. 2:12; 143:2)
and in the prophecies of Isaiah (Isa. 53:11) among others.
"Fanatical spirits" coming immediately after the
time of Christ and the apostles also distorted the Gospel
into Law, holding man to be righteous by the Law. Some of
'Robert Stupperich, ed., Melanchthons Werke in
Auswahl (Studienausgabe), 7 vols. (Guetersloh: Mohn and
Co., 1953-present), 2, pt. II, p. 353. Hereafter this
work will be cited as St.A.
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the pious, nevertheless, preserved the true understanding
of the Gospel as the Scriptures testify: that we receive
the remission of sins by grace, through faith, for the
sake of Christ alone. Others, then and now, teach that
men are able to satisfy the Law of God of themselves; that
righteousness is a consequence of keeping the Law, and
that such obedience is meritorious and worthy of eternal
life. These do not admit that faith signifies trust in
the mercy of God. They affirm, rather, that those reborn
ought to doubt even that they are in grace. This
understanding is not Christian, but pagan.2 These
errors do not edify God's people but lead the light of the
Gospel into darkness, obscuring the benefits of Christ,
true consolation of the conscience, and genuine prayer.
It is necessary therefore that the church expose this
error and warn against it.3
Melanchthon begins his warning against such
teaching in the church by emphasizing the coercive nature
of the Law. Aristotle is cited with approval when the
philosopher describes righteousness as the most beautiful
morning and evening star. Civil order is necessary
because the preaching of the Gospel cannot be efficacious
in a world without order or in those who persist in doing
2

lbid., pp. 354-56.

3

Ibid., p. 354.
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what is against the conscience. The notion that we merit
the forgiveness of sin by implementation of the Law or
that by the Law man is righteous or reconciled to God must
be rejected. When the Law and the recognition of sin are
brought together with the Gospel, many accuse the
evangelicals of stoic determinism. But this is mere human
opinion, and not the teaching of Saint Paul or of the
other apostles and prophets.4
With this warning Melanchthon develops his second
point, that it is through the preaching of repentance and
the promised deliverer that men are received by God, and
not because of obedience or works. This proclamation has
constituted the ministry of the church from the time of
Adam through Christ and the apostles, who were commanded,
"Go and preach repentance and the remission of sins in my
name." The preaching of repentance is the true voice of
the Law, through which God reveals both external sin
(wicked deeds) and internal sin (not fearing God, not
loving God, not trusting God). The Gospel itself accuses
the world of its unbelief when the world does not listen
to the Son of God and is not moved by his passion and
resurrection. The Holy Spirit convicts the world of sin
because it does not believe (John 16:8-9). The Law of
God's wrath denounces all mankind, and in part the
4

lbid., pp. 356-57.
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calamities of men are the effect of God's Law admonishing
men and calling all to repentance.5
When human minds hear the voice of the Law and are
terrified by sin, only then can the open promise of the
Gospel be heard, which sets forth the forgiveness of sins
by grace for the sake of Christ. This is Melanchthon's
third point. Faith comes by the mercy of God and not from
any worthiness in man. Faith is given to men by God in
order that men's minds might be encouraged through
forgiveness and reconciliation. If faith were based on
the habits of men, if human contrition or worthiness were
to be the standard of judgment, then the soul would be
plunged into desperation or doubt.
But we have a certain and firm consolation. It
on the benefits of God and not from a condition
own worthiness. Our consolation is solely from
for the sake of Christ's promise. And when God
forgives sin, he also gives us the Holy Spirit,
begins new virtures in the pious.6

depends
of our
mercy
who

. . To justify is a forensic word. .
Men are

Justificare est forense verbum. .

pronounced righteous, their sins are forgiven, and they
are reconciled to God.
When God forgives sin, at the same time he gives the
Holy Spirit to begin new virtues. However, first
terrified minds must seek remission of sins and
reconciliation.a
5

lbid., pp. 357-58.

6

lbid., p. 359.

'Ibid.

aIbid.
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The rigtheousness or worthiness of man is never
the cause of forgiveness. Righteousness is by grace
alone, but the forensic righteousness of justification
inaugurates a new person who has received the Holy Spirit
in order that he might begin to live a life pleasing to
God.
The next subtopic of his locus on grace and
justification focuses on the biblical description of
faith. Melanchthon begins by distinguishing the Roman
position from the evangelical understanding of
justification.
To Roman ears . . . to be justified by works signifies
to obtain forgiveness and to be righteous, that is, to
be acceptable to God, for the sake of proper virtues
and deeds. On the contrary, to be justified by faith
in Christ means to obtain forgiveness and righteousness
that is, to be reputed acceptable, not for the sake of
proper virtues, but for the sake of the Mediator, the
Son of God.9
This understanding is discerned from the Gospel itself and
especially in the writings of Saint Paul, who opposes any
other point of view as the voice of human reason and the
Law.
As the Baptist exclaimed, "Behold the Lamb of God who
takes away the sin of the world." Paul wishes for us
to put forth this sacrifice and teach that for the sake
of the Son of God forgiveness and reconciliation is
given, and not for the sake of our own virtues."
The righteous Son of God, seated at the right hand of the
9

lbid., p. 360.

"Ibid.
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Father, intercedes for us and forgives our sins.
Therefore faith points to him as Mediator and applies his
gifts to us.
Melanchthon underscores that such faith is not
only an historical knowledge, but a confident trust in the
promises of God, for the sake of Christ. Those who object
to this teaching do not understand Scripture and they do
not understand the certainty of God's promises. They
remain burdened by fear and doubt and they are distressed
about being forgiven. Consolation, however, comes from a
source outside themselves, the promised mercy given for
the sake of the Mediator. For those who trust in
themselves and not in Christ, the words of the Creed, "I
believe in the forgiveness of sins," are said in vain."
Faith is to assent to every word of God intended for us
and chiefly also to the promise of grace and
reconciliation given for the sake of Christ the
Mediator, as well as trust in the mercy of God's
promise for the sake of Christ. Now trust is a
movement of the will necessary for the response of
assent. The will which rests in Christ is kindled by
the Holy Spirit. 12
This understanding of faith is clearly attested by Saint
Paul, who in Romans 4 makes the promise correlative to
faith.
The promise is firm because it is by grace,
through faith. We assent to the promise and we are able
"Ibid., pp. 360-61.
"Ibid., p. 363.
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to assent by grace. If the Law were added as a condition,
desperation would follow. Romans 5:1 ("Justified by faith
we have peace. . . .") teaches that mere historical
knowledge of Christ does not effect peace with God but
only augments terror and desperation. What, indeed, is a
more terrible sign of the wrath of God against sin than
that no other victim was possible other than the death of
God's Son. . . . . It is not possible to placate the wrath
of God except through the Son." Faith is trusting that
these benefits of Christ apply to us. "This trust
consoles the terrors of the mind and affords peace.""
The Christian's consolation is found in submission
to the judgment of God, which is wrath against sin.
Faith rests in the mercy of God, who has been propitiated
through the death of his Son. It is a very personal
confidence, as was recognized by both the Psalmist (Ps.
2:12) and by Saint Paul (Eph. 3:12). The heart is not
purified by the righteousness of the Law. But faith alone
purifies the hearts of those who believe they are saved by
the grace of God in Christ Jesus. By faith, the Christian
can call in trust upon God and expect from God consolation
and help. 1

4

Those who do not teach that such

consolation comes from Christ do not rejoice in his
"Ibid., p. 365.
"Ibid., p. 366.
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benefits. When it is said, "We are justified by faith,"
nothing other is said than that for the sake of Christ one
receives the remission of sins and is reputed righteous.
This is the continuing witness of the Gospel and is
certainly the true consensus of the church and a true
explanation of Pauline teaching. But human reason
understands only the righteousness of works. The biblical
and evangelical understanding of faith is that to which
all the articles of Christian belief point.
Faith is to assent to every word of God intended for us
and chiefly also to assent to the promise of grace and
reconciliation given for the sake of Christ the
Mediator. By faith a man apprehends and applies the
promises of God and quiets the human heart. The
Creed's other articles point to this article: "I
believe in the remission of sins and life everlasting."
This is indeed the highest promise and end, to which
other articles refer, because "the Son of God is sent"
as John says, "to destroy the works of the devil," that
is, to put away sin and to renew righteousness and
eternal life.'s
The third subtopic of the locus "on grace and
justification" focuses on the meaning of the word "grace."
Philosophy obscures the benefits of Christ and the
imputation of grace, which is the free remission of sin,
mercy, and the gracious acceptance of God. This gift of
grace signifies also the reception of the Holy Spirit and
eternal life. "Eternal life" is a comprehensive term
including new life and eternal righteousness which is
begun now and is later perfected. The Law cannot offer
"Ibid., p. 371.
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true, eternal life, but only a discipline of external
morals, which is not eternal, not enduring, and not the
perpetual righteousness that God requires."
Melanchthon develops the content and meaning of
the term grace through an exegetical study centering in
Romans. This study is largely a repristination of the
insights already found in his Romans Commentary (first
published in 1532, but continuously edited and republished
throughout Melanchthon's lifetime). Melanchthon
structures his study of grace under four headings. First,
grace is the remission of sins, the imputation of
righteousness, and the gift of the Holy Spirit. It gives
the honor to Christ due to him as savior and mediator
(John 1:29; Isa. 53:10). Secondly, grace offers
consolation to the stricken conscience. Men need not
doubt that God has acted on their behalf in Christ (Rom.
4:16; John 1:18). Thirdly, grace exalts prayer and
dependence upon God through Christ as mediator. Finally,
this scriptural understanding of grace properly
distinguishes between Law and Gospel.
The Law has its own kind of promises, but they do
not include the remission of sin, reconciliation to God,
or the imputation of the righteousness of Christ. The Law
prescribes that man is righteous if he excels in obedience
"Ibid., p. 372.
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and is without sin. The Gospel proclaims the Son of God
as Mediator and claims Christians for his sake, being
reconciled by grace, alone. Therefore any opinion which
teaches that there is forgiveness for the sake of works
buries the doctrine of faith, the honor of Christ, and the
consolation of consciences in the Gospel."
The remainder of this subtopic on grace develops
the biblical foundation of the sola qratia, focusing on
Romans, chapters 3-5, but including exegetical studies of
Ephesians 2:8; Galatians 2:16; Galatians 3:14. It is
Melanchthon's continuing concern to anchor the evangelical
position in the Word of God and not in the traditions of
the church or philosophy of man. The following are also
cited as attesting to the truth of the evangelical
position regarding grace and faith: Matthew 11:28; John
3:16; Acts 10:43; Romans 10:11-13; 11:32; 1 Timothy 2:4; 2
Corinthians 6:1 and Luke 11:13. The position of the Roman
party leaves Christians in perpetual doubt concerning
forgiveness and detracts from Christ's honor, as Scripture
clearly attests."
Melanchthon concludes the locus, De qratia et de
justificatione, with a subtopic on good works, De bonis
operibus. Obedience, the righteousness of a good
"Ibid., pp. 373-77.
"Ibid., pp. 383-86.

212
conscience and of good works which God commands,
necessarily ought to follow reconciliation to God. This
is the teaching of Scripture: Romans 8:12; 1 Corinthians
6:9; 1 John 3:7-9; Ephesians 2:10.'9 What good works is
the Christian to do? Those which are commanded in the
Word of God and summarized comprehensively in the
Decalogue. The chief good works are those of the first
table of the Law: believing God, trusting God, and fearing
God. The Roman opponents ignore the first table of the
Law and teach nothing of faith, which is the principal
good work. How are Christians able to do such good
works? The internal obedience of the heart cannot begin
without knowledge of the Gospel and without the gift of
the Holy Spirit by grace (Gal. 3:14). Love of God is not
possible unless one first hears the voice of the Gospel.
Faith must preceed works. By grace the Holy Spirit is
received, who exalts new, spiritual impulses in the
regenerate which are congruent with the Word of God.
How do such good works please God? The Christian
lives with an infirmity which is evidenced by his failure
to overcome those things which impede good works, by the
imperfection of his works, and by the continuing
condemnation of the Law. Obedience is a necessary
response to the Gospel, but sin remains in the regenerate
'
9 Ibid., p. 386.
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when they continue to fight against the Law of God.2°
Nevertheless, although sin continues in the regenerate,
the believer does good works as one whose hope is in the
Lord and not in the merit of those works.
Melanchthon summarizes the relationship of grace,
faith, and good works to one another in three points: (1)
the regenerate are renewed or reconciled to God for the
sake of God's Son and are received by grace through faith
for Christ's sake; (2) in the regenerate there remain
infirmities, sin, and vicious affections which are
contrary to the Law of God; (3) obedience and
righteousness of conscience begin in the regenerate but
are far from perfection in the Law. Nevertheless, the
reconciled are able to please God for the sake of Christ,
who continues to bring before the Father the prayer and
worship of all believers. It is for the sake of Christ
that the believer himself is reconciled to God.
Reconciled to God in Christ, the works of the believer are
received by God in grace." Faith is excercized in
works because the regenerate believe in God and trust that
God will be pleased with even these works, done for the
sake of the promise in Christ. Christians then do good
works from three causes: (1) because they are commanded
20 Ibid.,

p. 396.

"Ibid., p. 399.
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by God; (2) because they are obliged to obedience by faith
(faith requires good works); (3) in order that faith may
be retained, because the Holy spirit is expelled from the
heart when that heart persists in sins against the
conscience.22 The Christian seeks to do the will of
God, as God has revealed that will.

II
.
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. We judge

concerning the will of God from the point of view of the
Word of God."23
Melanchthon concludes his locus on grace and
justification with a scriptural refutation of the Roman
position (De argumentis adversariorum). Expressing the
objections of the Roman party through syllogisms,
Melanchthon demonstrates that these positions are refuted
by the clear teachings of Scripture and cannot be
maintained. What is maintained is that man is saved by
grace through faith for the sake of Christ, and not from
works, although works are a necessary consequence of
faith. Such works done in faith are graciously accepted
by God for the sake of his Son and the regenerate, in
seeking to please God and to do his will, finds the
testimony to those works which God desires and commands in
the clear witness of the Scriptures and summarized in the
Decalogue.24
22

1bid., p. 404.

"Ibid., p. 415.
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1bid., pp. 415-440.
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Third Use of the Law
The description of the third use of the Law in the
final edition of the Loci is largely unchanged from that
of the 1535 edition. It remains brief and is specifically
directed to the office of the Law in the life of the
renatis (those reborn by grace through faith to whom the
righteousness of Christ is imputed and the ministry of the
Holy Spirit is bestowed).
In so far as the reborn are justified by faith, they
are free from the Law. . . . They are free from the
Law, that is they are free from its cursings and
condemnation and from the wrath of God which is set
forth in the Law. When the reborn retain faith and
trust in the Son of God, they fight against sin and
conquer the terrors of sin. Meanwhile, however, the
Law is taught. It shows the residue of sin in the
reborn so that knowledge of sin grows and with it
repentance. At the same time the Gospel of Christ is
heard so the faith grows. The Law is set forth for the
reborn so that it might teach certain works in which
God wills us to exercise obedience. Certainly God does
not wish us to devise some work or worship on our own,
but he wishes to rule us by his Word, as it is written,
"In vain do they worship me with the mandates of men,"
"your Word is a light to my feet." Human reason, when
it is not ruled by the Word of God, easily errs. It is
enraptured by desire so that it approves evil works (as
appears in the laws of the nations). The divine
ordinances remain immutable, so that we might submit to
God. Although we are free from the Law and from
condemnation because we are righteous by faith, for the
sake of the Son of God, however, so that we might
attain to obedience, the Law remains. The Law remains
because the divine ordinances remain in order that the
justified might be obedient to God and so that they
might have the beginnings of obedience. . . . 25
Melanchthon's explanation of the Law's third office can be
summarized under three headings: (1) freedom from the

25

St.A., 2, pt. I, 325.
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Law's condemnation for the renatis; (2) the abiding
necessity of teaching both Law and Gospel; and (3) the
Word of God as the instrument of God's self-revelation.
Insofar as the reborn are those justified by
faith, they are free from the Law's condemnation.
Melanchthon recognizes the duality of the Christian who is
both justified by grace through faith and in consequence
free of the Law and its condemnation, and yet remains a
sinner who stands accused by the Law. The third office of
the Law addresses the continuing function of the Law in
the regenerate who, although they are sinners and stand
accused by the Law, nevertheless are free from the Law's
condemnation through the imputed righteousness of Christ.
They are unwillingly sinners because those justified by
faith struggle against sin although sin continues to be a
part of their fallen nature.
Consequently, both Law and Gospel must be preached
to the regenerate, who are free from the Law's condemnation by grace and yet stand accused by the Law as
sinners. The Law demonstrates the residue of sin in the
regenerate. In so doing the Law brings about in the
regenerate a heightened sensitivity to sin. Moreover, in
addition to showing that which God condemns, the Law also
teaches those works in which God wills the regenerate to
excercize obedience. Since the Law continues to function
in the life of the regenerate, the Gospel must continue
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also to be preached so that faith, a trusting confidence
in the mercy of God through Jesus Christ, will continue to
grow. Only by faith can the believer look beyond his own
sin with confidence to the gracious acceptance of God.
The preaching of both Law and Gospel must be
anchored in God's Word.

God's Word is his instrument.

"God wishes to rule us by the Word. . . ." Human reason
or wisdom easily errs when it is not ruled by the Word.
The Christian continues to struggle with the affections of
sin; he is enraptured by the desires of the flesh. But
the divine ordinances of God's Word are immutable. As the
church must be obedient to the Word of God, so the
individual Christian must live in accordance with that
Word.
The third use of the Law may be described, then,
as the rule of God's Word in the life of the regenerate.
God does not desire that the regenerate should devise
works or worship according to human reason which, "when it
is not ruled by the Word of God, easily errs."
Melanchthon emphazises that the Word of God is the rule
and norm of both Christian doctrine and the Christian
life. One of the writings which most concisely develops
Melanchthon's understanding of the normative character of
the Scriptures is his treatise De ecclesis et de
autoritate verbi Dei (Of the Church and the Authority of
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the Word of God), written in 1539. Melanchthon reacts
against both the false claim of the Roman church that the
teaching of the church is to be preferred to the Word of
God 26 and against the false teaching of "fanatics" on
the right who distort the Word of God for their own
purposes."
But I call the church the assembly of true believers
who have the Gospel and sacraments and who are being
sanctified by the Holy Spirit, as the church is
described in Ephesians 5 and John 10. . . . 28
These then constitute the church: the assembly of
believers, the Gospel (Word of God), the sacraments, and
the sanctifying activity of the Holy Spirit. Melanchthon
affirms that the "church" through the ages has always
existed, but he acknowledges also that at times its
teaching and practices have been less pure and have even
obscured the Gospel through erroneous opinions. Articles
of faith have been denied. "Therefore, whenever the
authority of the church is adduced, one must ascertain
whether it has been the consensus of the true church,
congruent with the Word of God.29
"St.A., 1:326; Philip Melanchthon, "The Church
and the Word of God," in Melanchthon: Selected Writings,
trans. Charles Leander Hill, ed. Elmer E. Flack and Lowell
J. Satre (Minneapolis: Augsburg Publishing House, 1962) p.
133. Hereafter cited Hill, citations in the text are
those of the Hill translation.
St.A., 1:327.
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The majority of the work treats of church councils
and Latin and Greek fathers of the first seven centuries.
Melanchthon evaluates the writings of these individuals
and the pronouncements of these earlier Synods "according
to the Word of God, which abides always in the rule of
doctrine."30 Augustine receives positive treatment
because of his careful distinction between Law and Gospel
and his consistent reliance on Scripture. It may indeed
be argued that Melanchthon understands Augustine to be
more of an "evangelical" than he actually was in his
understanding of justification.31 In any case, his
treatment of Augustine allows Melanchthon to reiterate his
own understanding of the relationship of Law and Gospel.
It is as Paul says: therefore to be freed from the Law
is to be freed from that verdict that we are subject to
the wrath of God and eternal death. It is to be
liberated not only from rites or external spectacles,
but much more to be delivered from the Law which
completely terrifies, curses, damns, and slays us,
when, to be sure, another factor is proposed because of
which we are pronounced righteous, namely the Son of
God who has been made a victim for us.32
The church, the Word, the sacraments and the activity of
the Holy Spirit in the lives of believers constitute the
instruments by which the will of God is accomplished among
men. This church is no mere ideal, but exists by the
30
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grace of God where the Gospel is proclaimed and where
believers practice worship of God, repentance of sins,
study of the Word, and the Christian life according to
God's revealed will.
Let us not think that the church is only a Platonic
state. The assembly is the true church in which the
pure doctrine of the Gospel shines forth and in which
the divinely instituted Sacraments are rightly
administered. In such an assembly there must be some
living members of the church who practice true worship
of God, who repent, call upon God in true faith, devote
themselves to study, and work for the propagation of
the gospel, declare their confession and serve their
vocation. Finally, they practice the pious duties
demanded by God and as they face dangers of every kind,
they practice prayer and other good works."
In this concise description of the church Melanchthon also
provides an integrated analysis of the third use of the
Law in the lives of those reborn by grace through faith.
Melanchthon summarizes his exposition of the third
office of the law emphasizing the roles of Law and Gospel
in the life of the Christian. The Christian is free from
the curse of the Law and its condemnation, by grace
through faith in Christ. The Law remains, however, so
that those justified by the imputation of the
righteousness of Christ might begin obedience through the
efficacious ministry of the Holy Spirit. Melanchthon
never wavers in affirming that the chief and principal
function of the Law is that of accusing sin. The third
office of the Law, however, emphasizes the continuing
33
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reliance of the Christian on the Word of God so that he
might do the will of God according to the revealed Word of
God and not according to works of his own choosing or
devising. It is through works of human devising that the
church of his own time had come to abrogate the
distinctive messages of the Law and Gospel so that the
Gospel was subsumed into a category of the Law and the Law
of God was temporalized into philosophical legalism.
Through the third use of the Law Melanchthon emphasizes
the Word of God as the rule and norm for Christian
doctrine and practice in opposition to both the church of
Rome and fanatics on the right who distort that Word of
God, confuse Law and Gospel, and rob Christians of their
confidence in the sola gratia, sola fide and the soli per
Christum of the Gospel.
Regenerate Free Will
Melanchthon is aware that the question of free
will has intrigued man through the ages. Natural
philosophers (physicis) have made distinctions and named
processes by which choices are made in their psychological
investigstions. Some of these distinctions are of human
origin; others were given by the prophets and apostles.
In natural man there is a part that knows and judges which
is called the mind (mens) or the intellect (intellectus)
or reason (ratio). This knowing and judging is called
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knowledge (notitis). The other part of man is that which
desires (appetens) and is called the will (voluntas). The
will may be either complient or resistant to the knowledge
of the intellect. Under the desiring part of man are the
sensual desires or affections (affectus) which originate
in the heart of man and incite impulses in man toward the
object of desire.34
Melanchthon begins his discussion with a
definition of free choice (libero arbitrio). "Free choice
is the mind (mens) and will (voluntas) working together.
Free choice is that faculty of the will (voluntas) which
is able to choose or to desire what is pointed out to it
by the intellect, or to reject it." The will does this
according to its own unprejudiced nature (nature
integra). Although there are impediments to this process,
yet man has free choice (arbitrium). The ancients attest
to it and this vocabulary is common also to the prophets
and apostles, when they speak of the mind and heart, which
correspond to the philosophers' use of intellect and
will.35
While some philosophers deny that the human will
is free, the concern in the church is whether human will
is able to obey the Law of God, given man's natural
34
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depravity. Melanchthon responds that the natural man is
not even able to address this question because of the
greatness of the sin in which he is born. Unless a man
knows the Law of God, he is not able to do even outward
civil works, but perfectly and perpetually obeys his
corrupt human nature. The Law commands that man is to
love God with his whole heart. If human nature were not
corrupted by sin, if human nature had a clear and strong
knowledge of God, if it did not doubt the will of God, if
it had true fear and trust in Good, then human nature
would be outstanding in its complete obedience to the
Law. If this were the case in natural man, a firm light
would be set up concerning God and the impulses of all
consciences would be in accord with God. However, natural
man is oppressed by the illness of his ancestry; he is
full of doubt concerning God. He does not truly fear God
or trust in him, nor is he incited to love God, but "the
many flames of the affections are corrupt." As a result
natural man by no means is able to satisfy the Law of
God. What then is the will able to do? 36
There remains in natural man some measure of
judgment and an ability to choose among the things that
are subject to reason and senses. The human will is able
on its own, without renewal, to do the outward works of
"Ibid., p. 238.
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the Law to a limited extent. This is free will (libertas
voluntas) which philosophy rightly attributes to man.
Paul himself distinguishes between carnal and spiritual
righteousness, acknowledging that those who are not reborn
do have choice, within limits, and can do, within limits,
the outward works of the Law. For example, man is able to
keep his hand from murder, from robbery, from plunder.
Paul calls this carnal righteousness.37 The Law
instructs unregenerate man and it punishes his violations,
as it reveals and punishes the sorrowful sins of this life
(such as incest and murder). "The Law is set down for the
unjust" (1 Tim. 1:9). That is, the Law is to coerce the
unregenerate and to punish stubborness. Likewise, "the
Law is a teacher" (Gal. 3:24). That is, it coerces and
teaches. Man's external obedience does not merit the
remission of sins; neither does it justify ("by which we
are declared to be righteous before God"); however, it is
necessary, for by the civil righteousness which the Law
constrains the church in the meantime is able to teach
Christ. The Holy spirit is not efficacious in those who
are stubborn, those who persevere in delinquency against
the conscience.38
The freedom to do the Law is greatly impeded by
two causes: the infirmities with which man is born, and
37
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the devil. The corrupt affections in man are sharply
stimulated and greatly incited by the fallen nature of
man. Natural man is often obedient to impulses which are
contrary to the counsels of the mind. The devil too is
active in the impious. He impedes government and he
impels many things which lead to ruin. Citing biblical
and historical examples of the devil's destructive
influence, Melanchthon concludes that the frailty of man
is very great since all of history and indeed one's daily
experience ("in which so much misery is seen") teach that
man's wisdom is only so much confusion from which the most
dismal death results. Nevertheless, despite these
impediments (man's nature and the devil) there remains
some liberty in the average mind when outward morals are
reborn. 39
The church, however, is not concerned with free
will as it relates to external matters. The church is
concerned with free will as it relates to the Law
imprinted on human hearts. Carnal man is full of doubt
concerning God, without trust in God, and has an innate
hostility to the Law of God.
Though natural man is oppressed by sin and death, the
greatness of this evil is not seen by human
discernment, but in the revealed Word of God. It is
certain that man does not have the freedom to set aside
this depravity, which is with him from birth, or to set
aside death. This great and chief evil of mankind
39
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becomes evident when free will is weakened. The will
is not able to burn out the depravity in us from birth,
nor is it able to satisfy the Law of God because the
Law of God not only concerns outward discipline and
somewhat darkened works, but it also demands an inner
obedience of the heart, as the Law says: "Love the Lord
your God with your whole heart and with all your mind
and with all your strength." The Law judges and
condemns sin in natural man which is not removed. Just
as we are not able to deprive death of all its power,
so also we are not able to burn out the depravity with
which we are born. This evil can be acknowledged only
when one perceives the benficia Christi, who removes
sin and death and renews natural man. Thus the will is
captive, not free, except of course to exalt natural
depravity and death."
Natural man has a captive will and in his weakness cannot
understand his own condition. His will is free only to
violate the Law of God and to merit the cure of that Law:
death.
Melanchthon's third point concerns the spiritual
actions of regenerate man. The church has existed since
the beginning of the world. Those who are the church are
not guided by human strength or human weakness, but are
illuminated to spiritual impulses by the Holy Spirit:
fearing, believing and loving God. In some this is true
to a greater extent than in others. Philosophers and
Pelagians may ridicule this idea, but the Spirit of God
has been poured out upon the hearts of believers."
Melanchthon continues his discussion of the
Christian life with an exegetical study. "Those who are
40
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led by the Spirit of God are the sons of God," "If one has
not the Spirit of Christ, he is not of Christ" (Rom. 8:14
and 8:9). These two sentences are "clear and plain
witnesses of the gift of eternal life and the rule of the
Holy Spirit." "Spirit of God" does not signify
philosophic reason, but the Holy Spirit sent into the
hearts of the pious and kindling knowledge of God through
the Gospel and the proper influence of God's Law.
Melanchthon also cites 1 Corinthians 2:14. "The natural
man does not perceive those things which are sent from the
Spirit of God." He understands homo pyschikos to refer to
natural man with only his natural senses and reason, being
without the Holy Spirit. Paul distinguishes between the
natural (animalem) and spiritual (spirituali) life.42
Although limited knowledge is naturally impressed
on man concerning divine Law, nevertheless man has many
doubts about the providence of God and about the Gospel.
Man says to himself: perhaps we are regained, perhaps we
are heard clearly, but perhaps not. Each man considers
the darkness of his heart; he considers God's wrath, he
considers whether he is regained, whether he has heard
clearly, whether he delights in affliction. It is in the
context of these considerations concerning the security
and freedom of the soul versus flight from God, that this

"Ibid.
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writing of Paul is to be understood: "The natural man does
not receive the things which are of the Spirit of God."
Natural man does not clearly perceive God's wrath against
sin; he does not understand the peace of God or truly fear
God. This is also the testimony of Saint John (John 3:5;
6:44; 15:5). "Unless one is born of water and the Spirit,
he is not able to enter the Kingdom of God." "No one is
able to come to me, unless the Father draws him."
"Without me, you can do nothing."43
Melanchthon continues his exegetical study
emphasizing divine monergism with a reference from Isaiah
59:20-21. These words contain "a most sweet description
of the church and teach who is the church and where the
church is to be found and who has received the benefits of
God." The church is that gathering which proclaims the
Gospel tradition of the prophets and apostles. Where
there are living members of the church possessing the Holy
Spirit, there must also be found the Word of God, the
remission of sins, the Holy Spirit, and eternal life.
These are the posessions of those who are the church.44
Here the Holy Spirit is efficacious in the regenerate
through the proclamation of the Gospel, as is taught in
Galatians 3:14 ("that we might receive the promise of the
43
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Spirit through faith"). Free will in relation to the
unregenerate has already been denied. The context here is
a discussion of the regenerate, who are not to seek God
apart from his Word.
It is often said that understanding concerning God must
begin with the Word of God, for God is not sought apart
from his Word. At any time we begin with the Word,
there are three concurrent causes of good actions: the
Word of God, the Holy Spirit, and the human will,
assenting to and not resisting the Word of God. It is
possible, indeed, to discard the Word of God as Saul
himself voluntarily discarded it. But when the mind,
hearing the Word and being sustained by it does not
resist it, does not indulge in the Word with
indifference and understands it, it is enabled to
assent by the Holy Spirit. In this certainly the will
is not idle. The ancients said, "Grace leads the way,
the will only accompanies to do good works." So also
Basil says, "Only will and God has come beforehand"
(monon thelason, kai theos proapanta). Will a little
and God already come into the thoughts. God
anticipates us; he calls, he moves, he delights, but we
shall have seen and shall not have resisted. Sin
constantly begins with us and not from the will of
God. Chrysostom says, "He draws, but he draws the one
who wills" (0 de elkon ton boulomenon elkei). Just as
in this same place John writes, "All who have heard the
Father and would learn, come to me." . . . [Christ]
commands us, "Teach," that is, "hear the Word and do
not resist," but assent to the Word of God and do not
give way to indifference.""
The regenerate have received the Word without asking for
it, while their human will continued to struggle against
that Word. Nor would it have helped the regenerate if the
will had been as that of a statue. The only time the will
does not struggle against God and his Word is when it too
has.become holy. Even the regenerate must struggle
against their natural depravity.
45
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With those who
most difficult
assents feebly
except for the
are called and
the Spirit."

are holy, however, there are certainly
times. Still, the will is not idle, but
and would fall down in desperation,
promises and examples among those who
are repeatedly called and delighted by

Only the continuing activity of the Spirit keeps the
Christian from falling.
Melanchthon attacks the license of the Epicureans
who would maintain that if man is justified by grace and
not works, then he may indulge in indifference and other
depraved affections. Nor will Melanchthon allow the
opinions of "the crazy Manicheans" who maintain that there
are some men for whom conversion is not possible.
"Conversion did not happen for David as if the lapsed were
turned into a fig tree, but it happened with some free
will in David when he heard rebuking and the promise, and
then willed to be free of the offense."" It is
important to note here that Melanchthon is using
"conversione" in the sense of conversio continuata. David
was certainly already one of the people of God, but he had
sinned against God. It is David's repentance that
Melanchthon is here terming "conversion."
Melanchthon has no intention of calling the sola
gratia, sola fide into question. Indeed, the whole
paragraph is a defense of divine monergism against those
"Ibid., . 244.
"Ibid., pp. 244-45.
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who would contend that good works are necessary to be
justified before God. Further evidence of this
interpretation of Melanchthon comes immediately with a
citation of Romans 1:16, "The gospel is the power of God
unto salvation." But the Gospel cannot be that power when
it is resisted, when its promises are thought of lightly.
The Gospel must be assented to and believed. How is this
done? "The Gospel is the ministry of the Spirit. We
receive the promise of the Spirit through faith." What
Melanchthon is resisting is the notion that faith is a
kind of infused quality within man. God, through the Holy
Spirit, brings the Christian to faith; in faith the
Christian must respond. Reconciliation between God and
man requires the grace of God and the response of faith.
If so much is to be expected of this infused quality
without any of our action, like the enthusiasts and
Manicheans imagine, it is not the work of the gospel
and there is no light in the soul. But God instituted
the ministry and it is heard so that the mind might
know the promises and embrace them. Then we may resist
indifference, because the Holy Spirit is efficacious in
us at the same time.48
There is no excuse for delay in responding to God's
gracious gift of faith with a life of good works. "The
mandate of God is eternal and immovable, the voice of the
gospel most be obeyed, the Son must be heard, the Mediator
must be acknowledged." If one says, "I cannot,"
Melanchthon answers, "In some way you are able, when the
48Ibid.,
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voice of the Gospel sustains you, when you are helped by
God. I beseech and I know that the Holy Spirit is
efficacious in being a consolation within you."49
Melanchthon exhorts his readers to struggle
against their natural depravity. "I know God in this same
manner converts us when, exalted by the promise, we
struggle with ourselves, when we call upon and resist our
indifference and other depraved affections." There is a
struggle going on within the Christian: the Word, the
Spirit, and the regenerate will versus man's depravity,
captive will, indifference to God, and the devil.
Free will in man is the faculty to apply oneself to
grace. That is, one hears the promise and is able to
assent and to give up sins against the conscience.
This does not happen when one is in league with the
devil. . . . Since the promise is universal and since
there is in God no contradicticn of the will, it is
necessary that there be in us some cause of
discrimination, why Saul was cast down and David was
received. Therefore it is necessary that there is a
dissimilar action in these two. Properly understood,
this is true and is used in the exercise of faith and
in true consolation, when the soul's rest is in the Son
of God shown in the promises. It illustrates this
conjoining of causes: Word of God, Holy Spirit, and the
will."
The free will to which Melanchthon refers is that possesed
by those who rest in the Son of God in the exercise of
faith. He employs the examples of Saul and David as an
illustration of the "joining of causes" he earlier used in
49 Ibid.
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the context of bonae actionis. The regenerate, having the
Holy Spirit and dependent on the Word of God, must
exercise their renewed hearts and minds in choosing God's
will.
"Even if the weakness is great, nevertheless there is
still free will, when indeed already, by the Spirit,
one is able to help and to do something to the external
guarding against falling."51
Melanchthon continues to address the problem of
obedience in the Christian life. His point is that the
Christian, although imputed righteous, remains weak and
must perpetually guard against falling by the power of the
Spirit mediated through the Word and the use of his own
regenerate will (heart). He cites the example of Joseph,
who was able to resist the allurement of adultery. There
were two causes why he was able to resist this sin: first,
"the Word of God and the Holy Spirit influencing the mind,
so that the Word might ardently be understood," and
secondly, "the mind's understanding, depending upon how
much it is ruined when the devil is obeyed." Even for the
regenerate, then, there may be a loss of gifts, the
eternal wrath of God, punishment in this life and in the
future, plus many lapses and scandals. But the Holy
Spirit working in man's regenerate will strengthens the
Christian in his weakness and restrains the flames of the
heart. This same Spirit continuously incites fear of God
s
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and faith which rests in God. "In this the will is not
idle, but resists such allurements and handles the eyes
and feet so as to avoid occasional lapses. These examples
show clearly the causes of good actions."52
Melanchthon concludes this third section of the
locus on free will by emphasizing that bonae actionis

are

(1) increased by the help of the Holy Spirit, and are (2)
stimulated by our diligence, as Christ said, "He gives the
Holy Spirit to those who ask." Melanchthon condemns
"those who disdain, are idle, who resist, who petulantly
throw others to wickedness." He reminds his Christian
readers, "Paul orders us to be on guard, so that it is not
in vain that we receive grace," and exhorts them
"diligently to remember how much Christ promises kindness
and how many times and how often he commanded us to
pray." "Ask and you shall receive." If the Christian
does this, then he will know how to make progress in a
life of good works. Faith is incited prayerfully to
petition to God for strength. If the Christian does not
do so, "Indifference is increased, because we neglect the
understanding of these precepts and promises of
Christ."53 Melanchthon's concern is pastoral and
homiletical. He is not arguing a theological point so
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much as he is addressing the spiritual needs of his
Christian readers.
The fourth part of the locus on free will
addresses "the many things which happen to man which are
incomprehensible to human judgment and are certainly not
begun in us." There are aspects of this life over which
we have no control and this constricts human free will.
Joseph had no control over his banishment into exile by
his brothers. Other things which happen are errors of men
in judgment, as when Josiah pondered what was the right
thing to do when he made war with the Egyptians. The
prophets prophesied concerning this danger in various
places. Moses was called to lead the people out of Egypt,
but by no means foresaw that they would spend forty years
in the desert, or that the multitude would wander around
without water or food because of the sins of the people
and the sedition of their leaders. Moses only knew that
he would have no success by himself, but that he would be
leading by God's command. All this shows, as Jeremiah
said (Jer. 10:23), that the way of man is not in man's
power and that it is not possible to direct one's way and
calling by human counsel or human diligence, nor can one
lead successfully unless God helps.
Thus also the Baptist says, "Man is not able of himself
to undertake anything, unless it as given to him from
heaven." Hezekiah was successful in governing, because
he was helped by God. Ahijah was not successful
because he was not helped by God. Anthony desired to
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rule alone, but it was not given to him from heaven but
it was given to Augustine. These writings do not
abolish freedom of the will, which pertains to the
choosing of those things which have been foreseen, but
is said concerning objects outside us and concerning
events which happen at the same time as those various
other causes in addition to our own will, as the will
of Pompey alone was not able to be the cause of
victory.54
While there is freedom of choice, therefore, it is
limited by these external impediements. Man should be
taught to place his trust in God and to ask for help from
God, since many things which happen are incomprehensible
to man. Melanchthon quotes Jehoshaphat, "When we do not
know what to do, let us turn our eyes to you, 0 Lord."
Christ himself promises, "I will not leave you orphans"
(John 14:18). The same is said in the Psalms, by Paul,
and by the Lord. "You may be sure you will be successful
in your endeavor, when God helps you." It is for this
assistance that the Christian is to pray.55 The reason
for confusion concerning this question is that, "Men for
the most part act as if they were drunk and without
discipline, without diligence, and they live without any
exercise of faith and calling. How are they then able to
discern concerning actions or objectives?" Melanchthon
answers, pointing to Paul. Paul recognizes that his
understanding is a gift of God alone and is not mixed with
54
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inference or error nor is it entangled with corruption of
doctrine or other evils. "Thus he prays that his great
cares could be ruled and helped by God."56
At this point Melanchthon recapitulated what has
been assessed concerning free will. First: Human nature
is corrupt. Therefore the knowledge of God in man's heart
is obscure and man's heart and will are aberrant before
God. Man does not fear, trust, or love God, but is rather
seized by many corrupt emotions. Second: The devil, with
a horrible hatred of Christ, "develops each opportunity by
which he can implicate man in snares and sins and increase
man's passion for dangerous crimes, as he did in Cain,
Saul, Judas, and others." Third: "this life is one of
trouble and danger in which many daily experience
unexpected and confusing opinions, as David did not
foresee the sedition of his son. 'You don't know what the
late evening brings."" "If man's nature were
unimpaired, he would not be impeded in his freedom, nor
would he be in darkness and perversions nor would he be
disturbed by the devil or by trouble." Rather, "He would
be most free to choose and could have the faculty to
act." But this is not the case.
The Law of God is not incited without the Holy Spirit.
The lowest outward discipline is often impeded. There"Ibid., p. 249.
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fore if one contends that the saying of the church
concerning the present nature is to be accepted, it is
necessary to add many restrictions. . . . But through
God man is able to hurl down evil and he is able to do
rightly when encouraged by the Holy Spirit. Now and
then the will is not idle, nor does one have a will as
if one were a statue. . . . The will is made one of
helping the Holy Spirit in great freedom, that is, being
a circumspect and a constant agent and ardently calling
upon God.58
Melanchthon concludes his discussion of free will
with a look at two citations from Jerome. "Let him be
anathema, if anyone says that it is impossible for God to
have foreknowledge." Melanchthon maintains that, if anyone
should say that God does not have foreknowledge, it is
certain that that man does not understand why the Law of
God was given. Certainly political law judges that Law
should do a certain thing, and it does. But the Law of God
was given chiefly because it shows the judgment of God
against sin. God desires to look with his wrath upon the
man in sin and he shows sin, "by the voice of the Law."
The righteous man loves God with his whole heart. But
because man is not able to do this, the Law judges and
accuses man and declares its wrath against man. This is
what Melanchthon describes as the second, chief and
principal work of the Law.59
The second reason the Law was given was so that
obedience to the Law might begin in Christ (third office of
58

1bid., p. 250.

"Ibid., pp. 323-25.
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the Law). Because men are reconciled to God, their
obedience is begun in Christ with the help of God. This is
carefully explained by Paul in Romans 3. Works do happen,
but these are external acts, and Paul denies that, for the
sake of these works, a man is justified or that he
satisfies the Law. When it is said that "the Law is
impossible" it is meant that due to man's corrupt nature
the Law judges both inward and outward sin. Finally, the
benefits of Christ must to recognized, for it is he alone
who removes sin. The Law does not remove sin; rather, it
accuses man of sin. By the Law no man is righteous.
Therefore Christ gives us the Holy Spirit, so that in
our infirmities the law is begun and makes us somewhat
wholesome, and the teaching of the devil against all
mankind is suppressed.6°
For the natural man, the Law is impossible. For the
regenerate, the Law is possible. The Law is God's will for
his people and by the power of the Holy Spirit, obedience
is begun.
Melanchthon then considers a second saying of
Jerome: "Let him be anathema, if anyone says he is able to
do the Law without grace." Grace is to be understood as
including not only the imputation of righteousness by grace
for the sake of Christ, but also as the continuing activity
and help of the Holy Spirit. The imputation of the
righteousness of Christ would necessarily preclude works

"Ibid.
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because of its recognition of Christ's work and its faith
in the satisfaction for sin accomplished by Christ.
First, it must be said of grace that, "the law of God
happens through grace." For the sake of Christ man is
received and becomes a member of the body of Christ. In
this it is certain that already man pleases God, just as
if he had done the whole Law. By the imputation of grace
man is received, though unworthy, and overcomes sin.
Secondly, grace is to be understood as the many faceted
work of the Holy Spirit.
Minds are incited to the true light and preserved in
the Word of God. The impulses of faith are excited in
the heart and minds are moved so that they undertake
what is beneficial for us and for others."
He who has received the grace of God is to pray therefore
that he might do what pleases God and what is useful for
himself and for the church. He is unable to do this
unless God helps and sustains him. It is certain,
however, that God wills to be with the believer and to
make him strong when he prays, as Christ clearly says,
"How much more will your heavenly Father give the Holy
Spirit to those who ask." But man seldom prays for help.
Rather, in desperation he flees from God and seeks human
counsel. This is why men do not come to a recognition of
the promises and benefits of Christ. Therefore the
regenerate should cast off their indifference and
"Ibid., pp. 250-51.
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ignorance and understand the greatness of one's misery and
danger so that they might incite themselves truly to call
upon God. The promises of God are true, "Ask and you
shall receive." "God is near to all those who call upon
him in truth." Jerome writes:
"Law works through faith," that is, by imputation for
the sake of Christ and by the help of the Holy Spirit,
so that when obedience as begun, though we are far from
perfection in the Law, nevertheless we are accounted
righteous for the sake of Christ."
The Law is established then both by the imputation
of the righteousness of Christ in the initial conversion of
the Christian (conversio prima) and by the Holy Spirit in
the continuing conversion (conversio secunda, conversio
continuata) which characterizes the Christian life.
The Law is established through faith, first by imputation because for the sake of Christ we receive
reconciliation, without which theology is the voice of
condemnation, and secondly, because by faith we receive
the Holy Spirit and he begins and continues obedience
for the sake of Christ."
This concluding paragraph summarizes Melanchthon's
position throughout the locus. It is evident that Law is
used here not only in its accusatory function, but also as
the revealed will of God for the regenerate (third use of
the Law). The righteousness of God is established in man
first by faith; that is, it is imputed to man for the sake
of Christ. Secondly, the righteousness God requires is
"Ibid., pp. 251-52.
"Ibid., p. 252.
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established in the Christian life through the sanctifying
activity of the Holy Spirit. In the first case, the
righteousness of imputation, man is entirely a passive
agent, fulfillment of the Law is imputed to the sinner.
God, for the sake Christ, imputes the benefits of Christ's
vicarious satisfaction. In the second case, however, the
Christian man, having received the benefits of Christ, is
now enabled by the Holy Spirit to resolve and to begin
active obedience to God's will, as a consequence of faith.
Melanchthon affirms the monergism of God's activity
in bringing men to faith, but in accordance with Saint Paul
(Romans 5-8) affirms also that once God has acted, man must
respond with a faith active in love (Gal. 5:6). Man makes
this response of loving obedience by the power of the Holy
Spirit. Melanchthon's locus on free will is directed to
the regenerate and predicated on faith in the imputation of
Christ's righteousness and the gift of the Holy Spirit.
Forensic justification is the foundation on which
Melanchthon builds his understanding of the Law's
pedagogical function in the regenerate and of the
regenerate will's function in choosing what God desires and
commands. The imputation of righteousness and the bestowal
of the Holy Spirit renew the hearts of those who believe
and by faith the regenerate are enabled to know and to
choose God's will.

CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSIONS
The repetitious (often verbatim), didactic style
of Melanchthon facilitates summarizing his theology. Two
themes predominate: divine monergism (justification by
grace through faith for the sake of Christ's imputed
righteousness) and Christian piety (new spiritual life
mediated by the Holy Spirit through the Word of God and
impelled by the Spirit through the regenerated heart of
the Christian). These themes reflect what Melanchthon
terms "the two chief parts of Scripture" -- Law and
Gospel. The Gospel is the non-imputation of sin and the
imputation of the righteousness of Christ. The Law is the
immutable will of God, written in the hearts of men,
obscured by sin, and revealed in the Decalogue. The Law
always accuses sin in the sinner. For those righteous by
grace through faith, the Law remains the immutable will of
God to be sought out in loving obedience.
Melanchthon's theological method is synthetic. It
is his purpose to show how the revelation of God in the
Old and New Testament Scriptures join in proclaiming the
beneficia Christi. The key to this synthesis is the propper distinction between Law and Gospel. Gospel focuses in
243
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the righteousness of God. Law focuses in the righteousness of men. Justification is God's act by which he
forgives sin, imputes to the sinner the righteousness of
Christ, and bestows his Holy Spirit. Sanctification is
the resultant co-operation of regenerate man working with
God the Holy Spirit in effecting the revealed will of God.
In order for man to work with God, God must first work
within man. In the act of justification God bestows his
Holy Spirit, who works within human hearts through Word
and sacrament, enabling men to love God, to trust God, and
to obey the will of God. This regenerated heart
(voluntas) is capable of free choice (libero arbitrio).
Apart from God's Spirit, man has no free choice. He can
only sin. Indeed, even with the Spirit of God, the
choices of the regenerate often remain tainted by sin and
it is only by grace (God's gracious favor and acceptance)
that the "works" of the Christian are reputed "good."
For the Christian, then, the Law has two
distinctive functions. The primary office of the Law
(second use) is the accusation of sin. Daily the
Christian must throw himself on the mercy of God,
imploring forgiveness and seeking pardon of all sins for
the sake of Christ. Such repentance characterizes every
aspect of the Christian life, including "good works." The
other office of the Law (third use) is that the Law
instructs the Christian through the Scriptures in God's
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immutable will. Because the Christian, although imputed
righteous, is also a sinner, his knowledge of God's will
remains obscured by sin. Were the Christian to rely only
on his inherent knowledge of God's will, he would choose
not the works that please God, but works of his own
devising. Therefore the Christian remains dependent on
God's revelation of his will throughout the Scriptures and
codified in the Ten Commandments. This Law is taught by
Christ in the gospels and interpreted by the apostles in
the epistles. In this sense the Law is for Melanchthon a
codification of the natural Law which was written into
human hearts at the time of creation.
Ragnar Bring is partly correct when he writes that
Melanchthon identifies the content of the new life in the
Spirit with the fulfillment of the Law.' This is true,
Melanchthon would maintain, of that part of the Law which
relates to "external righteousness" (the second table of
the Law). The real foundation and meaning of the Law is
found, however, in the first table where love of God,
trust in God, true worship, prayer and study of the Word
are required. The fulfillment of the First Commandment is
faith, trust (fiducia) in God's imputed righteousness and
the non-imputation of sin, for the sake of Christ. It is
not adequate to conclude, as Bring does, that Melanchthon
'Ragner Bring, Das Verhaeltnis von Glauben and
Werken in der Lutherischen Theologie (Munich: Chr. Kaiser
Verlag, 1955), 142.
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has a moralistic concept of sin. 2 For Melanchthon, as
for Luther, sin has its basis in unbelief, which is
evidenced in a failure to love God, trust God, and to look
to God alone for peace and reconciliation. Natural man
cannot bring himself to fear, love or trust in God. This
is God's work. Melanchthon thus stresses the sola of
grace and faith, and the total helplessness of man's
condition.
Melanchthon does not distinguish between the names
"original" and "actual" sin. Actual sin has its source in
original sin, and both the origin and the act of sin are
descriptive of the total sinfulness of man. Man's natural
depravity cannot be removed by doing one's best ("facere
quod in se est") because the Law demands perfection, a
perfection no man can give. The only cure for sin is that
God would not impute sin to the sinner and would instead
impute the righteousness of Christ and bestow the gift of
his Holy Spirit. Bring, who describes Luther as holding
to a theocentric view of salvation and Melanchthon as
holding to an anthropocentric view of salvation, fails to
understand Melanchthon precisely at this point. Bring
contends that Luther links the new life of the regenerate
with justification, but that Melanchthon sees this new
life only in the context of fulfilling the Ten
Commandments.' According to Bring, Luther finds a unity
2

lbid., p. 143.

3

Ibid., pp. 59-62.
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in faith and works, but a radical opposition between Law
and Gospel, while Melanchthon blends Law and Gospel
together and separates faith from works.4 Moreover,
Bring continues, Christian liberty is the opposite of a
Law-activated ethics and Melanchthon's emphasis on free
choice belongs with legalistic thinking.s
The study of Melanchthon provided in chapters IV
and V shows this to be a distortion of Melanchthon's
position. Like Luther, Melanchthon is completely
theocentric when it comes to describing the monergism of
divine grace by which the unregenerate are reborn. In the
resultant "new life" Melanchthon has two foci: (1) the
enabling activity of the Holy Spirit through Word and
sacrament and (2) the need for the regenerate will to
utilize the Word to ascertain the will of God and to
utilize the sacrament as an instrument of the Holy
Spirit's enabling power for new life. Seeking God's
revelation of himself in his Word and finding in that same
Word both the promise of reconciliation and instruction in
the abiding will of God, Melanchthon emphasizes the sola
Scriptura principle for Christian renewal. The Christian
who truly fears, loves, and trusts in God is not accused
by the Law. Rather, the Law instructs the Christian in
God's will. On the other hand, when the Christian does
4 lbid.,

pp. 142-43.

s Ibid.,

pp. 156-57.
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not fear, love and trust in God above all else, but gives
into the passions and affections of the flesh, the Law is
not merely instructional, it accuses of sin. The same
Word from God can have different effects for different men
(regenerate and unregenerate) and differing effects within
the same man (when repentant and when unrepentant). This
is not a blending of Law and Gospel nor is it a moralistic
theology. It is a proper distinction of Law and Gospel.
Melanchthon would never affirm that the Law impels
Christian obedience. This is the work of the Holy Spirit;
it is a gift of grace. The Law does not empower
obedience; it accuses and instructs. The Gospel does not
accuse sin or instruct in righteousness; it empowers
obedience through the forgiveness of sin and the bestowal
of the Holy Spirit. Melanchthon does not separate faith
from works. He distinguishes the one (faith) as the
antecedent to the other (works). Works depend on faith.
Men are justified, not by obedience or works, but by faith
alone. Nevertheless, works are necessary for the faithful
because the Spirit of God cannot persist within a heart
that willfully sins against God's Law. In this sense
Melanchthon could affirm that good works are necessary for
salvation. The works of the regenerate have no salvific
merit in themselves. But they are necessary as the
fruits, evidence, and effects of faith.
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ring inquires, "Does the indwelling of Christ
have the same meaning for Melanchthon as it has for
Luther?" He admits that Luther and Melanchthon did not
recognize a difference in their positions.6 The
"indwelling of Christ" motif does not blend easily with
the juridical imagery of forensic justification: the
imputation of Christ's righteousness and the nonimputation of sin. But forensic justification is the
vocabulary of Saint Paul. The "indwelling" imagery of
renewal is prominent in the gospel and epistles of Saint
John. This does not mean that Paul and John (Melanchthon
and Luther) are expressing different theologies of
justification, but that one is speaking of the cause of
justification and the other is emphasizing the effect of
justification. In justification God forgives sins and
imputes the righteousness of Christ. This is
Melanchthon's understanding of forensic justification. In
justifying the sinner, God the Holy Spirit is also
imparted to the regenerate. Melanchthon describes
sanctification as the Holy Spirit's efficacious activity
within the Christian heart through Word and sacrament.
Melanchthon, then, speaks not of the indwelling of Christ,
but of the indwelling of the Spirit of God. The
righteousness of Christ is imputed. The Spirit of God is
6 lbid.,

pp. 56-58.
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imparted. In this sense, Melanchthon clearly differs from
the early Luther who held to an "effective" rather than a
"forensic" view of justification. Those who typify
Luther's theology as the "Christ in us" are describing the
young Luther still influenced by John Tauler, the
Theologia Deutsch,' and the Augustinian (Thomistic) view
of justification.
Using Thomas Aquinas as typical of the scholastic
view of justification (for reasons given in the introduction) it is clear that Melanchthon's desire to be faithful
to Saint Paul made it impossible for him to utilize the
'The impact of John Tauler on Luther is well
documented in the studies of Steven Ozment. Steven
Ozment, Homo Spiritualis: A Comparison Study of the
Anthropology of Johannes Tauler, Jean Gerson and Martin
Luther (1509-1516) in the Context of their Spiritual
Thought (Leiden: n.p., 1969). Steven Ozment, The
Reformation in Medieval Perspective (Chicago: Quadrangle
Books, 1971). George Williams provides thorough
documentation both chronologically and theologically of
Luther's use of Tauler's sermons in his Romans lectures
and of his high opinion of them. Between 1515 and 1544
Luther makes twenty-four references to John Tauler as a
good German theologian. Ozment, The Reformation in
Medieval Perspective, p. 227. Luther mistakenly believes
Tauler to be the author of the Theologia Deutsch, which he
prized as a demonstration that his teaching was not new
and that good theology could be written in the German
language. In his opinion, the Theologia Deutsch was
evidence that "German theologians are without a doubt the
best theologians." Martin Luther, "Preface to the
Complete Edition of A German Theology," in Luther's Works,
55 vols., gen. eds. Helmut Lehmann and Jaroslav Pelikan
(Philadelphia: Fortress Press/St. Louis: Concordia
Publishing House, 1955-present), 31:76. Hereafter this
work will be cited as AE. Luther edited the Theologia
Deutsch and it was his first published work. In an age of
cultic formalism and philosophic theology, Tauler rejected
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Augustinian, "effective" vocabulary of justification inherited from the middle ages and mediated in the sixteenth
century through the interpreters of Thomas Aquinas
(especially Cajetan).
Melanchthon and Thomas clearly differ in their
formulations regarding the function of the Law, the
relationship of Law and Gospel, imputation and renewal in
justification, the relationship of justification and
sanctification, the definition and function of faith, the
relationship of faith and love, the nature of grace, and
the place of sin and grace in the life of the Christian.
For Melanchthon, Law and Gospel are antithetical. Thomas
identifies the Gospel with the new law of Christ. For
Melanchthon, sin is forgiven. In Thomas, sin is removed.
Melanchthon distinguishes between justification as the
imputation of righteousness and sanctification as
renewal. Thomas includes forgiveness and renewal in the
transformation of the Christian. For Melanchthon, man is
justified by faith alone. For Thomas, man is justified by
the externals of religion and appealed to the inwardness
of the Christian soul reposing in the Spirit of God. In
conseqence, although Tauler respected reason, he was not
uncritical of its effects. Although Tauler encourages
Christians to be faithful in worship, he recognized the
uselessness of an ex opere operato performance of
externals. Tauler distinguished between the inward man of
faith who is formed in the image of God and who shares in
all the riches of God through grace and the outward man
who is turned in on himself and overwhelmed by the pain
and problems of life. A mystic, Tauler emphasized the
indwelling of Christ.
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faith informed by love, including the movement of the free
will and the assent of the intellect. For Melanchthon,
justification is the forgiveness of sins and the
imputation of the righteousness of Christ. For Thomas
justification is also the forgiveness of sins but not in a
primary sense; justification is rather the acquisition of
righteousness -- transformation and renewal. For
Melanchthon, faith is a confident trust (fiducia) in the
imputed righteousness of Christ and the forgiveness of
sins. For Thomas, faith is an intellectual assent that
unites man with God as first truth; faith is knowledge.
For Melanchthon, justification is the continuing
imputation of the righteousness of Christ to men who
continue to resist God and his will, who continue to
violate his Law. For Thomas, justification is the result
of God enforcing his intentions against the resistance of
man, who is ultimately powerless.
Melanchthon describes the Christian as both
justified and a sinner. For Thomas, the Christian is
healed through the infusion of habitual grace so that the
love of God, formerly impossible, is now possible.
Righteousness and sin are mutually exclusive and do not
exist in the same individual. For Melanchthon, the
Christian's good works are good only in so far as they are
done in faith and accepted by God in mercy. For Thomas,
good works have a merit in themselves. For Melanchthon,
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justification is a function of the Gospel over against the
continuing accusation of the Law. For Thomas, justification serves to fulfill the Law. For Melanchthon,
theology begins with man's need to be reconciled to God.
For Thomas, theology is a science, the imprint of God's
own knowledge. Thomas experiences no turmoil about his
relationship with God.
Ultimately for Thomas, justification is the
acquisition of justice. For Melanchthon, justification is
the imputation of righteousness. It is in the context of
this difference that one must understand Melanchthon's
rejection of "effective" justification and the
formulations of scholastic theologians describing
justification as an "infusion of grace" and as a
qualitative transformation of the regenerate. That Thomas
is in the Augustinian tradition and part of the catholic
tradition of western theology cannot be doubted. That
this tradition adequately represents the dynamics of New
Testament theology and in particular Saint Paul's theology
of justification must be denied. For this, one must turn
to the carefully exegized theology of Melanchthon in his
Romans Commentary and the epitomizing of that theology in
the Loci. Melanchthon's forensic vocabulary of
justification is a repudiation of Rome and of the
Augustinian tradition on the basis of Saint Paul. For
Luther the vocabulary of forensic justification and the
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distancing of evangelical theology from the Augustinian
tradition came more slowly.
Some would deny that Luther ever utilized the
forensic vocabulary of justification found in
Melanchthon. Karl Holl is most often cited in defense of
an understanding of Luther's theology of justification
which affirms that for both the early and mature Luther,
justification means to make unrighteous men righteous
(effective justification).
In justification, Luther regards it as essential that
the one with whom God -- out of free grace -- has
entered into relationship will also actually become
righteous in this relationship; otherwise God's
judgment of justification would amount to a lie. To be
sure, it is not a case of forming a good intention to
'mend one's ways' after one has been justified; rather,
God himself transforms the person within the new
relationship.8
In this citation Holl has expressed the concern which is
essential to the effective justification -- forensic
justification debate.

If God declares that an unrighteous

man is a righteous man and there is in actuality no
difference in the man, those holding an effective view
conclude that forensic justification is a legal fiction and
God is misrepresenting reality or is altogether
capricious. Holl's solution is one that affirms that there
is indeed a difference in man made by justification. Man
Karl Holl, What Did Luther Understand by
Religion? ed. James Luther Adams and Walter F. Bense,
trans. Fred W. Meuser and Walter R. Wietzke (Philadelphia:
Fortress Press, 1977), p. 117.
8
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is "transformed" within the new relationship of grace.
Holl is in fact holding to the western, catholic tradition
of Augustine.
Erich Seeberg in his Luthers Theologie in Ihren
Grundzuegen holds a similar position. Justification, as
the declaration and act of God, is the means by which God
makes sinful man pure and righteous, and one may even say,
pious. The "religious man" does not make himself what he
is. Through the declaration of God, a new man is made.9
Justification is not a one time act but a process of
renewal.1° Through faith one receives the righteousness
of Christ who is indeed the sinner's righteousness. Faith
makes this "alien righteousness" of Christ one's own
righteousness so that the one who believes in Christ
becomes one with him. Faith thus makes the Christian
actually righteous so that the Christian has in reality a
new righteousness." Similarly, Julius Koestlin
describes Luther's theology in terms of "inward
transformation," "a making righteous," and a "process of
becoming righteous."12
9 D. Erich Seeberg, Luthers Theologie in Ihren
Grundzuegen, (Stuttgart, W. Kohlhammer Verlag, 1950), p.
117.

"Ibid., p. 121.
"Ibid., p. 123.
12 Julius Koestlin, The Theology of Luther, 2
vols., trans. Charles E. Hay (Philadelphia: Lutheran
Publication Society, 1897), 2: 439.
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There is general agreement that such a description
of justification is appropriate to the theology of the
young Luther, who often expresses his theology of justification in the Augustinian sense of iustum facere, to make
righteous. Regin Prenter and Uuras Saarnivaara, each of
whom stresses the forensic nature of justification in the
mature theology of Luther, also recognize that the younger
Luther speaks in this effective way." Ewald Plass notes
the difference in definitions of justification given by
Luther.
At first the term "to justify" (iustificare) appears in
Luther's writings in a broader sense than the Pauline
sense of simply pronouncing righteous. It includes the
making personally righteous. This is the Augustinian
(and essentially Catholic) view of justification. If
Luther, even after he had come to recognize the sola
fide, for a while occasionally uses the term in such a
sense, this is not surprising. He then speaks of
justification as a growth. But later the use of the
term disappears and he tells us that the justification
takes place, "at once, and does not come piecemeal."
Scholarly criticism of Holl and others relates to their
contention that Luther continued to maintain this
Augustinian position throughout his life. Such an
opinion, it is affirmed, is a distortion of Luther's
theology. Saarnivaara describes Holl as maintaining that,
"Uuras Saarnivaara, Luther Discovers the Gospel
(St. Louis: Concordia Publishing House, 1951), pp. 9-18.
Also: Regin Prenter, Spiritus Creator, trans. John M.
Jensen (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1953), p. 70.
"Ewald M. Plaas, What Luther Says, 3 vols. (St.
Louis: Concordis Publishing House, 1959), 2: 701.
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Justification means renewal and only after God has
renewed man and made him righteous, he declares him
righteous. The actual basis of the divine judgment
which justifies is not the merit of Christ, but the
renewal of man. . . . As we shall see, Holl is in the
main right if we consider Luther's early teaching on
justification. But he is wrong with regard to his
final teaching. Holl's mistake was that he interpreted Luther in light of his early or pre-Reformation
statements regarding justification."
Prenter writes in similar vein in the classic, Spiritus
Creator.
It is impossible to agree with Karl Holl and R. Seeberg
in speaking of a gradual real Gerechtmachung (process
of justification) as a content of Luther's doctrine of
justification. The source of Holl's and Seeberg's
presentation, as we shall see later, is the pietistic
attitude which the positive theology of the nineteenth
and twentieth centuries inherited partly from
Schleiermacher and partly from the revivalistic pietism
of the nineteenth century. 1 6
Holl for his part maintains that the union of
Christ with the believer is a union not only with the
crucified Christ but the resurrected Christ, and that
Luther is affirming the Pauline doctrine that one is
buried with Christ and raised with Christ to newness of
life. "Luther recovered the meaning of the Pauline unity
of the death and resurrection of Christ; but his recovery
was slow to bear fruit within Lutheranism.""
Melanchthon was unable to appreciate this insight and
through his emphasis on justification as a forensic
"Saarnavaara, pp. 13-14, footnote 38.
"Prenter, p. 69.
17

Holl, p. 117.
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declaration, Luther's peculiar insight was lost to later
Lutheran orthodoxy as well."
Michael Rogness concurs with Holl's judgment that
Melanchthon's description became normative for Lutheran
Confessional theology. Noting Melanchthon's emphasis on
"forensic justification," Rogness concludes that
Melanchthon did "determine the course of the doctrine [of
justification] among succeeding Lutheran theologians."
This emphasis gave,
his doctrine a distinctive flavor compared with Luther.
By basing justification on a pronouncement from God
about something outside of us, imputed to us, the whole
process acquired a somewhat abstract coloring. In
removing justification from any quality or work in us,
it tended to become something apart from us
altogether. This was certainly not the case with
Luther. Justification for him was very concrete, a
uniting of ourselves with Christ. Luther, of course,
agreed in substance with the imputatio of Christ's
righteousness, since it was really his righteousness
which God counted as ours, but he never really uses the
word much himself."
To be sure, Rogness is correct in ascribing to Melanchthon
a continuing emphasis on justification as a forensic
activity of God. However, his description of forensic
justification as "somewhat abstract," fails to give
adequate attention to Melanchthon's emphasis that in
justification the Holy Spirit is bestowed to the
regenerate and that the Holy Spirit begins new spiritual
"Ibid.
"Michael Rogness, Reformer Without Honor:
Philip Melanchthon (Minneapolis: Augsburg Publishing
House, 1969), pp. 112-113.
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impulses in the justified. His analysis of Luther, that
Luther "never really much used the word [imputatio]
himself" is not born out in even a cursory reading of the
Galatians Commentary or the Disputation on Justification.
Here Luther repeatedly uses the verb "imputare" with
reference to the non-imputation of sin and the imputation
of the righteousness of Christ.
Bengt Haegglund concurs that it was Melanchthon
who gave "precise formulation to the Reformation position,
but in so doing he altered to some extent the basic ideas
which we find in Luther. n20

Haegglund's point is that

Melanchthon carefully distinguished between imputation of
righteousness and regeneration. Haegglund describes
Luther, on the other hand, as affirming that,
a man participates in the Spirit from the time he
appropriates the merits of Christ to himself by faith.
Faith signifies participation in Christ. Regeneration
results, simultaneously, from imputation. For the
latter (imputation) is not simply a legalistic act of
judgment but also God's life giving Word which raises
man up and gives him the new birth.2I
Haegglund'a distinction between Luther and Melanchthon is
unclear. Melanchthon also asserts that man participates
in the Holy Spirit from the time of his justification.
Nor is imputation for Melanchthon "simply a legalistic act
of judgment." Melanchthon could easily affirm the
20 Bengt Haegglund, History of Theology, trans.
Gene J. Lund (St. Louis: Concordia Publishing House,
1968), p. 251.

2IIbid.
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description of justification Haegglund here posits of
Luther, except that Melanchthon would not describe faith
as a "participation in Christ," but as a confident trust
in the vicarious satisfaction of Christ. Haegglund admits
that in Melanchthon's dispute with Osiander, "It then
appeared as though Melanchthon's presentation of justification was a veritable defense of the essential reformation position," but he adds, "at the same time .

.

.

something of the richness of Luther's point of view had
been lost."22
It is a consistent opinion of those who describe
Luther as maintaining an effective understanding of
justification that his insight has been distorted or lost
by the "forensic view" of justification held by
Melanchthon and later Lutheran Confessional theology. The
concern is that a purely forensic description of
justification perpetuates a legal fiction with no basis in
reality. This is, of course, the criticism the Roman
Catholic tradition has always leveled at Lutheran
theology. But the real problem is that it misrepresents
what is meant by forensic justification in the theology of
Melanchthon and in the theology of the Formula of
Concord. Arthur Carl Piepkorn provides a helpful
summation of what Lutherans understsnd by forensic
22Ibid.
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justification. Forensic terminology is not original with
Lutheran theology, but is based on the scriptural witness
of Saint Paul.
The appeal to or the rejection of "purely forensic"
terminology in the doctrine of justification must be
made carefully. On the one hand, the biblical language
of Law and accusation and wrath and judgment seems to
make the use of juridical terminology unavoidable. On
the other hand, the mere continued use of forensic
vocabulary will not guarantee that one is reproducing
the substance of the New Testament teaching on
justification. For one could, purely forensically,
speak of God as simply declaring a sinner to be
innocent and in that process "bury Christ" completely
and do away with the whole teaching of faith, as the
Apology puts it.
Forensic justification does not exonerate man as
sinner. God executes a just sentence, the sentence of
guilty and deserving of death. . . . If the sinner
gets justified, that means that he has that sentence
executed. If the sinner nevertheless lives, then that
does not mean a simple exoneration or even an instance
of justice tempered by mercy. Rather, it produces the
happy surprise reflected in St. Paul's exclamation,
"Dying, and behold we live!"23
The wrath of God against sin has had its way. Jesus
Christ died for sinners. "The death sentence on the
guilty sinner has been executed on the righteous Son. u24
The non-imputation of sin and the imputation of the
righteousness of Christ are essential if God is to pronounce the repentant sinner righteous. In order that
God's "forensic declaration" is not merely an exoneration
of the sinner's guilt, it is necessary that the penalty of
23Arthur Carl Piepkorn, Profiles in Belief, 3
vols. (San Francisco: Harper and Row, 1978), 2: p. 62.

24Ibid.
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sin has been paid. In order that the righteousness of God
is not merely a legal fiction, it is necessary that the
righteousness of another ("alien righteousness") be
imputed to the sinner. The believer has died to sin and
come alive through Christ. This is precisely
Melanchthon's theology of forensic justification.
Does Luther then hold an understanding of
justification that differs from Melanchthon's? Gerhard
Ebeling provides a key to understanding Luther's theology
of forensic justification in his recognition that, for
Luther, grace does not alter man, but man's
situation.2s Thomas McDonough, a Dominican priest,
makes a valient effort to understand how the imputation of
the righteousness of Christ changes man's situation
although leaving man himself unchanged, and concludes that
"the believer's righteousness or justice is not intrinsic
or ontological, but merely imputed or alien. . . . God no
longer looks upon the believer's sins as meriting
damnation; they are cloaked over by the infinite merits of
Christ."26 McDonough is half right. The believer's
righteousness is not intrinsic or ontological, as it is in
Thomas Aquinas. It is imputed. It is the righteousness
2s Gerhard Ebeling, Luther, trans. R. A. Wilson
(Philadelphia: Fortress Press), p. 156.

"Thomas M. McDonough, 0.P., The Law and Gospel
in Luther (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1963), p. 53.
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of another. But God does not cease to look upon the
believer's sins as meriting damnation. Sin damns. But
when God looks at the believer's sin, he sees that the
curse of sin has already been paid through the vicarious
atonement of Christ. McDonough's conclusion recognizes
this. Christ constitutes the totality of the Christian's
goodness, even after justification.27
Regin Prenter analyses Luther in similar fashion.
Whether the struggle against sin takes place in us or
not, is not determined by our own real qualification in
general but our situation: whether we are under grace
and therefore possess as the gift of God that faith in
Christ Jesus which can struggle against sin, which
under grace is regarded to be sin that is not imputed
and not mastering, or whether we find ourselves under
wrath and thereby the power of the Law in the
conscience is robbed of every iota of real
righteousness."
Prenter's point is that it is not the regenerate piety of
the transformed Christian which struggles against sin and
gradually overcomes it; it is rather the "alien
righteousness" of Christ which is a gift of God mediated
through faith in Christ, which struggles against sin.29
This alien righteousness is not merely a legal
proclamation, it is the living Christ himself. "He it is
"Ibid., pp. 53-56.
"Prenter, p. 73.
"Ibid., pp. 71-72.
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who in a living and struggling presence overcomes sin. It
is not something his presence has made to grow in us.“30
Saarnivaara maintains that it was through this
forensic understanding of justification that Luther made
his break with Augustinian-catholic tradition and returned
to the theology of Saint Paul. In this Luther recognized
that "justification is not a gradual process but an
instantaneous act of God whereby He pronounces the sinner
free from his guilt."" The consequence is that the
sinner is completely righteous, guiltless and blameless in
the sight of God, claiming as his own the righteousness of
Christ. Saarnivaara's analysis is helpful in understanding Luther, although as McDonough emphasizes, Luther
is not providing a systematic schema but a biblical
theology confirmed in the Christian's experience as sinner.
Melanchthon's theology is more simple because it
is less existential. Melanchthon simply wants to
reproduce the theology of Saint Paul by definition and
epitomization so that the teaching of the church may be
true to the Scriptures and the piety of the people might
not be confused by philosophy or undermined by erring
tradition. It has been noted (chapter III) that Luther's
description of justification in forensic terms is
3° Ibid.,

pp. 73-74.

31 Saarnivaara,

p. 10.
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paralleled by the antinomianism of Agricola and the need
to define the roles of Law and Gospel in conversion and
regeneration. It is also the case that the forensic
vocabulary of justification becomes classically Lutheran
at this time through the publication of the Augsburg
Confession

and its Apology. A third factor in Luther's

development in affirming the forensic nature of
justification might well have been Melanchthon's
publication of the Romans Commentary in 1532. This
careful exposition of Romans provided the exegetical basis
for the Lutheran understanding of justification as
confessed at Augsburg. In the Smalcald Articles Luther
draws upon this understanding of Romans (Part II, Article
I. Christ and Faith).32 Certainly Melanchthon's Romans
Commentary received his highest praise.33
Thus the evidence in the later writings of Luther
(as seen in chapter III of this study) does allow one to
affirm that the mature Luther did hold to a forensic view
of justification. Melanchthon's theology, rather than a
distortion of Luther, may have provided some of the
stimuli for that mature position. This is not to imply
that Luther was indifferent about the "making righteous"
of the Christian, but that this "outward righteousness"
32

SA, II, I, 1-5.

33Martin Luther, D. Martin Luthers Werke, 94
vols. (Weimar: Herman Boehlaus Nachfolger, 1883-present),
Tr., I: 130. Also Tr., II: 235.
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is properly descriptive not of justification, but of
sanctification. Haegglund offers a helpful analysis of
what the imputation of righteousness meant to Luther.
But this so-called imputation concept must not be
interpreted to mean that it refers only to an external
form of judgment. For it was precisely in this context . . . that Luther spoke of an "inner righteousness." The verdict which exonerates, which makes a man
just, is God's own living and creative Word, which
gives the new life and changes man entirely. Therefore
there is no contridiction (as some have wanted to maintain) between the concept of imputation as the basis of
justification and the idea of faith as a living,
active, power.34
Justification and sanctification must be distinguished,
but never separated. "True faith is not idle. We can,
therefore, ascertain and recognize those who have true
faith from the effect or from what follows."35
Regin Prenter is correct when he describes
sanctification for Luther as the condition of the
Christian between baptism and resurrection, taking refuge
in Christ's alien righteousness.36 Hans Iwand,37 Jan
Siggins,38 Lennart Pinomaa,39 Philip Watson," and
34 Haegglund,
36 Prenter,

p. 228.

35 AE, 34:183.

pp. 75-76.

37Hans Joachim Iwand, Rechtfertigungslehrer and
Christusglaube (Mucich: Kaiser Verlag, 1961), p. 56.
38 Jan D. Kingston Siggins, Martin Luther's
Doctrine of Christ (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1970),
p. 157.
39 Lennart Pinomaa, Faith Victorious, trans. Walter
J. Kukkonen (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1963), p. 64.
4°P. S. Watson, "Luther and Sanctification,"
Concordia Theological Monthly, 30 (1965): 255.
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William Landeen41 all describe Luther's mature doctrine
of justification as the non-imputation of sin and the
imputation of the righteousness of Christ. Neither Luther
nor Melanchthon would separate the imputation of
righteousness from the effects of renewal. The separation
of forensic justification from effective renewal is a
distortion of Lutheran theology. Edmund Schlink writes,
"If the sinner is declared righteous by God, he is no
longer regarded as righteous; he is righteous."42

In an

accompanying footnote Schlink notes,
As a matter of fact, it must be said plainly as
possible: to be declared righteous is the same as to be
made righteous and vice versa. "Justum effici,"
"regenerari," "vivificari" are other terms for "justum
reputari," "remissionem accipere," "Deo acceptum esse,"
but one and the same event takes place.43
Affirmation of a forensic view of justification need not
imply an abstract meaning for justification. John
Loeschen captures the dialectic of Luther's understanding
of justification as both imputation and regeneration in
his threefold analysis of the simul Justus et peccator.
From one perspective Luther can say that the Christian
is at the same time (simul) wholly (totus) sinner and
wholly just. From another perspective he can say the
41 William Landeen, Martin Luther's Religious
Thought (Mountain View: CA: Pacific Press Publishing
Assoc., 1971), p. 153.
42 Edmund Schlink, Theology of the Lutheran
Confessions, trans. Paul F. Koehneke and Herbert J. A.
Bouman, (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1961) p. 94.
43

Ibid., p. 94, footnote 13.
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Christian is at the same time (simul) partly (partim)
sinner and partly just. Only by combining the two
perspectives do we arrive at the complete formulation
of his teaching: the Christian is at the same time
(simul) wholly and partly sinner and justified. Three
senses of simul.44
What Luther expresses with his simul dichotomy,
Melanchthon expresses with his emphasis on forensic
justification, regenerate free will, and the third use of
the Law. The Christian is righteous by the imputation of
the righteousness of Christ and the non-imputation of sin
(totus iustus). With the bestowal of the Holy Spirit in
the moment of justification, the Christian heart is renewed so that it begins to see the will of God revealed in
his Law, although feebly and with recurrent sin (partim
iustus, partim pecoator). So for Melanchthon too, the
Christian is one who is perfectly righteous having the
righteousness of Christ in justification, and imperfectly
righteous in the beginnings of new life in the Spirit of
God.
The difference between Luther and Melanchthon,
then, is not one of effective verses forensic
justification. If forensic justification is understood as
the imputation of the righteousness of Christ and the
non-imputation of sin, then both Luther and Melanchthon
clearly taught the doctrine of forensic justification.
Neither did Luther or Melanchthon deny that the effects of
44 John R. Loeschen, Wrestling with Luther (St.
Louis: Concordia Publishing House, 1976), p. 75.
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justification must result in a life of renewal and
sanctification. Nor did Luther or Melanchthon find the
impetus for this new life in "the new Law of the Gospel"
(Aquinas). For Luther, the power of Christian renewal was
often expressed as the indwelling of the Spirit of
Christ. For Melanchthon, the power of Christian renewal
was found in the imparting of the Holy Spirit. What then
is the difference? For Luther the indwelling of the
Spirit of Christ accents the incarnate Word, the
Christian's participation in Christ. For Melanchthon, the
bestowal of the Holy Spirit emphasizes the means the
Spirit uses to empower new life -- the written Word of the
Scriptures and the promise of Christ in the sacraments.
One notes with interest that in the Smalcald Articles,
when Luther accents forensic justification, he also
specifies the means by which God communicates his grace.
First, through the spoken word, by which the forgiveness of sin (the peculiar function of the Gospel) is
preached to the whole world; second, through Baptism;
third, through the holy Sacrament of the Altar; fourth,
through the power of the keys; and finally, through the
mutual conversation and consolation of brethren."
The difference between Luther and Melanchthon is that
Melanchthon emphasized the Word, not as preached, but as
written. A small difference, perhaps, but a difference
reflective of the men: Luther, the pastor, preacher of the
Word; Melanchthon, the teacher, pedagogue of doctrine.
45

SA, III, IV.
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One may say then, in this sense, that Melanchthon was more
bound to the written Word as the instrument of the Spirit
than was Luther, who rejoiced that the Word might come
alive through preaching and the "mutual conversation and
consolation of brethren." For Luther, the dynamics of the
Word were fulfilled in the proclamation of the gospel.
For Melanchthon, the power of the Word was to be found in
its revelation of Law and Gospel so that men might be
schooled in pure doctrine and true piety. It is not
surprising, then, that Melanchthon emphasized the
continuing necessity of the written Word as the revelation
of God's will for Christians seeking to do those works
that please God.
Melanchthon's understanding of libero arbitrio
(free choice) cannot be correctly understood unless one
carefully notes his distinction between the forensic
nature of justification and the effective nature of
sanctification. In justification man is entirely
passive. In sanctification man must be actively seeking
the will of God. For the regenerate Christian, good works
are necessary for salvation. Thus the third use of the
Law and the regenerate free will play prominent roles in
Melanchthon's description of Christian renewal. Without
the Holy Spirit, there could be no new obedience. Without
free will in the Christian there could be no free choice
and Christian responsibility. Without free choice, the

271
only function of the Law would be to accuse and condemn
sin, also in the regenerate. But because the Holy Spirit
has regenerated man's heart and his ability to choose
God's will, the Christian can seek in the Law that which
pleases God and is efficacious for Christian renewal.
With that freedom to choose also comes responsibility.
The Christian who uses his free choice to choose against
God's revealed Law will suffer the same fate as did Saul.
Therefore the Christian must "apply himself unto grace;"
that is, hearing God's promise of grace, he is to cling to
it and to abandon all sins against God's Law and his
Christian conscience.
The human being is never merely a block of wood or
a piece of stone or a statue in relation to God. Unregenerate man is totally and completely opposed to God in
everything and is incapable of moving toward God. His
sinful affections overwhelm him and he cannot conquer
them. Regenerate man, on the other hand, has free will to
choose to hear God's Word, to hear God's address of Law
and Gospel, and through repentance, the Christian is able
to seek the forgiveness of sin and the beneficia Christi.
The Christian can and must choose to obey the Law of God
in a life of "spiritual righteousness," giving to God the
obedience he requires. The will of the non-Christian is
captive. He cannot aspire to "spiritual righteousness"
because natural man cannot overcome his spiritual
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privation, the affections of sin. Those who have
"spiritual righteousness" are those who are illuminated to
spiritual impulses by the Holy Spirit and who fear,
believe, and trust God. Human will in the regenerate is
not always able to bring about the spiritual effects God
demands. Sometimes Christians are unrepentant. They
choose works of their own devising. But God is not to be
sought apart from his Word. Therefore, there are always
three causes of bonae actionis in the regenerate: the Word
of God, the Holy Spirit, and the human will, "assenting to
and not resisting the Word of God."46
When Luther wrote his De Servo Arbitrio, it was in
the context of the conversion of the unregenerate. Can
the will of natural man contribute anything to the restorration of the relationship between God and man? Luther's
unequivocal reply was "no." In Melanchthon's discussion
of libero arbitrio the context is not that of initial
conversion (conversio prima) as was Luther's but the
continuing conversion (conversio secunda, conversio
continuata) endemic to the Christian life." One who
does not distinguish the difference in context and
opponent in these writings is likely to misinterpret
"Robert Stupperich, ed., Melanchthons Werke in
Auswahl (Studienausgabe), 7 vols. (Guetersloh: Mohn and
Co., 1953-present) 2, pt. I, p. 243. Hereafter this work
will be cited as St.A.
"Ibid., pp. 243-244.
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Melanchthon as a synergist. Only the Christian may freely
choose to obey the Law in love and thus live a life
pleasing to God and in conformity with the Law. But the
obedience of the regenerate is always imperfect and it is
not because of his obedience that he is termed
"spiritually righteous" but because he has received by
faith the beneficia Christi, the forgiveness of sin and
the righteousness of Christ.
God alone converts man and only by grace, through
faith, alone, is man's initial indifference to God
replaced by fiducia and repentance, so that "one hears the
promise and is able to assent and to give up sins against
the conscience." The Christian life then centers in the
renewing act of God, the continuing ministry of the Holy
Spirit though Word and sacrament. As a Christian,
regenerate man has the necessity to choose to do the will
of God or to reject God's will. This is why Melanchthon
affirms there are three causes of "good works": the Word,
the Spirit, and the regenerate will.
If we speak of the total life of the pious, even if the
weakness is great, nevertheless, there is still free
will when, indeed, already in the Spirit, one is able
to help and to do something in the external guarding
from falling. 48
In speaking of free will to choose or reject the Law and
the promises, Melanchthon is speaking of the "life of the
pious."
48Ibid.

274
Melanchthon counters the arguments of the
enthusiasts and of the Manicheans who suppose that men do
not have free will. The enthusiasts err because they do
not recognize that God is not to be sought apart from his
Word. The Manicheans err because they deny the Christian
man's ability to choose and make him merely a pawn for the
forces of good and evil, powerless to seek the good or to
repress the evil. In this Melanchthon is anticipating
some of the concerns of the writers of the Formula of
Concord.49 While the unregenerate may have some freedom
to choose to do the external works of the Law, only the
Christian can truly love and trust God, which is the true,
internal fulfillment of the Law. Melanchthon often quotes
the words of Christ, "He gives the Holy Spirit to those
who ask" (Luke 11:13). The Christian is constantly to
petition God for the power of the Spirit who alone enables
man to will and to do God's will.
Melanchthon's emphasis in the Loci on libero
arbitrio does not concern how man comes to faith, but how
man lives in the faith. His concern is that the sola fide
may be misunderstood in an epicurean fashion; that is,
that a man may feel that it does not matter how one lives,
but only that one believes. Melanchthon reflects the
epistles of Paul and the epistle of James in affirming
49

FC, SD, II, 74 and 80.
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that one shows what one believes by how one lives. If a
Christian does not push away spiritual indifference and
other vices of the flesh, he cannot trust solely in God.
One's faith must have an impact on one's life so that the
believer is able to live with afflictions and troubles,
even the pain of death, in conformity with God's good
will. If the Christian gives in to affliction and trouble
and fears death, then his will is not in conformity with
God's will and the impediments of life have separated the
believer from God. Even after regeneration man's nature
remains corrupted, and the devil's horrible hatred of
Christ implicates the Christian in many sins. The
troubles and afflictions of this life bring uncertainty,
darkness and perversity, but against these impediments the
Christian will is helped and strengthened by the Holy
Spirit and the regenerste will becomes a circumspect and
constant agent against these impediments as it calls
ardently upon God.
Because of Melanchthon's emphasis on the
functional aspect of the regenerate will his locus de
libero arbitrio continually speaks of the function of the
Law as it impinges in the life of the regenerate. For
natural man, the Law is a curse. For spiritual men who
have received the promise, the beneficia Christi, the Law
is the will of God to be sought out and performed in
love. Even for the Christian, however, Melanchthon is
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quick to affirm that righteousness rests not in the
fulfillment of the Law, but in the benefits of Christ. In
this position Melanchthon expressed precisely the doctrine
of the Formula of Concord regarding the third use of the
Law." The bestowal of the Holy Spirit impels those
forgiven and imputed righteous for Christ's sake to seek
out the will of God in his Word and to live according to
the Law of God in love. When the spiritual man fails to
live according to God's Law, the Law accuses him and
declares its wrath to him (second use). It is for this
reason that Melanchthon reiterates that "the Law is
impossible," for it is God's judgment on both outward sin
(failure to love the neighbor) and internal sin (a lack of
faith and trust in God). At the same time, Melanchthon
constantly repeats that the Christian is not a man of the
Law but of the promise. The benefits of Christ, which the
Law is not able to take away, remain with the regenerate.
This is why Christ is the mediator, because, for his sake,
sinful man is declared righteous. By the Law is no one
made righteous, for the purpose of the Law is to show sin.
Therefore God gives to us the Holy Spirit, so that in
our infirmities, nonetheless, the obedience of the Law
is begun and makes us somewhat wholesome, and the
teaching of the devil is suppressed."
50

51

FC. SD. VI.
St.A., 2, pt. I, pp. 250-51.
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In carrying through his dual emphasis on what
Christ has done for man (forensic justification) and that
man by the power of the Spirit must do (through libero
arbitrio and tertio usus legis), Melanchthon speaks of the
grace received by the Christian from two perspectives.
First he speaks of imputed grace: grace received for the
sake of Christ by which a man is declared just. Being
justified, it is certain that a man pleases God just as if
he had done the whole Law. Secondly, Melanchthon speaks
of grace as the continuing activity of the Holy Spirit
through Word and sacrament. It is this grace which
sustains the Christian life.
Minds are incited to the true light and preserved in
the Word of God. The movements of faith in the heart
are excited; minds are moved so that they undertake
what is beneficial for us and for others. . . .
Always, therefore, we pray that we might do what
pleases God and is useful for us and for the church.
And neither way is one able to do anything unless God
helps and guides us. sz
This remains the primary focus of Melanchthon's
later loci on libero artitrio and the third use of the
Law, the need for the forgiven sinner, having received the
benefits of Christ and the gift of the Holy Spirit, to
discipline his life according to the Law of God. This he
cannot do on his own, for he is afflicted with the
affections of sin. Only a new heart, made alive through
the Word of promise by the Spirit of God, can bring about
"Ibid., pp. 251-52.
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renewal and the capacity for true piety and obedience.
The freedom of the regenerate will and the third use of
the Law complete each other in the psychology of Christian
obedience. Christian renewal expressed in loving
obedience is the fruit and effect of the imputed
righteousness of Christ and the imparting of God the Holy
Spirit.
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